

Palestinian Authority

Ex-Post Evaluation of Technical Cooperation Project  
“Improvement in Local Governance System”

External Evaluator: Juichi Inada, Senshu University

## 0. Summary

The Project’s objective was to improve the foundation of local governance system by clarifying the major issues of local finance and joint councils, formulating their policy and strategy for improvement, and strengthening the capacity of stakeholders in local governments.

The Palestine Authority regards the strengthening of institutional foundation as its most important policy, among which local finance and joint councils are prioritized. The Community Empowerment Component (CEC) was added and started one and a half years after the beginning of the project, targeted at the Jordan River Rift Valley (JRRV) that was the least developed area in the West Bank region. Therefore, this project coincides with government policies and development needs. The project also coincides with the Japanese government policy of strengthening its assistance to Palestine. However, at the time of the start of the project, a quite broad area of local governance had become the target of assistance, the logical relationship between outputs / project purposes and the overall goal was unclear, and thus there was a problem in a part of its approach. Thus, the project coincides with the development plan and development needs of Palestine and Japan’s ODA policy, but there was a problem in its approach. Therefore, its relevance is fair.

As to the effectiveness of the project, the Local Finance Policy (LFP) and Joint Council (JC) Strategy<sup>1</sup> were approved by the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG), and JCs were strengthened to some extent through the CEC. However, the training system initiated by the MoLG was not established; therefore, its effects have been limited. Although the improvement of the lives of local people in the JRRV area was the positive impact of this project, improvements in the services provided by LGUs (Local Government Units) and the financial decentralization to LGUs are still on the way. Thus, the project’s effectiveness and impact are fair.

Both the project cost and the project period far exceeded the planned cost and period. Thus, its efficiency is low.


As to the sustainability of the project, necessary policies for sustaining the effects of the project continue, but there are some problems in terms of organizational and technical aspects, and a serious problem in the financial aspect. Thus, sustainability of the project is low.

In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be unsatisfactory.

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<sup>1</sup> The LFP is a policy paper which summarized the measures for improving the financial situations of LGUs. JC Strategy is a policy paper which summarized the measures for making local governance more effective by gathering small scale LGUs and formulating JCs.

## 1. Project Description



Project Locations<sup>2</sup>



Mid-west JC Service Center

### 1.1 Background

The Palestine government has promoted the improvement of local governance systems and decentralization to LGUs for state independence in the future as well as independent management of administration and finance, through legislation of the Local Government Law (in 1997), gradual implementation of local election (in 2004), and other means, after the establishment of the transitional authority in 1994. However, as a result of the blockade of the Palestinian autonomous area and restrictions to travel in the area imposed by Israel after the Intifada broke out in September 2000, Palestinian economic and financial situations deteriorated significantly, and the administrative and financial independence of LGUs also suffered. In addition, existing legislations and laws of local finance at that time were not matched with the conditions in LGUs, which could not have enough autonomy under poor financial conditions, and there were no their own local finance law and ordinances. At the same time, there was a lack of staff who had expertise in local finance and opportunities for systematic human resource development.


Under such circumstances, this project was started as a technical cooperation project, and the MoLG became its counterpart that was facing many problems, in response to the assistance for local governance reform made in 2004, and based on the project design formulated by the core staff of the MoLG and heads of LGUs at the time of the training seminar for project formation held in Japan in 2005.

During the project period, the CEC was added as a related component of JC in February 2007, for the purpose of strengthening the functions of JCs by planning and implementing pilot projects in the JRRV area and encouraging autonomous activities in the communities<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> The red (darkened) area is "Area A" where the Palestinian Authority has administrative and security jurisdiction.

<sup>3</sup> The Palestinian side requested the Japanese side to enhance JICA project not only from drafting policy and strategy of local governance, but also to concrete projects that can contribute to the improvement of services provided by local

Figure 1: Target Area of the Project and Locations of 4 JCs



Notes: Based on JICA Document. Right side columns show the names of LGUs of 4 JCs.

## 1.2 Project Outline

Overall Goal	Municipal services are improved through promotion of LGU amalgamation and formation of JCs. LGUs' revenue is improved through implementation of local finance policy.	
Project Purposes	The foundation for implementing policies in the area of local finance and joint councils is established.	
Outputs	Output1	Major issues of local finance are clarified and a basic policy for improvement of local finance is recognized and promoted in MoLG.
	Output2	Major issues for joint councils are clarified and a strategy for improvement of service delivery is recognized and promoted by MoLG.
	Output3	Needs of LGUs are identified and MoLG is able to implement training for capacity development of LGUs.
Total cost (Japanese Side)	1,052million yen	
Period of Cooperation	September 2005 – August 2008 (extension period: September 2008-December 2010)	

governments in the entire area of JRRV. (Based on interviews with MoLG officials.)

Implementing Agency	Ministry of Local Government
Supporting Agency	4 Joint Councils (JCs) in JRRV area
Organization in Japan	Koei Research Institute Inc. (CEC)
Related Projects	<p>1) Technical Cooperation:  Adviser for Local Administration in Palestine (2011.3-2012.3)  Improvement of Local Governance System (Phase 2), (2012.6-2014.3)  Project for Improvement of Local Finance System in Palestine (2012.10-2016.9)  The Project for Capacity Development on Solid Waste Management in Jericho and Jordan River Rift Valley in Palestine (2005,9-2010.2), Phase II (2014.10-2017.9)</p> <p>2) Grant Aid:  The Project for Establishment of New Schools in the West Bank (FY2008)  The Project for Support for the Public Activities of the Communities in Jordan Valley (FY2009)</p> <p>3) Other Organizations:  The World Bank, Municipal Development Program Phase 1 (2009.9-2013.4)</p>

### 1.3 Outline of Terminal Evaluation

#### 1.3.1 Achievement Status of Project Purpose at the time of the Terminal Evaluation

Through the achievement of Output 1, 2 and 3, major issues for local finance and Joint Council were clarified, and training for capacity development for the staff of LGUs was implemented. The foundation for implementing policies in the area of local finance and Joint Councils was expected to be established soon<sup>4</sup>.

#### 1.3.2 Achievement Status of Overall Goal at the time of the Terminal Evaluation

The Terminal Evaluation Report mentioned that the JC strategy should be disseminated through the initiatives of MoLG, ensuring a linkage between the JC strategy and other strategies of MoLG (amalgamation strategy, etc.), while the LFP should be implemented for increasing revenues of LGUs under the initiative of MoLG. Those efforts need to be continued, and these efforts should be continued to achieve the Overall Goal<sup>5</sup>.

#### 1.3.3 Recommendations at the time of the Terminal Evaluation

The following recommendation was made at the time of the Terminal Evaluation.

(1) Local finance: MoLG should set priorities to implement tasks recommended by the action plan of LFP, and take preparatory steps for implementation, before the end of project

<sup>4</sup> Summary of Terminal Evaluation, p.3.

<sup>5</sup> Terminal Evaluation Report, p.4, 80.

completion.

(2) Joint councils: MoLG should put more effort into aligning JC strategy with other several ongoing strategic planning processes on local government framework. Although all 15 pilot projects have not yet been completed by the time of the completion of the project, experiences and lessons drawn from the pilot projects should be included in the JC Strategy Annex document. Therefore, the period of the Project needs to be extended until the end of December 2010, and continuing efforts should be put into completing pilot projects and drafting the JC Strategy Annex, which includes the lessons drawn through pilot projects.

(3) Training: MoLG should consider whether the MoLG should continue its training for LGU staff, or if the training should be conducted by other organizations. Also, the MoLG should be encouraged to formulate a solid plan on the future status of the Jericho Training Center<sup>6,7</sup>

## **2. Outline of the Evaluation Study**

### **2.1 External Evaluator**

Juichi Inada, Senshu University

### **2.2 Duration of Evaluation Study**

This evaluation study was performed according to the following schedule.

Duration of the Study: November, 2014 – December, 2015

Duration of the Field Study: January 5, 2015 – January 15, 2015, and March 28, 2015 – April 3, 2015

### **2.3 Constraints during the Evaluation Study**

The Terminal Evaluation Report mentioned that we need to have another perspective on the impacts of the project process and communication among stakeholders, in addition to the standard method of DAC 5 evaluation criteria, in order to evaluate the projects implemented under the situations of occupation or conflict, which have a different nature from normal projects. It also proposed the need to evaluate the timing for commencing the project, contents of the project, selection of target areas and beneficiaries, relevance of the implementation system, impact of such projects, and how it has responded to the change in situation, based on the perspective of peace-building<sup>8</sup>. The evaluation team made additional analyses on those points under the section of relevance. However, the evaluation rating is based on the standard DAC 5 evaluation method.

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<sup>6</sup> Jericho municipality offered its facility for training, and it was used as a training center during the project period.

<sup>7</sup> Summary of Terminal Evaluation, p.6.

<sup>8</sup> Terminal Evaluation Report, pp. 33-34.

### **3. Results of the Evaluation (Overall Rating: D<sup>9</sup>)**

#### **3.1 Relevance (Rating: ②<sup>10</sup>)**

##### 3.1.1 Relevance of the Development Plan of Palestine

In the “Local Governance Reform Action Plan” approved by Palestine government in 2004, the capacity development of LGU staff in the areas of financial management, budget formulation and accounting, improvement of decentralization laws including local finance, and improving the effectiveness and coverage of public services were mentioned. This project coincided with these reform agenda items at the time of planning.

The “Palestine Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010” set forth the establishment of the foundation of Palestine government, and the formation of local governance system was an important part of it. The next “Palestine National Development Plan 2011-2013” focused on the strengthening of the institutional foundation of the Palestinian government, and prioritized the formulation of framework of local government. In the “Palestine Development Plan 2014-2016”, an even greater focus was placed on public service delivery, while substantial delivery of public services was prioritized in the plan.

The “Palestine 13th Program”, which was one of the development plans formulated by the Palestinian government in August 2009, set out the strengthening of LGUs as one of its five priority agenda items, and established the goals of capacity development of LGUs, participation of residents in the development process, and autonomy of finance and administration of LGUs. To achieve those goals, the Program mentioned that the MoLG should put effort into the securing of financial resources of LGUs, amalgamation of LGUs to improve public services to residents, and establishment of training center for staff of LGUs.

In addition, this project coincides with the “Strategic Framework of Cross Sector Plan 2011-2013,” which was a sector strategy for local governance, as well as the “Strategic Framework of the MoLG 2010-2014,” because these strategic frameworks included the restructuring of LGUs, such as financial decentralization for autonomy of LGUs and the amalgamation of LGUs.

Thus, the project coincides with the Palestinian development policy, both at the time of planning and at the time of project completion.

##### 3.1.2 Relevance of the Development Needs of Palestine

Palestinian participants in the training program in Japan discussed the outline of the project before the start of the project in 2005. In addition, a needs assessment survey was conducted just after the start of the project. The contents of the project tried to coincide with the needs of

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<sup>9</sup> A: Highly satisfactory, B: Satisfactory, C: Partially satisfactory, D: Unsatisfactory

<sup>10</sup> ③: High, ②: Fair, ①: Low

Palestine through the implementation of these processes<sup>11</sup>.

The Municipal Development Lending Fund (MDLF), which was established in 2005, the same year as the start of the JICA project, has been supporting the local governance system in Palestine, with the support of many international donors such as the World Bank and Danida (Danish International Development Agency)<sup>12</sup>. Major components of the assistance include local finance, strengthening of local governance framework, capacity building, and improvement of infrastructure, which are the same as the agenda for the JICA project. All of these issues can be regarded as important ones that coincided with the needs of local governance in Palestine.

The pilot projects of CEC, which were launched in February 2007, have focused on the JRRV area as their target, because the area was the most marginalized area in West Bank, and the CEC was appreciated by the stakeholders of Palestinian Authority and local residents as it responded to the needs for improving people's lives<sup>13</sup>. The pilot projects were followed by the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment, which had extended assistance to that area<sup>14</sup>. Hence, the project coincided with development needs even at the time of project completion.

JICA's approach of JC strategy emphasized the strengthening of JCs; on the other hand, other major donors have focused on the amalgamation strategy of LGUs instead of the strengthening of JCs. The difference in approach had existed both at the time of planning and at the time of project completion. As an example, the World Bank has made effort to strengthen the financial foundation and service delivery of municipalities in its approach to strengthen local finance<sup>15</sup>. In that sense, JICA's approach was different from that of the World Bank, yet shared a common long-term goal. Hence, the project coincided with the development needs of Palestine at the time of project completion<sup>16</sup>.

Therefore, the project is responding to development needs, both at the time of appraisal and at the time of ex-post evaluation.

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<sup>11</sup> "Training Needs Assessment" (February 2006), and "Needs assessment of JSC" (April 2006) were conducted by JICA, with the survey outsourced to ID Management Consulting. The survey checked what was necessary to strengthen JCs, and the kind of training that was needed, and the details of the contents of the project were decided based on the results of the survey.

<sup>12</sup> The MDLF began providing assistance in 2007, and the total amount of its projects was US\$321 million during the period from 2007 to 2014.

<sup>13</sup> Based on JICA documents. Voices of residents at the time of project completion. As to the assessment of pilot projects at the time of ex-post evaluation, see Column "Impact of CEC".

<sup>14</sup> The Project for Support for the Public Activities of the Communities in Jordan Valley (2009 FY). This Grant Aid for Community Empowerment was in fact implemented between 2010 and 2012. (The project period overlapped with the JICA project in 2010.)

<sup>15</sup> The World Bank has supported the strengthening of finance and service delivery of municipalities in its "Municipal Development Program Phase 1" (September 2009~April 2013).

<sup>16</sup> In the successive project of JICA on Joint Councils, the strengthening of JCs is regarded as a transitional approach toward the goal of amalgamation. On the other hand, other donors have begun to think the approach of strengthening JCs as a meaningful transitional approach. (Based on interviews with The World Bank, MoLG, etc.)

### 3.1.3 Relevance to Japan's ODA Policy

“Outline of Japan's ODA Policy to Palestine in 2004” mentioned the provision of assistance for administrative reform as well as democratization as the areas of priority for Japan's assistance, at the time of planning. It also emphasized the improvement of governance systems of the central government and capacity strengthening of local governance to improve the stability of local communities. Furthermore, the “Basic Policy of Assistance to Palestine,” which was announced when Foreign Minister Machimura visited Palestine in January 2005, mentioned the provision of assistance for strengthening the foundation of the Palestinian government for the future establishment of the State of Palestine<sup>17</sup>.

Therefore, the project is consistent with this initiative and Japanese ODA policy at the time of planning.

### 3.1.4 Appropriateness of Plan and Approach of the Project

In this project, the project design was expected to be modified flexibly according to unexpected external factors such as security situations in Palestine, and the flexibility was included in the contents of the agreement of project implementation. In fact, the project period was extended for two years and the total cost of the project increased significantly. After that, the PDM (PDM Ver.0) at the time of starting the project in September 2005 was revised at the time of the mid-term evaluation in March 2007 (PDM Ver.1), and it was revised again at the time of the Second Management Advisory Survey conducted in October 2009 (PDM Ver.2)<sup>18</sup>.

Looking at the process of the changes to project design, broad areas of the local governance agenda were picked up as the target areas for assistance, and the priorities and focus were not clear at the time of starting the project in 2005<sup>19</sup>. Therefore, the approach of linking outcome, project purposes and overall goals was not clear, and the problem remained even after several revisions of the PDM. Specifically, one of the overall goals was to “improve LGUs' revenue through the implementation of local finance policy, and the Ministry of Finance was essential to bring about the realization of this goal. However, the MoF could not be sufficiently involved throughout the project period. In addition to the external factor of severe financial conditions of the Palestine government as a whole, there was a problem in the approach of project at the time of planning.

Furthermore, the JICA's approach of aiming to strengthen JCs at the time of the start of the project in 2005 was different from the approach of assisting in amalgamation of the World Bank,

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<sup>17</sup> The Japanese government announced the initiative of “Corridor of Peace and Prosperity” in July 2006, as a long-term effort for the future co-existence of Israel and Palestine, and pledged its intention to strengthen the socio-economic foundation of JRRV.

<sup>18</sup> In this ex-post evaluation, evaluation was conducted based on PDM Ver.2 in principle, instead of PDM Ver.0 formulated at the time of planning.

<sup>19</sup> Based on the comments of local stakeholders of MoLG officials and JICA local staff.

and the CEC added to the project later focused on the JCs in the most difficult area in the West Bank of Palestine (JRRV) as the target of its pilot projects. This choice coincided with the developmental needs of improving the lives of residents in JRRV, but resulted in difficulties in achieving the effects of the project purposes.




Figure 2: Different Tracks for LGU Amalgamation and the Location of JC expected in the Project

Source: JICA Document. Other major donors aimed to improve public services through the amalgamation of LGUs to municipalities, but JICA’s JC Strategy aimed to achieve improvement of public services by strengthening JCs through the path of Track A shown in the Figure.

This project was highly relevant to the country’s development plan and development needs, as well as Japan’s ODA policy. However, there was a problem in its approach because the relationship between outcomes/project purposes and overall goals was unclear. Therefore, its relevance is fair.

### 3.2 Effectiveness and Impact<sup>20</sup> (Rating: ②)

#### 3.2.1 Effectiveness

##### 3.2.1.1 Achievement of Project Purpose

The project purpose was to “establish a foundation for implementing policies in the area of local finance and joint councils.” The following Table 1 shows a summary of project purpose,

<sup>20</sup> Sub-rating for Effectiveness is to be put with consideration of Impact.

indicators, and actual situation.

Table 1: Achievement of Project Purpose

Project Purpose	Indicator (PDF Ver.2)	Actual
The foundation for implementing policies in the area of local finance and joint councils is established.	①Local finance policy (LFP) is approved by MoLG.	LFP was approved by the Minister of MoLG in May 2010.
	②JC strategy is approved by MoLG.	JC strategy was approved by the Minister of MoLG in May 2010.
	③JC function is strengthened. (additional indicator)*	South JC and North JC were strengthened, but North-east JC was not functioning.
	④Training system is established. (additional indicator)**	Training system was not constructed including training plan.

Notes: \*The purpose of CEC as an additional component is considered to be the strengthening of the function of JCs through the implementation of pilot projects for improving the basis of local finance and Joint Councils. Therefore, ③ has been included as an additional indicator.

\*\*Establishment of training system for capacity building of LGUs is an essential factor for achieving the project purpose. Therefore, ④ has been included as an additional indicator.

In the following section, the concrete situations of output are summarized and divided into separate components.

Table 2: Output Indicators of the Project

	Component	Indicators 【PDM Ver.2】
Output1	Local finance	Major issues of local finance are clarified and a basic policy for improvement of local finance is recognized and promoted in MoLG.
Output2	Joint councils, CEC	Major issues for joint councils are clarified and a strategy for improvement of service delivery is recognized and promoted by MoLG.
Output3	Training system	Needs of LGUs are identified and MoLG is able to implement training for capacity development of LGUs.

#### (1) Local Finance

In the area of local finance, the first version of LFP was completed in March 2008, and reviewed by major LGUs in the West Bank area, and the final version of LFP was completed in June 2009. Brief leaflets of the final version of LFP were formulated and distributed to stakeholders of the government and members of LGUs. In the process of drafting the LFP, stakeholders were involved in the discussion of its contents, and the MoLG officials regarded the LFP as a useful document for promoting the understanding of the stakeholders of LGUs on its basic framework. The existence of the LFP was also well known among the staff of relevant international donors<sup>21</sup>.

<sup>21</sup> LFP was not regarded as an important document because the MoF was not involved in the drafting process. (Based on interviews with the MoF and related donors such as MDLF and Danida.)

Hence, Output 1: “Major issues of local finance are clarified and a basic policy for the improvement of local finance is recognized and promoted in MoLG,” was mainly achieved.

## (2) Joint Councils

In the area of joint councils, the JC Strategy was formulated by the JCspd of MoLG and JICA Project Team, and the final version was completed in March 2010. The JC Strategy was not the same as the amalgamation strategy of LGUs to municipalities, which was the mainstream for other donors, instead, it coincided with the transitional approach in the process of amalgamation of LGUs. Hence, the formation of the JC Strategy is regarded as meaningful in clarifying the strategy of LGUs toward amalgamation. Besides, JCspd took a central role in drafting the strategy, and held about 10 workshops for LGU staff who were in charge of local administration during the process of formulating the strategy, and the outline of the strategy was assumed to be recognized by stakeholders of MoLG. The leaflets of the JC Strategy were produced and distributed to the stakeholders of local governance through seminars on the JC Strategy.

Therefore, Output 2: “Major issues for joint councils are clarified and a strategy for improvement of service delivery is recognized and promoted by MoLG.” was mostly achieved.

“JC Strategy: Annex” had not yet been completed at the time of terminal evaluation, because 3 pilot projects were delayed and the lessons learnt from the pilot projects could not be included in the document. However, the experiences of pilot projects in JRRV area were summarized in the Project Completion Report, and the key points of the experiences were summarized in the leaflet for the JC Strategy that was formulated later.

## (3) Community Empowerment Component (CEC)

A part of Output 2 (joint councils), the Community Empowerment Component (CEC), was added. The purpose of CEC was to encourage autonomous activities by communities of JC and LGUs through the planning and implementation of pilot projects in JRRV area, to summarize the problems and lessons in drafting the JC Strategy, and to disseminate the framework of JCs. JCs have been implementing the pilot projects.

On the other hand, in terms of the effects of improvement of people’s lives, most pilot projects have contributed to the improvement of the lives of the residents. Therefore, these efforts were appreciated by the local leaders of LGUs and residents<sup>22</sup>. Besides, CEC has contributed to strengthening the function of JCs at least in South JC and Mid-West JC, among the four JCs of the South, Mid-East, Mid-West and North JCs, in respect to the dissemination of

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<sup>22</sup> As pilot projects of CEC, 92 project proposals were proposed, and 15 pilot projects were implemented (9 pilot projects in the first phase, 6 pilot projects in the second phase). Other proposals were examined as proposals for Grant Aid for Community Empowerment (“The Project for Support for the Public Activities of the Communities in Jordan Valley”), and 26 projects were implemented from 2010 to 2012. The project established “the improvement of lives of local residents” as its project purpose.

larger administrative institutions in the JRRV area. This was appreciated by the residents as a good project with concrete benefits.

#### (4) Training System

10 core staff of MoLG (Dept. of Budget, Finance, and JCspd, etc.) were trained, and conducted training for MoLG staff and leaders of LGUs as trainers. Training materials based on the needs of LGUs were also produced in this project and distributed to the participants at the seminars.

More than 2,600 members of LGUs and JCs participated in the training seminars, and the number exceeded the number of the original plan of 1,000. Based on the interview survey conducted on the participants after the training seminars, the average score was more than 4 (maximum of 5) for 18 courses among the total 20 courses held between March 2009 and April 2010<sup>23</sup>. Therefore, Output 3: “Needs of LGUs are identified and MoLG is able to implement training for capacity development of LGUs.” was mostly achieved, because the training was implemented as planned.

On the other hand, a training plan based on the results of financial analyses was not formulated by the end of project completion, and training was not conducted after 2011<sup>24</sup>, therefore, a training system was not constructed.

As mentioned above, the LFP and the JC Strategy were approved for Output 1 and Output 2, and the JCs were partly strengthened by the implementation of pilot projects. That means the project was effective in strengthening the function of JCs. On the other hand, the effectiveness of Output 3 was limited, because the training system was not established by the MoLG, although training seminars were conducted as planned during the project period.

Thus, the project purposes were partially not achieved.

### 3.2.2 Impact

#### 3.2.2.1 Achievement of Overall Goal

Achievement of overall goal was that “Municipal services are improved through promotion of LGU amalgamation and formation of JCs.” and “LGUs’ revenue is improved through implementation of local finance policy.”<sup>25</sup> Table 3 shows the achievement of the overall goal. The JICA report indicated that the overall goal would be realized in 2015, which is 5 years after

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<sup>23</sup> Terminal Evaluation Report, 2010, p.12.

<sup>24</sup> The main reason was considered to be the lack of will to implement training among the top leaders of MoLG. (Based on interviews with some core staff who worked in the training center of MoLG.)

<sup>25</sup> Overall goal in 【PDM Ver.0】was to “Develop capacity in the area of local finance and JCspd to attain sustainable local governance system”, and verifiable indicators of overall goal in 【PDM Ver.1】 were “①Basis policy for local finance is approved by MoLG, and ②Basic strategic plan for JCspd is approved by MoLG.

the project completion, and continuous efforts should be made”<sup>26</sup>.

Table 3: Achievement of Overall Goal

Overall Goal	Indicator	Actual															
Municipal services are improved through promotion of LGU amalgamation and formation of JCs.	①The number of amalgamated LGUs and active JCs is increased.	<p>The number of active JCs increased during the project period, but has been decreasing after that. (See the following table.)<sup>27</sup></p> <p>The change of the number of LGUs and JCs in West Bank of Palestine</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>2005</th> <th>2008</th> <th>2010</th> <th>2014</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>LGUs</td> <td>484</td> <td>484</td> <td>484</td> <td>352</td> </tr> <tr> <td>JCs</td> <td>60</td> <td>84</td> <td>84</td> <td>72</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>(source: interview with the MoLG staff)</p>		2005	2008	2010	2014	LGUs	484	484	484	352	JCs	60	84	84	72
		2005	2008	2010	2014												
LGUs	484	484	484	352													
JCs	60	84	84	72													
LGUs’ revenue is improved through implementation of local finance policy.	②Types of services and budget by amalgamated LGUs and JCs are increased.	The types of services and budget of JC expanded temporarily during the project period, but they have not increased especially after 2013.															
	③LGUs’ revenue is increased.	Revenues of LGUs have been fluctuating every year and stable increase of revenue has not yet realized.															

#### (1) Local Finance

Some seminars were held for MoLG and LGU staff to revise the LFP, during 2011-2012 after the project completion. Thus, MoLG was putting effort into revising and disseminating the LFP until 2012. However, the efforts were discontinued due to political reasons after 2013, and efforts to revise and bring about the realization of the LFP came to a standstill in the MoLG<sup>28</sup>.

Although this project supported MoLG as a counterpart in the formulation of the basic policy for local finance, Ministry of Finance (MoF) played a significant role in realizing LFP and financial transfer from the central government to local government, while the influence of the MoLG in financial policy was limited. It was essential to involve the MoF to bring about the realization of the LFP, but the MoF could not be fully involved as a related organization into the project. Hence, there was a problem with a part of the approach in the original plan<sup>29</sup>.

At the time of ex-post evaluation, JCs were not the main actors in service delivery, but served

<sup>26</sup> Terminal Evaluation Report, 2010, p.80.

<sup>27</sup> The fact that there is no increase of the number of JCs and LGUs between 2008 and 2010 means that amalgamation of LGU was not achieved even after the establishment of JCs. And, the decrease of the number of LGUs and JCs between 2010 and 2014 means that amalgamation of small scale LGUs into existing municipalities were progressed and some small and micro JCs for Solid Waste Management (SWM) were stopped to operate based on the MoLG strategy for SWM, although governorate level JCs for SWM remained.

<sup>28</sup> Reportedly, the policy direction was changed by the change of minister of MoLG. (Based on the interviews with MoLG)

<sup>29</sup> In the successive project of JICA on local finance (Project for Improvement of Local Finance, October 2012-September 2016), MoF is the counterpart agency for providing assistance on the fixed assets tax system, instead of MoLG.

as the windows for coordinating common issues of LGUs; LGUs continued to be the core actors in providing public services because the LGUs had strong political resistance to losing their power and budget.

JCs were the implementing agencies in both CEC (implemented during 2007-2010) and Grant Aid for Community Empowerment (implemented during 2010-2012), but there were no changes to the structure in which JCs did not have a permanent budget for their own use as independent actors. The lack of progress in financial transfer to local governments was considered as the most important reason as to why the number of services and the amount of budget of JCs or amalgamated LGUs have not increased.

The situation of local finance in Palestine indicated that the population of each LGU had been increasing during the project period and even after the project completion, but the budget of each LGU was not increasing but fluctuated significantly each year. The revenue of LGUs comprised mainly of the financial transfer from the central government for the public services of electricity and water supply, and there were no major changes to the basic structure of the budget of LGUs. Transportation fees for the maintenance of roads came from the central government in 2009, but were suspended later. A decision was made to resume the provision of these fees, but they had not yet been distributed at the time of ex-post evaluation. The main reason was because the budget of the Palestinian government was severely restricted and there were few financial resources that could be transferred to local governments. (This can be regarded as an external factor.) The revenue from the fixed assets tax did not make up a large portion yet, because it was still in the process of reform in 2014. The new JICA project on local finance, formulated after this project, set the MoF as a counterpart of the project, and the approach is considered to be appropriate in terms of its effectiveness of policy and organizational capacity.

There were no cases where the revenue of LGUs increased as a result of the project. For example, Aljiftlik, which is a LGU in Mid-East JC, began to operate public bus service as a pilot project. This showed a surplus but not enough revenue sources at the time of ex-post evaluation. The salaries of operational staff for the facilities built through the pilot projects, such as libraries, are covered by the budget of the LGUs in which the facilities locate.

Thus, indicators of overall goal, which are “② Types of services and budget by amalgamated LGUs and JCs are increased.” and “③ LGUs’ revenue is increased.” were not realized.

## (2) Joint Councils

After the JC Strategy was drafted in 2010, the revised version of “JC strategy 2014-2018” was formulated in 2013, although the work assisted under the new JICA project followed after this project. The revised version had been drafted by the MoLG itself, with support from the

following project. The new features of the revised version of JC Strategy were to separate the functions of JCs into single service and multiple services, and to provide concrete action plans, among others. Based on the fact that the revised version of JC Strategy had been drafted, and the experiences from the pilot projects of CEC had been shared among the staff of MoLG and LGUs in the target areas of the following project, the activities of the MoLG on Joint Council are regarded as continuing after the project completion<sup>30</sup>.

On the other hand, there were different approaches to the amalgamation strategy of LGUs among related donors (giving much consideration to amalgamation, continuation of the function of LGUs, or JCs between the two), and the MoLG itself was fluctuating between the two different strategies of the amalgamation of LGUs to municipality and strengthening of JCs. The reasons behind the differences in the approaches are that: (1) the World Bank, MDLF, etc. have been providing assistance in the amalgamation of LGUs to municipalities, (2) there are political resistances among LGUs against losing their power to municipality as a result of the amalgamation, and (3) JICA has been providing assistance to strengthen JCs.

Although major donors such as the World Bank and MDLF have emphasized the amalgamation strategy of LGUs to municipalities, their stance have been changing from amalgamation to the realistic approach of strengthening JCs and municipalities as a transitional strategy<sup>31</sup>. In the JRRV area, which JICA has focused on as a major target, the establishment of JCs was regarded as a transitional strategy toward amalgamation in the long term. Hence, the two approaches of amalgamation to municipalities and strengthening of JCs are now not contradictory to each other. In reality, some JCs are not functional, and some LGUs have been amalgamated into the Jericho Municipality.

During the project period from 2005 to 2010, the number of JCs had been on the rise, but the number of LGUs and JCs had decreased after 2010 because of progress in the amalgamation of LGUs to municipalities. The decrease in the number of JCs was mainly caused by the integration of LGUs in the surrounding area into municipalities. In the JRRV area, which the JICA project focused on as a target of CEC, some JCs were established during the project period, but the LGUs continued to exist after the establishment of JCs.

Thus, the indicator of overall goal in the area of Joint Council, which is that “①The number of amalgamated LGUs and active JCs is increased.” was not achieved.

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<sup>30</sup> The successive project on joint councils by JICA is considered to be a factor for the continuation of activities of MoLG.

<sup>31</sup> Based on the interviews with major donors such as MDLF, The World Bank, Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC), and Danida. In the World Bank project “Municipal Development Program-Phase 1” conducted during 2009-2013, it was implemented with the aim of improving public services and functions of municipalities, instead of increasing the number of municipalities. The number of municipalities targeted by the Program increased from 132 in 2009 to 135 in 2013. (The World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, 2014.)

### (3) Community Empower Component (CEC)

The activities for strengthening JCs were conducted through the implementation of CEC during the project period, but many JCs were not functional in reality after the project completion. After the project completion, there were some cases where the JCs still existed officially and LGUs held meetings on their common issues (in South JC and Mid-West JC), but there was a case where there were no meetings among LGUs of the same JC (Mid-East JC). The situation for the JCs depended on the relationship between LGU leaders, geographical locations of LGUs, and other factors.<sup>32</sup>

Table 4 (Current Status of Pilot Projects of CEC) shows the status of 15 pilot projects at the time of ex-post evaluation. Although there were no major damages in general as to the facilities and equipment of those pilot projects such as JC buildings, some facilities were utilized very well but some to a lesser extent at the time of ex-post evaluation. Specifically, many projects for improving lives, as proposed by the residents (the projects of CIPP in Table 4), had stopped their activities. As the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment was implemented in the JRRV area in the West Bank after 2010 and the JCs were the beneficiaries of the sub-project, the JCs were functional when the grant aid was implemented, but some JCs became nominal and not functional as a core of LGUs after the completion of the grant aid.

Table 5 below shows the summary of questionnaires to residents, conducted in our beneficiary survey in 12 pilot projects<sup>33</sup>. The questions were: ①Was the project useful in improving your life? ②Has the project contributed to strengthening JC? ③Do you know that the project is funded by Japanese aid? The results of ① and ② were converted to scores. 10 is the highest score; the score is higher, the higher the level of contribution of the project.

Scores for “①improvement in lives of residents” were high in general, and especially high in Mid-West JC. Scores for “②strengthening of JC” were relatively high, although not as high as scores for ③. Based on the detailed interviews with residents, respondents sometimes mistook their VC (Village Council) as JC (Joint Council). Therefore, the effects on the strengthening of JC were not clear. Scores of “③Perception of Japanese aid” were not high. The main reason is considered to be that the pilot projects were implemented under the initiatives of MoLG and LGUs (JCs were recipients), and Japanese contributions were not visible.

Thus, in terms of indicators of overall goal, “②types of services and budget by JCs” had increased temporarily, but the indicators of “①The number of amalgamated LGUs and active JCs is increased.” and “③LGUs’ revenue is increased” were not achieved.

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<sup>32</sup> The four JCs are North cluster (Tubas Governorate), Mid-West cluster (Nablus Governorate), Mid-East cluster (Jericho Governorate), and South cluster (Jericho Governorate).

<sup>33</sup> In our ex-post evaluation, our team conducted our beneficiary survey in all pilot projects which were still active at the time of ex-post evaluation, extracting 355 samples in total, distributing and collecting questionnaires/answers.

Table 4: Current Status of Pilot Projects of CEC

Code	Pilot Project (location)	Current Status	Status of Utilization, Outcomes, Problems etc.
LGPP-1	Women's Center (Al'auja & Fassayel)	③	Facilities are in good condition, and used for seminars. (Seminars are supported by other donors as well.)
LGPP-2	School Buses (Mid-WestJC)	②	Only one bus out of two is used. Maintenance cost is high because they are used cars. Drivers are hired by LGU.
LGPP-3	Construction of VC Building(Aljiftlik)	②	Facilities are in good condition, but not used frequently. There are almost no JC meetings.
CSPP-1	Pre-school Education (Bardalah)	②	Equipment is still used by (about 15) children.
CSPP-2	Public Library (Alnwei'meh & Aldyouk Alfoqa)	③	Facilities are in good condition, and used as venues for seminars. A librarian is hired by LGU.
CSPP-3	Literacy Education (Mid-WestJC)	①	Seminars were held only in the first year of the project. The participants (illiterate women) appreciated the project.
CIPP-1	Livestock (Marj Alghazal, Marj Na'jeh, Alzbeidat)	①	Activities were stopped after the livestock was sold out.
CIPP-2	Handicrafts (Aljiftlik)	①	Women's group started activities but stopped in 2012 because of severe market competition.
CIPP-3	Apiculture (Ein Elbeidah & Kardalah)	①	All the bees died because of insecticide spray from nearby Israeli fruit farms. Now, farmers are trying to restart.
JC-N1	North JC Service Center (Ein Elbeidah)	③	Facilities are in good condition, and used for seminars etc.
JC-W1	Middle JC Service Center (Alnassariyah)	②	The completion of construction was delayed till 2011. Facilities are in good condition, but not used frequently. No management cost has been prepared and there is no staff.
JC-E1	Public Bus (Aljiftlik)	③	Two buses are operated in two routes. Financial surplus is gained. (Drivers are hired by LGU.) The Bus route to Jericho is beneficial to the lives of residents.
JC-S1	VC Building Renovation (Fassayel)	③	The completion of construction was delayed by December 2010. Facilities are in good condition, and used for seminars.
JC-S2	Kindergarten (Aldyouk Alfoqa)	②	The completion of construction was delayed by December 2010. Facilities are in good condition. The number of children is 14, same as that in 2010. Director was former core staff LGU.
JC-S3	Multipurpose Hall (Al'auja)	③	Facilities are in good condition, and used for seminars etc.

Notes: Based on the interviews with LGUs/JCs staff in charge of pilot projects, and site visits. The top 9 projects are "existing pilot projects" and lower 6 projects are "new pilot projects".

Figures for "Current status" show the rating as follows: ③ fully utilized or effective, ② effective but with problems, ① ineffective or suspended. (Rating was accorded by the author, based on interviews and site visits.)

Table 5: The Results of Beneficiary Survey on 12 Pilot Projects of CEC

Code	Project Name (location)	No. of respondents	1. Was the project useful in improving your life? (*)	2. Has the project contributed to strengthening JC? (*)	3. Do you know that the project is funded by Japanese aid? (Share of "Yes":%)	
CIPP-3	Apiculture (Ein Elbeidah & Kardalah)	20	8.5	7.3	100	
CSPP-1	Pre-school education (Bardalah)	15	8.7	7.7	53	
JC-N1	North JC Service Center (Ein Elbeidah)	40	8.6	6.8	68	
CSPP-3	Literacy education (Mid-West JC)	20	9.5	6.5	40	
LGPP-2	School Buses (Mid-West JC)	40	9.8	8.8	63	
JC-W1	Middle JC Service Center (Alnassariyah)	40	9.2	8.8	75	
JC-E1	Public Bus (Aljiftlik-Mid-East JC)	Residents	20	9.8	6.8	35
		Children	25	9.4	7.7	56
CSPP-2	Public Library (Alnwei'meh & Aldyouk Alfoqa)	40	8.7	8.6	55	
LGPP-1	Women's Center (South JC)	Al'auja	20	10.0	8.8	55
		Fassayel	20	8.9	8.9	85
JC-S1	VC Building Renovation (Fassayel)	20	9.0	7.8	55	
JC-S3	Multipurpose Hall (Al'auja)	20	7.8	7.9	60	
JC-S2	Kindergarten (Aldyouk Alfoqa)	15	9.7	9.7	87	

Notes: Scores of (\*) were calculated using the following method. "Very much" scored 10, "More or less" scored 5, "Not at all" scored 0, and each score was aggregated for the figure/ number of answers (excluding the number of respondents giving no answers). The higher the score, the higher the degree of appreciation from residents.

Column 1: School bus project in Mid-West JC and public bus project in Mid-East JC

Among the list of CEC pilot projects, examples of appreciated pilot projects were the school bus project in Mid-West JC (LGPP-2) and the public bus project in Aljiftlik VC of Mid-East JC (JC-E1).

A school bus in Mid-West JC has been used for commuting to primary and secondary schools in six LGUs of Mid-West JC. It was highly appreciated and positive answers to the effects on strengthening JC were given. Two used cars were provided through the project (in consideration of budgetary limitations), but only one car is now utilized as maintenance costs have been high.

On the other hand, public buses in Mid-East JC have been operated by Aljiftlik VC instead of JC, and its effect on strengthening JC is low. However, the project had been greatly appreciated in terms of its benefits. There are two routes served by the public buses. One is a route to connect Mid-East JC and Jericho, and another is a commuting bus for kindergarten children inside Aljiftlik. Two new buses were provided, and maintenance costs are currently relatively low. Drivers' fees and fuel costs are covered through users' fees and budget of LGU for now.



Photo1: School bus in Mid-West JC (LGPP-2)



Photo2: Public bus in Mid-East JC Aljiftlik (JC-E1)

#### (4) Training

There has been no systematic training conducted by the MoLG, after the project completion. The Jericho Training Center utilized for training during the project period was not used as the training center after the completion of the project, and there was no systematic training plan at the time of ex-post evaluation<sup>34</sup>.

The 10 staff who were trained as trainers between 2006 and 2010 were engaging in their own work in their departments and were not working as trainers at the time of ex-post evaluation. Besides, training was not conducted at the time. Therefore, training materials formulated by the project were not used for training.

The aim of training was to achieve the overall goal: “Municipal services have improved.” However, the lack of training system after the completion of the project led to the failure in the achievement of the indicators of the overall goal, which are “The number of active JCs has been increased” and “Types of services by JCs have been increased.”

As mentioned above, although there has been progress in the amalgamation of LGUs to municipalities, the number of active JCs has not increased. In addition, the types of services and budget of JCs have not improved since 2013 after the CEC and Grant Aid were completed, although the service and budget of JC did increase temporarily during the time when these projects were implemented. Reform of fixed assets tax, which can be a new financial resource for LGUs, is still underway. Therefore, the impact expected through the implementation of the project is limited, and this project has not achieved its overall goal.

<sup>34</sup> It was because of the lack of political will of leaders of MoLG. (Based on interviews with staff of MoLG)

### 3.2.2.2 Other Impacts

#### (1) Impact on the Natural Environment

None.

#### (2) Land Acquisition and Resettlement

Land acquisition and resettlement could occur only in the CEC, because JC buildings, community centers, and libraries were constructed as pilot projects requested by LGUs. However the land where these facilities were built had originally been government-owned land, and no land acquisition and resettlement issues arose<sup>35</sup>.

#### (3) Impact on the Improvement in People's Lives in the JRRV Area

At the time of planning, the following consideration was brought up. "In light of human security, peace building, poverty, and gender, JICA will give consideration to adopting a participatory method and process in the formation of projects targeting a wide area, to offer benefits for socially vulnerable people, and not widen the gap of social structure, gender and area." The CEC was a component introduced with the aim of realizing this approach in the JRRV area.

Many pilot projects were implemented in Area-C<sup>36</sup>, which was under the strong influence of Israel, relatively poor, where economic activities were restricted, and which received little assistance from donors. The assistance for improving the lives of "marginalized people" was appreciated by local residents and officials of Palestinian authority.

The following comments were made in terms of concrete impacts of the project. (1) Other donors began to come and offer aid after JICA showed that aid in Area-C was feasible. (Interview at Mid-West JC) (2) Communication and exchanges among communities have expanded because of the construction of JC buildings, community centers, libraries, etc. (Interviews at Mid-West JC and South JC) (3) The Women Center has contributed to the empowerment of women by providing a space for seminars and activities organized by Women's Organizations. (Interview at South JC) (4) Living environment has been improved through assistance from some projects of CEC and Grant aid, and has contributed to halting the decrease of the youth population. (Interview at Mid-West JC)<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> The project of construction of VC Building (LGPP-3) in Jiflik was delayed, because it was located in Area-C and took a long time to receive permission for construction from Israel. This is regarded not as an impact but external factor that restricted the implementation of the project.

<sup>36</sup> "Area-C" is the area where Israel has jurisdiction of both administrative and security authority.

<sup>37</sup> Terminal Evaluation Report of the project mentioned that "Implementation of the project in JRRV has contributed to growth in the confidence of local residents and leaders of LGUs to sustain the communities in this area. This project also had the impact: Provision of better preschool education has led to the enhancement of the conscience of parents toward preschool education. School buses became available for local residents after several discussions with the Ministry of Transportation. It could enhance the capacity of operation and management of Women's Center. It also encouraged joint activities among different communities.

As mentioned above, there were some effects achieved through the implementation of this project, and effectiveness and impact of the project are fair. As to the project purpose, the LFP and the JC Strategy were approved by the ministry, and the JCs were partly strengthened by the implementation of pilot projects of CEC. That means the project was mostly effective in strengthening the function of JCs. On the other hand, the training system was not established by the MoLG. Therefore, the project was achieved at a limited level.

This project achieved its overall goal at a limited level, because the number of active JCs had not increased, although the amalgamation of LGUs to municipalities had progressed. Moreover, the types of services and budget of JCs had not increased especially since 2013, although the services and budget of JCs improved temporarily during the implementation of the CEC. Reform of fixed assets tax, which can be a new financial resource for LGUs, is still underway.

### 3.3 Efficiency (Rating: ①)

#### 3.3.1 Inputs

Table 6: Planned and Actual Inputs

Inputs	Plan	Actual (at the time of completion)
(1) Experts	Short-Term (13 MM)—local governance in general, local finance, Joint Council/planning, system engineering/database	Long-Term: 1 person, Short-Term: 14 persons in total number (42.5MM)—capacity building of JC, CDC, etc.
(2) Trainees received	Training in Japan (about 8 persons), Third Country Training (about 10 persons per year)	58persons (Training in Japan: 39 persons, Third Country (Jordan) Training: 20 persons)
(3) Equipment	Remodeling, equipment and furniture required for a training center, a vehicle	Remodeling, equipment and furniture required for a training center, a vehicle
(4) Others	Field activities (workshops, in-country training, diagnostic survey, training needs assessment, questionnaire)	Field activities (workshops, in-country training, diagnostic survey, training needs assessment, questionnaire)
Japanese side Total Project Cost	149 million yen in total	1,052 million yen in total
Palestinian side	1. Cost of counterpart staff (3 persons) 2. Facilities and Land for Project Management Office and Training Center	1. Cost of counterpart staff (8 persons in total number) 2. Local staff (7 persons) 3. Facilities and Land for Project Management Office and Training Center (Underground floor of library of Jericho municipality was offered.)

Note: The amount of inputs from Palestinian side was unclear because of the lack of data, so the contents of inputs are provided instead.

### 3.3.1.1 Elements of Inputs

#### (1) Dispatch of Experts

After the start of the project, appropriate inputs were injected under the difficult conditions in Palestine, such as the dispatch of short-term experts to draft the LFP and JC Strategy. The first long-term expert was dispatched in January 2007, and a group of JICA experts was delegated to engage in CEC in February 2007<sup>38</sup>. In the latter period of the project, inputs increased according to the expansion of the project, especially for CEC.

#### (2) Training in Japan/Jordan

Thirty-nine (39) Palestinian staff members, mainly the staff of MoLG, participated in the training in Japan, and fifty-eight (58) staff members participated in the third-country training held twice in Jordan. The actual number of participants exceeded the number expected at the time of planning (54 persons in 3 years). Average number of trainees each year was calculated at the time of planning, and the increase of the number of participants was mainly brought about by the extension of the project period<sup>39</sup>.

#### (3) Machinery and Equipment

At the beginning of the project, the activities of the project stagnated and inputs of equipment were delayed because of the political turmoil in Palestine. The equipment provided to the training center by the Japanese side was maintained under the responsibility of the director, project managers, and other staff assigned by the MoLG, and was fully utilized. The equipment provided to the Jericho Training Center is now used as the equipment for JICA's Jericho Sanitation Project<sup>40</sup>, as well as the facility, after the project completion.

#### (4) Inputs from Palestinian Side

After the birth of the Hamas regime in March 2006, there was a period when the Palestinian side could not be involved in the project because of the strike by public servants, which served as an example of the obstacles to project implementation. After the situations improved, the directors and managers of the Palestinian side were highly motivated and committed to the project, and the project manager played a central role.

The Jericho Training Center was located at the underground floor of the library of Jericho Municipality, which offered the facility to the MoLG for free. The Jericho Training Center was closed after the project completion, and the office is now used as a project management office

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<sup>38</sup> JICA expert group was contracted to implement CEC, but they also supported for other components of local finance and Joint Councils.

<sup>39</sup> Terminal Evaluation Report, p.20.

<sup>40</sup> Technical Assistance and Capacity Building Project for the Jericho Sanitation Project (December, 2012-July 2016).

of JICA's Jericho Sanitation Project.

### 3.3.1.2 Project Cost

The planned project cost was 149 million yen, and the actual project cost was 1,052 million yen, which was significantly higher than planned (706% of the plan amount).

The significant difference between the planned and actual amounts was mainly caused by the expansion of inputs, the identification of concrete focus and priorities after the beginning of the project, response to the recommendations that the project needed in order to strengthen its implementation system, and introduction of a new component to existing components, at the time of mid-term evaluation in 2007. Significant expansion in actual cost was mainly derived from the cost of CEC (pilot projects provided to JCs), which was newly added in 2007. At the time of the first management advisory survey conducted in May 2008, the project period was extended for two years up till 2010, and the project costs increased in August 2008 as well. Furthermore, the budget of CEC (pilot projects) was expanded, exceeding the limit of the amount of sub-projects in their implementation; this was another major reason for the increase in the project costs. (Originally, 5 million yen had been the maximum budget allocated for each sub-project requested by LGUs, and 500,000 yen had been the maximum budget allocated for each project requested by civil organizations, at the time of planning of CEC)<sup>41</sup>.

### 3.3.1.3 Period of Cooperation

The planned period of cooperation was from September 2005 to August 2008 (36 months), and the actual period of cooperation was from September 2005 to December 2010 (64 months), which was significantly longer than planned (178% of the plan).

The factors affecting the extension of the period of cooperation were as follows.

One factor was the turmoil in Palestinian politics. After the establishment of the Hamas Cabinet in 2006, Japanese aid including JICA assistance was suspended for a while. Another factor was the difficulty in finding appropriate long-term experts who could be dispatched to Palestine because of special security conditions in Palestine as an unstable area, so JICA was unable to dispatch any long-term expert until January 2007. Hence, it was difficult to implement the project smoothly. At the time of the first management advisory survey conducted in May 2008, the progress of the project was reviewed and the delay of the project was indicated. As CEC was added as a new component in 2007, one and a half years after the project beginning, the period of cooperation had to be extended for two years, and the project completion date was extended from August 2008 to August 2010. Besides, some pilot projects such as the building of

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<sup>41</sup> Necessary costs of pilot projects sometimes expanded in the process of implementing them, and the increase of expenditure was allowed in case there were inevitable reasons for it such as cost increase of materials and construction. (Interviews with JICA local staff)

Aljiftlik village council needed to obtain a license from Israeli side, which was not necessarily granted in a timely manner and thus caused delays.

At the time of the terminal evaluation survey conducted in May 2010, three pilot projects had not yet been completed. Then, the period of cooperation was extended again up to December 2010. Most of the 15 pilot projects (9 existing and 6 new pilot projects) were completed by August 2010 by responding flexibly to obstacles that arose in their implementation process. However, three pilot projects (namely, the construction of service center in Mid-West JC, construction of kindergarten in South JC, and construction of VC building in South JC) could not be completed before August 2010 and were therefore extended again until December 2010. This was because of the unexpected amount of time taken for the procurement and arrangement of implementation, the difficulty of coordination with local contractors in implementing the project, and the delay of obtaining permits for land use for the construction of the building from Israeli authority, etc. Two projects among the three uncompleted pilot projects at the time of August were completed in December 2010, and the remaining project was completed in mid-2011<sup>42</sup>.

Judging from the process of the project mentioned above, the stagnation of the project until the beginning of 2007 was caused by external factors such as unstable Palestinian political situations. The two-years extension of the project period decided at the first management advisory survey in March 2008, and the further four-month extension of the project period decided at the terminal evaluation survey, were based on appropriate reasons that took into consideration the progress of the CEC, which was delayed because of obstacles derived from socio-political situations such as delays in obtaining permission from Israel. Then, the decisions of extension were regarded as appropriate.

Thus, the significant expansion of project costs were mainly caused by the CEC added to the project in 2007, and the significant extension of the period of cooperation was mainly caused by uncontrollable factors in the project.

Therefore, both the project cost and the period of cooperation significantly exceeded the plan, although there were reasonable factors behind the increase. Therefore, efficiency of the project is low.

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<sup>42</sup> The completion date of the project was considered to be December 2010, because that was the date for finalizing the project completion report and all works of experts were terminated at that moment, although one pilot project had not yet been completed by the end of December 2010.

## Column 2: Project implementation under unstable security conditions

This project faced unstable political conditions (external factor) during the period from the start of the project in September 2005 to the beginning of 2007. The course of events was as follows.

After Hamas became the ruling party in the election held in January 2006 and the establishment of the Hamas regime in March 2006, the relationship of Palestine with the international community deteriorated, and armed conflicts occurred frequently between Hamas and Fataha. The situation was relatively stable around the period of March 2007, when the Haniya integrated regime was established, but a large scale armed conflict occurred in June 2007. After the conflict, the regimes of West Bank and Gaza split. After that, the situation in West Bank became more stable.

The period of the suspension of new Japanese ODA projects was from April 2006 to August 2007, but existing projects were continued even during the period. In the case of this project, the Management Advisory Mission was sent in August 2006, and the JCspd workshop was held in the same month of 2006. The first long-term expert was dispatched in January 2007, and the mid-term evaluation survey was implemented in February 2007.

Because of the special situation in Palestine, it was difficult to find and dispatch an appropriate person as a long-term expert during the period from the beginning of the project in 2005 and 2006. Hence, JICA focused on dispatching short-term experts and utilized local human resources in its operations in the fields. After the start of the project, short-term experts were dispatched for drafting the LFP and JC Strategy in response to the needs of the counterpart, and efforts were made to keep to the schedule of activities for the project. The efforts of JICA to implement this project under such difficult conditions should be evaluated positively.

In the pilot projects of CEC starting 2007, 92 project proposals were proposed. Assistance was provided for 15 pilot projects in this JICA project, while assistance was provided for 22 projects among the remaining project proposals using the Grant Aid for Community Empowerment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Since so many project proposals were proposed in 2008, efforts were made to find other aid frameworks to assist in more projects that could not be covered by the CEC. JCs became the recipients of the following Grant Aid as counterparts of the individual projects, and the Grant Aid project has contributed to the improvement of living of local people in the same way as CEC. These efforts were much appreciated by the local residents. Thus, the CEC contributed to the formulation of a larger scale project under the Grant Aid (1.176 billion yen).

### 3.4 Sustainability (Rating: ①)

In the following section, sustainability in terms of the policy background, organizational, technical, and financial aspects is summarized, focusing on the services and financial resources of JCs and LGUs.

#### 3.4.1 Related Policy and Institutional Aspects for the Sustainability of Project Effects

In terms of the policy aspects, strengthening of institutional basis of local governments of Palestine and the establishment of the framework of local governance were prioritized in “Palestine National Development Plan 2011-2013”, and the focus was transformed to public service delivery and improvement of concrete services of local government in the new “Palestine Development Plan 2014-2016”. Furthermore, the “Strategic Framework of

Cross-sector Plan 2011-2013” and “Strategic Framework of MoLG 2010-2014” coincided with these national development plans.

On the other hand, in terms of the institutional foundation after the project completion, the amalgamation of LGUs to municipalities progressed in the West Bank as a whole, such as Hebron, but the number of active JCs did not increase. The types and budget of JCs did not increase and the reform of fixed assets tax as a new financial resource is still underway. Financial transfer from the central government to local government has not yet progressed under the situation of chronic financial deficit of Palestine Authority. In terms of JC Strategy, the MoLG could not take a definite stance between the two different approaches of focusing on the amalgamation of LGUs (which was the mainstream among other donors such as the World Bank and MDLF) and strengthening JCs. However, the long-term goal and direction (which is “Municipal services are improved through promotion of LGU amalgamation and formation of JCs.”) are shared between JICA and other major donors, and other major donors have begun to take a more pragmatic approach, while the two approaches are converging with each other.

Thus, stakeholders have begun to share the basic policies and direction of local governance, although the foundation of local finance and joint councils has not yet been established. Therefore, sustainability of the project effects is assured to some extent in terms of policy and institutional aspects.

#### 3.4.2 Organizational Aspects of the Implementing Agency for the Sustainability of Project Effects

In terms of organizational aspects, the Budget Department is responsible for local finance, and JCspd is responsible for joint councils, at the time of ex-post evaluation. That was the same during the project period. The Ministry of Finance has jurisdiction over the establishment of fixed assets tax system, which is the focus of the succeeding JICA project, and the Budget Department of the MoLG was involved in the issue but could not exert a substantial influence on it<sup>43</sup>. The number of staff of JCspd was strengthened to nine (including Director) during the project period, but was reduced to four after the project completion. At the time of ex-post evaluation, the number of staff increased to six (seven including a staff member of MoLG in Jenin), after two staff members were added by the support of BTC. At the end of 2014, the Policy Unit was established with the support of the Danish government. It is responsible for policy coordination and it serves as an example of reforms for a more effective organizational structure. In 2014, a part of the Administration Department was divided, and the Human Resource Department was established as a section to deal with the issue of human resource

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<sup>43</sup> Based on interviews with the MoF.

development<sup>44</sup>.

Among the four JCs (LGUs clusters), the South JC is still functional as a framework for LGUs to tackle their common issues and hold several meetings among them in the same way as during the period of the project. However, the Mid-West JC and North JC are now less active and hold joint meetings only where necessary. The Mid-East JC is only nominal with no meetings of JC, and each LGU is active autonomously. At the time of project completion, the necessity of monitoring the effectiveness of JCs was mentioned in JICA report, and frequent communication between the MoLG and JCs was carried out to monitor the activities of JCs. However, there were almost no concrete actions to strengthen the function of JCs, because the training system had not been established and there is no new budget which can be provided to JCs.

The Jericho Training Center was dissolved after the project completion. Jericho Municipality had the intention of continuing to provide the facility for free, but the top leaders of MoLG did not have the intention of establishing their own training center at the time<sup>45</sup>. The lack of training center shows the lack of will to continue training activities of MoLG by themselves.

Thus, although there are some positive factors, such as the trend of institutional reform of MoLG, and the increase in the number of staff of JCspd, there were some negative factors. For example, some JCs are not active in the JRRV area, and the training center was dissolved after the project completion. Therefore, there are some problems in terms of organizational aspects of the sustainability.

### 3.4.3 Technical Aspects of the Implementing Agency for the Sustainability of Project Effects

After the project completion, the training center was dissolved and no systematic training programs existed. A report titled “MoLG: Human Resource Capacity Development Strategy” was proposed by a consultant hired by BTC in December 2014, which mentioned the necessity of capacity development, but a concrete plan for strengthening technical capacity for the future has not yet been identified.

As systematic training was discontinued, manuals formulated under the project are not used in a systematic way and have not been revised. Ten trainers trained under the project are working in their respective departments as core staff, but not as trainers.

In a part of the programs in which assistance was provided by donors, seminars and training have been conducted on the techniques of financial management, project management, etc.<sup>46</sup> In other words, the staff of counterpart departments receiving assistance in the area of local

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<sup>44</sup> Human Resource Department consists of only two personnel including director, and is responsible for human development programs with assistance from BTC.

<sup>45</sup> Based on interviews with MoLG.

<sup>46</sup> Examples of donors are international donors such as GIZ, BTC, and international NGOs such as World Vision, Global Communication.

governance from major donors have many chances of training and have relatively high expertise, although the chances of training depend on the assistance from donors. Moreover, they have opportunities for OJT (On the Job Training) to enhance their capacity, because there are many foreign advisers such as JICA expert dispatched as an adviser for the next project (“Improving Local Governance System: Phase II”), and Danida advisers who are providing assistance on policy issues as long-term experts to MoLG. As to the individual and institutional capacity of the four JCs that were established during the project period, an assessment of capacity development was conducted in June 2010. The assessment report showed that there were differences in the levels of management capacities among the four JCs<sup>47</sup>.

Thus, the capacity of the staff who was involved in local governance issues, including the counterparts of the projects with assistance provided by donors, has improved. However, a training system for improvement of capacity of the MoLG has not been established, and opportunities for continuous training and capacity development have not been provided. Therefore, there are some problems in terms of technical aspects of the sustainability.

#### 3.4.4 Financial Aspects of the Implementing Agency for the Sustainability of Project Effects

##### (1) Financial Situation of JCs and LGUs

Financial transfer from central government to local governments has not progressed as a result of the chronic financial deficit of the Palestine Authority as a whole, and there have no major changes in terms of the budgetary and revenue structure of LGUs.

The revenue of LGUs comprises mainly of the financial transfer from the central government for the public services of electricity and water supply, and LGUs are trying to provide their public services within the limitation of their current budget. Transportation fees for maintenance of roads came from the central government in 2009, but were suspended later. It was decided that this would be resumed, but had not yet been distributed at the time of ex-post evaluation.

Based on the statistics<sup>48</sup> of the budget of each LGU between 2008 and 2014, the budget of LGUs of the four JCs is not stable and has been fluctuating significantly each year.

The MoF demonstrates a positive stance in establishing the fixed assets tax system as a stable financial source in the future, and JICA has been assisting in their activities in its successive project. Once the fixed assets tax system has been established, the share of the tax would become a large portion of the revenues of LGUs. However, it is still in the process of reform

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<sup>47</sup> The assessment report summarized the capacities of JCs as follows: “Technique” of individuals were relatively high in South JC and Mid-West JC, low but improving in North JC, low in Mid-East JC. “Intellectual resource” “operation & management system” “Monitoring and evaluation” of organizations were relatively high in North JC and South JC, low in Mid-West JC and Mid-East JC, “Financial management” “collaboration with ministries” were relatively high in Mid-West JC and South JC, low but improving in North JC, and low in Mid-East JC. Items were categories assessed in the report. (Based on the report provided by JICA.)

<sup>48</sup> Statistics provided by Budget Department of MoLG.

and there are no significant changes at this moment<sup>49</sup>.

In terms of the operation and management (O & M) of four JCs (LGU Clusters) and 15 pilot projects after the project completion, JCs do not have their own budget in general. JCs were the recipients of the CEC pilot projects and Grant Aid for Community Empowerment, but there is no other continuous budget for JCs and the basic structure is unchanged. The O & M budget of pilot projects has been paid for by LGUs, including the personnel costs of staff (such as librarians, bus drivers). The continuation of pilot projects faces budgetary constraints. As an example, the public bus of Aljiftlik (JC-E1, see Column 1) shows a surplus at the time of ex-post evaluation, but the O & M cost of the bus is expected to increase in the future. In the case of the school bus project in Mid-West JC (LGPP-2, see Column 1), two used buses were provided but only one bus is now in operation to reduce the O& M cost of buses and driver's fees. At women's center (LGPP-1), women's union has been continuing their activities by receiving financial support from NGOs such as Global Communication<sup>50</sup>.

## (2) Situation of Governmental Budget for Local Governance

The budgetary situation of Palestine Authority has been very serious, and its budget for local governance has depended on aid from international donors. This situation had remained the same up till now<sup>51</sup>.

The MDLF has been the largest financial resource for local governance, and approximately US\$250 million was provided in total during the four years of Phase 1 from 2009 to 2012. The financial assistance has been used for the improvement of infrastructure of LGUs, to supplement the budget of LGUs, for the emergency rehabilitation of the Gaza area, and for policy reforms and program management, among other activities. The MDLF has continued after 2013, and Phase 2 is now ongoing from 2013 to 2016. Major donors of the MDLF, which are the World Bank, GIZ, and Danida, have made commitment to continuing the assistance during the period of Phase 2.

Looking at the shares of financial resources for local governance in 2014, bilateral direct assistance from international donors including JICA made up 59% of the total, and that from MDLF made 23%, while the budget of MoLG made up only 18% of the total<sup>52</sup>.

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<sup>49</sup> In some municipalities which have the service of Solid Waste Management (SWM), the revenue from SWM shows a large share in total revenue.

<sup>50</sup> Global Communications is a civil organization assisted by USAID.

<sup>51</sup> The revenue of Palestinian Authority increased from 1.64 billion dollars in 2008 to 2.05 billion dollar in 2011, but revenues collected by the Palestinian Authority was only 370 million dollars of 2.05 billion dollars in 2011, because Israel controlled the export and import of Palestine and collected tariffs, and sent back to Palestinian Authority regularly. In November 2012, Israel stopped the transfer of clearance revenue of 100 million dollar to Palestine, as a countermeasure against the attainment of observer state at the United Nations by the Palestinian Authority, and the freeze of transfer has deteriorated the financial situations of Palestinian Authority furthermore.

<sup>52</sup> MoLG (Policy & Planning Unit), Donor Mapping, January 2015.

Thus, in terms of financial aspects, there is still a serious problem in the financial situation of Palestinian Authority as a whole, and this has been a major factor behind the unstable financial situation of LGUs and insufficient service delivery by JCs. Concrete activities, seminars and training have also depended on assistance provided by international donors.

The budget for local governance as a whole remains dependent on external resources. As international assistance in this area has been continued, the Palestinian government is expected to continue its efforts to improve the foundation of local governance using such external resources.

Therefore, major problems have been observed in terms of financial aspects, because the situation of shortage in budget of Palestine Authority have not been improved and are expected to continue. They are dependent upon assistance from international donors such as MDLF, although the establishment of a fixed assets tax system may improve the situation of local finance to some extent in the future.

Thus, minor problems have been observed in terms of the policy background, organizational, and technical aspects of the implementing agency, and major problems have been observed in terms of financial aspects. Therefore, sustainability of the project effects is low.

## **4. Conclusion, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations**

### **4.1 Conclusion**

The Project's objective was to improve the foundation of local governance system by clarifying the major issues of local finance and joint councils, formulating their policy and strategy for improvement, and strengthening the capacity of stakeholders in local governments.

The Palestine Authority regards the strengthening of institutional foundation as its most important policy, among which local finance and joint councils are prioritized. The CEC was added and started one and a half years after the beginning of the project, targeted at the JRRV that was the least developed area in the West Bank region. Therefore, this project coincides with government policies and development needs. The project also coincides with the Japanese government policy of strengthening its assistance to Palestine. However, at the time of the start of the project, a quite broad area of local governance had become the target of assistance, the logical relationship between outputs / project purposes and the overall goal was unclear, and thus there was a problem in a part of its approach. Thus, the project coincides with the development plan and development needs of Palestine and Japan's ODA policy, but there was a problem in its approach. Therefore, its relevance is fair.

As to the effectiveness of the project, the LFP and JC Strategy were approved by the MoLG, and JCs were strengthened to some extent through the CEC. However, the training system

initiated by the MoLG was not established; therefore, its effects have been limited. Although the improvement of the lives of local people in the JRRV area was the positive impact of this project, improvements in the services provided by LGUs and the financial decentralization to LGUs are still on the way. Thus, the project's effectiveness and impact are fair.

Both the project cost and the project period far exceeded the planned cost and period. Thus, its efficiency is low.

As to the sustainability of the project, necessary policies for sustaining the effects of the project continue, but there are some problems in terms of organizational and technical aspects, and a serious problem in the financial aspect. Thus, sustainability of the project is low.

In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be unsatisfactory.

## **4.2 Recommendations**

### 4.2.1 Recommendations to the Implementing Agency

(1) The necessity of establishing a training system for the MoLG (Recommendation to the MoLG)

The MoLG should improve its training system, formulate its training plan, and take concrete actions for human resource development of the MoLG and JCs as soon as possible. As examples, the MoLG is expected to formulate and implement its training program, by utilizing the former Jericho training center, to enhance the capacity of MoLG staff for formulating development plans and budget, capacity of LGU staff for carrying out accounting work, and the IT expertise of MoLG and LGU staff, etc.

(2) The necessity of closer cooperation between MoF and MoLG on the issue of local finance (recommendation to JCspd and Budget Department)

In the area of formation of local finance policy and financial resources of joint councils, the MoF has major authority in realizing those policies, therefore, the MoLG should formulate its action plan for improving financial policy and financial resources of JCs in close cooperation with the MoF. As an example, a concrete action plan is expected to be formulated in a revised version of LFP, in collaboration with the MoF. Also, close collaboration should be maintained between JCspd, Budget Department, and the MoF to formulate concrete measures for resolving the financial problems raised in the JC Strategy.

### 4.2.2 Recommendations to JICA

(1) To encourage the MoLG and the MoF to collaborate

As local finance and joint councils have close relationships with each other, JICA has been assisting the MoF in the area of local finance, and the MoLG in the area of Joint Councils, in its

successive projects in those areas. As the close collaboration between the two ministries is essential for securing financial resources and improving public services in local governments, and JICA has been assisting both ministries in its programs, JICA is expected to put effort into encouraging the collaboration between the two ministries, and to help make policies and plans more effective.

### **4.3 Lessons Learned**

(1) Effective implementation of projects that include multiple components and different ministries

This project included three different components of local finance, joint councils, and training. In light of assisting the improvement of local governance, the MoLG became the counterpart agency in all components. However, involvement of the MoF was essential to bringing about the realization of financial reforms in local governance such as LFP, and the transfer of financial resources to LGUs. Therefore, the approach of this project, which focused on MoLG the a counterpart, had its limitations in making reform plans and policies effective. In that sense, JICA's approach of focusing on the MoF in the successive JICA project on local finance was appropriate, and it is important for JICA to encourage the two ministries to collaborate with each other in implementing plans and policies of local governance.

In the case of a project to assist with governance reforms, including the formulation of strategies and plans of local governance as well as budgetary and finance reforms, it is necessary to gain the positive support of all related ministries for the project, and to maintain close collaboration among them, in order to achieve the purposes of the project (The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Local Government are almost always important in any country). The counterpart(s) of the project must be selected carefully and appropriately at the time of planning. Multiple ministries could be the counterparts of one project, or multiple projects in one ministry as a counterpart could also be considered as far as related ministries could collaborate with each other. In any case, it is essential to keep the involvement of related ministries in the project at the time of planning, and to make clear the roles and concrete activities of those related ministries and organizations.

(2) Implementation of a project of comprehensive governance assistance, in the case of adding a large scale component to the project

In this project, the total cost of the project increased significantly and the period of cooperation was extended significantly as well, mainly because a large scale component (CEC) was added in the middle of the project period (one and a half years after the start of the project), which was not included in the original plan. Although the CEC was regarded to contribute to

“the strengthening of joint councils” in its PDM, in reality, the CEC was quite in line with the project purpose of the Grant Aid for community empowerment, namely “the improvement of access to public services at the community level (in JRRV),” as inferred from the fact that many sub-projects proposals of CEC were implemented under the Grant Aid project.

This project was a comprehensive governance assistance to promote administrative and financial reforms. It sometimes happens to add new activities and/or modify original PDM flexibly, responding to the real situations and/or needs of counterparts, after the start of the project to assist in the administrative and financial reforms of the counterpart countries. In the event that the additional component, though along with its project purpose, has a different factor in substance, and is a large component in terms of the cost, it would be advisable to separate the additional component from the original project and to implement it separately, in light of effectiveness of the project.

(3) Evaluation standards of the projects implemented under difficult conditions such as projects in fragile states and projects for peace building, which are vulnerable to external factors

This project tackled the difficult issues of strengthening the foundation of local governance in Palestine, under extremely unstable political and socio-economic circumstances. In the case of evaluation based on standard DAC 5 items, the evaluation ratings of effectiveness and efficiency of such projects tend to be worse, because the projects are vulnerable to negative political and economic external factors.

The low ratings of such projects may discourage the motivation to undertake projects under difficult conditions in the future. While it is necessary to apply common evaluation standards to all projects in the light of objectivity, it is also necessary to take all methods into considerations from political and diplomatic perspectives or in light of the long-term impacts of the projects, so as not to reduce the likelihood of initiating these projects, As an example, supplementing the evaluation is an option that can be explored, by setting other standards for projects implemented under difficult conditions, such as in cases where governmental agencies are still fragile or where external factors (especially security situations) strongly affect the project implementation. Besides, the lessons learned and experiences of from those projects conducted under difficult conditions, such as projects in fragile states and projects for peace-building, should be accumulated and utilized for future project planning and implementation.

Annex: Situations of Achievement by Outcomes

Output	Indicators	Status	Points of Evaluation
Output1: Major issues of local finance are clarified and a basic policy for improvement of local finance is recognized and promoted in MoLG.	① Local finance policy is drafted.	Achieved	The first version of LFP was completed in March 2008, and reviewed by major LGUs in West Bank, and the final version of it was completed in June 2009.
	② Concerned people understand local finance policy sufficiently.	Achieved	Leaflets were also produced based on the final version, and distributed to the stakeholders in the government and members of LGUs, and its existence was recognized among donors' community.
Output2: Major issues for joint councils are clarified and a strategy for improvement of service delivery is recognized and promoted by MoLG.	① JC strategy is drafted.	Achieved	The final version of the JC Strategy was completed in March 2010.
	② DJCspd and Regional Directorates of MoLG understand JC strategy sufficiently.	Achieved	Workshops were held about 10 times, and stakeholders of MoLG were invited during the process of drafting the JC Strategy. Leaflets on the JC Strategy were also made and distributed to the stakeholders of local governance at the seminars etc.
	③ Experiences and lessons learned from pilot projects are included in the JC strategy annex document.	Partly achieved	The lessons were not summarized at the time of terminal evaluation, because of the delay in the pilot projects. The experiences of pilot projects were summarized in the Project Completion Report in December 2010, and the key points were summarized in the JC Strategy: Annex.
	④ Number of dissemination activities for JC strategy organized by DJCspd.	Achieved	Leaflets on the JC Strategy were produced and distributed to the stakeholders in local governance at the seminars etc.
Output3: Needs of LGUs are identified and MoLG is able to implement training for capacity development of LGUs.	① 10 trainers are trained.	Achieved	Staff from each department of MoLG were trained and 10 staff became trainers.
	② Training materials which reflect needs of LGUs are developed.	Achieved	Training materials were drafted with the assistance of JICA experts.
	③ 1,000 LGU and JC members are trained.	Achieved	More than 2,600 LGUs and stakeholders of the Joint Councils participated in seminars.
	④ 10 trained trainers are able to conduct trainings with the developed training materials.	Partly achieved	10 trainers trained under the project taught the core staff of MoLG and LGUs. (Training was not conducted after 2011.)
	⑤ 70% of participants evaluate the training above 4 out of 5 levels.	Achieved	Based on the survey conducted by external consultants, 18 courses were evaluated by participants above 4 out of 5 levels on average, among 20 courses conducted since March 2009 to April 2010.
	⑥ Training plan of the training center based on financial analysis is prepared.	Not achieved	Training Plan with financial projection had not been drawn up at the time of project completion.