United Republic of Tanzania/ Republic of Rwanda

FY2017 Ex-Post Evaluation of Japanese Grant Aid Project

"The Project for Construction of Rusumo International Bridge and One Stop Border Post Facilities"

External Evaluator: Tomoyuki Sho, IC Net Limited

0. Summary

The objective of this project is to ease the traffic restrictions and facilitate the border-crossing procedures at the Rusumo border between Rwanda and Tanzania through the reconstruction of the Rusumo International Bridge and the construction of One Stop Border Post (hereinafter referred to as "OSBP[1]") facilities, thereby contributing to the smooth and stable logistics and distribution of goods along the Central Corridor.

Since the project was consistent with the national development policies and road/transport sector strategies of Rwanda and Tanzania and their development needs at the times of planning and ex-post evaluation, as well as Japan's aid policy at the time of planning, its relevance is high. The outputs, such as the constructions of a bridge, roads, and border post facilities, had been produced as planned, and the project period and the project cost were both within the plan. Therefore, the efficiency is high. By reconstructing the Rusumo bridge, this project has eased gross weight and speed restrictions for travelling vehicles and enabled large trucks, which could not cross the bridge before, to pass through smoothly. Moreover, owning to the development of the OSBP facilities, the border-crossing procedures based on the OSBP system and the 24-hour operation of the OSBP facilities have been implemented by the time of ex-post evaluation. And the time necessary for customs and border-crossing procedures has been dramatically shortened, and the transportation cost for a cargo for a round trip between Dar es Salaam and Kigali has also been reduced as expected. Furthermore, due to the elimination of a bottleneck, the numbers of vehicles passing through the Rusumo border and the Central Corridor have substantially increased, and it has helped accelerate the development and improvement of the entire Central Corridor. Thus, the effectiveness and impact of the project are high. As for the operation and maintenance, no specific problem has been identified in terms of its technical aspect. However, there is a concern about the staffing level and operational budget for customs and immigration as their workloads at the OSBP facilities have been expanding along with the increasing traffic volume. In addition, X-ray scanners for cargo inspection, which were to be borne by the Rwandan and Tanzanian sides, have not been installed yet due to budgetary reasons. Therefore, the sustainability of the project is fair.

In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be highly satisfactory.

[1] The One Stop Border Post (OSBP) is a system that makes the border-crossing procedures, such as customs, quarantine, and immigration control, which used to be handled separately both at the entry and exit points, completed at once through jointly managing the procedures by two countries for the purpose of promoting the logistics and distribution of goods.

1. Project Description



Project Site

Rusumo Bridge Built by the Project

OSBP Facilities Constructed by the Project

1. 1. Background

Rusumo, the target area of this project, is located at the border of Rwanda and Tanzania on the Central Corridor (total length of 1,463 km), which extends from the Port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to the Rwandan capital of Kigali. The Central Corridor is an economic corridor within the East African Community (hereinafter referred to as "EAC") region, which rivals to the Northern Corridor connecting Kenya–Uganda–Rwanda. And it is an important alternative logistics route to the Northern Corridor particularly for a landlocked Rwanda.

At the time of planning, however, the Rusumo bridge that connects Rwanda and Tanzania had already been in use for nearly 40 years and its design load capacity was limited, as well. Thus, heavy trucks with a gross weight of more than 32 tons had to transport goods to Kigali via the Northern Corridor by running an extra distance of about 400km. Moreover, because the Rusmo bridge was a single lane, it had been chronically congested with travelling vehicles. Thus, it was urgently needed to replace the bridge to accommodate the increasing size of vehicles and the growing traffic volume. Furthermore, the Rusumo border post had limited parking spaces compared to its traffic volume and had a shortage of the personnel stationed. Consequently, it

had become to take a long time for customs and border-crossing procedures, and the dwell time of cargo trucks heading from Tanzania to Rwanda at the border had become exceeding 24 hours. Therefore, it had become a priority for both Rwanda and Tanzania to eliminate the bottleneck in the border and promote the logistics and distribution of goods along the Central Corridor by replacing the bridge and constructing and operationalizing the OSBP facilities at the Rusumo border post.

Against this background, the Government of Rwanda and the Government of Tanzania made requests to the Government of Japan in July 2007 and February 2009, respectively, for grant aid for the purpose of reconstructing the Rusumo bridge located at the border of Rwanda and Tanzania and developing the OSBP facilities.



Source: *Preparatory Survey Report* (Images of Rusumo Bridge, OSBP Facilities, and New Roads)

Figure 1. Project site location Map of Rusumo Bridge, Access Roads, and OSBP Facilities

1. 2. Project Outline

The objective of this project is to ease the traffic restrictions and facilitate the border-crossing procedures at the Rusumo border between Rwanda and Tanzania through the reconstruction of the Rusumo International Bridge and the construction of the OSBP facilities, thereby contributing to the smooth and stable logistics and distribution of goods along the Central Corridor[2].

[2] The Ex-Ante Evaluation Report states the objective of this project as "easing the traffic restrictions and facilitating the border-crossing procedures at the Rusumo border between Rwanda and Tanzania through the reconstruction of the Rusumo International Bridge and the construction of the OSBP facilities" and does not mention any impact. But the report lists as the qualitative effects of this project the leveling of the distribution of goods that had been over-dependent on the Northern Corridor and the contribution to smoother and more stable logistics throughout East Africa. Moreover, with regard to the higher goals and project objectives, the Preparatory Survey Report mentions that "the project is essential to ensure safe and swift cross-border cargo transportation." Therefore, this evaluation regards "the smooth and stable logistics and distribution of goods along the Central Corridor" as the impact of this project.

Grant Limit / Actual Grant Amount	Tanzania (D/D): 40 million yen / 39 million yen Tanzania (Main Work): 1,860 million yen / 1,625 million yen Rwanda (D/D): 40 million yen / 39 million yen Rwanda (Main Work): 1,860 million yen / 1,625 million yen
Exchange of Notes Date / Grant Agreement Date	Tanzania (D/D): March 2011 / March 2011 Tanzania (Main Work): August 2011 / August 2011 Rwanda (D/D): March 2011 / March 2011 Rwanda (Main Work): September 2011 / September 2011
Executing Agency	Tanzania: Tanzania National Roads Authority (TANROADS) Rwanda: Rwanda Transport Development Agency (RTDA)
Project Completion	December 2014
Main Contractor	Daiho Corporation
Main Consultants	Chodai Co., Ltd. / Nippon Koei Co., Ltd (JV)
Basic Design	November 2009–October 2010
Related Projects	Technical Cooperation Projects: Tanzania: ・ Project for the Comprehensive Transport and Trade System Development Master Plan (2011–2013) Tanzania / Rwanda: ・ Project for Capacity Building for the Customs Administrations of the Eastern African Region (2007–2009) ・ Project for Capacity Building for the Customs Administrations of the Eastern African Region (Phase 2) (2009–2013) ・ Project on Capacity Development for International Trade Facilitation in the Eastern African Region (2013–2017) ODA Loan Projects: Tanzania: ・ Arusha-Namanga-Athi River Road Development Project (2007–2014) ・ Road Sector Support Project (2010–2013) ・ Road Sector Support Project 2 (2013–2017) Rwanda: ・ Rusumo-Kayonza Road Improvement Project (2016–) Other International Organizations and Aid Organizations, etc.: Tanzania: ・ World Bank "Dar es Salaam Port Development Projects" (1979–) (Loan) ・ World Bank "Integrated Roads Program Project" (1990–2004) (Loan) ・ Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) "Dar es Salaam-Mlandizi Road Upgrading Project" (1998–2001) (Grant aid) ・ DANIDA "Chalinze-Melela Road Rehabilitation Project" ・ (2001–2004) (Grant aid) ・ African Development Bank (AfDB) "Shelui-Nzega Road Upgrading Project" (2003–2005) (Loan) ・ AfDB "Nelson Mandela Road Improvement Project" (2003–2010) (Grant aid) ・ European Development Fund (EDF) "Morogoro-Dodoma and Mandela Road Upgrading Project" (2004–2010) (Grant aid)) ・ World Bank "Singida-Shelui Road Improvement Project"

	(2005–2007) (Loan) ・ EDF "Isaka-Lusahunga Road Upgrading Project" (2007–2008) (Grant aid)) ・ AfDB "Singida-Minjingu Road Upgrading Project" (2009–2010) (Loan) ・ AfDB "Namanga OSBP Construction Project" (2011–2012) (Loan) ・ International Development Association (IDA) "Taveta OSBP Construction Project" (2011–2012) (Loan) ・ IDA "Lunga-Lunga OSBP Construction Project" (2011–2012) (Loan) ・ IDA "Mutukula OSBP Construction Project" (2011–2012) (Loan) ・ IDA "Ishibania OSBP Construction Project" (2011–2012) (Loan) Rwanda: ・ EDF "Kigali-Kayonza Road Upgrading Project" (2005)

2. Outline of the Evaluation Study

2. 1. External Evaluator

Tomoyuki Sho, IC Net Limited

2. 2. Duration of Evaluation Study

This ex-post evaluation study was conducted with the following schedule.

Duration of the Study: November 2017 – December 2018

Duration of the Field Study: March 1 – 28, 2018; June 27 – July 11, 2018

3. Results of the Evaluation (Overall Rating: A[3])

3. 1. Relevance (Rating:③[4])

3. 1. 1. Consistency with the Development Plans of Rwanda and Tanzania

At the time of planning, Tanzania's national development policy documents *Tanzania Development Vision 2025* (formulated in 1999) and *National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty* (NSGRP) (formulated in 2005) listed the expansion of infrastructure projects related to road network construction as a priority objective for promoting the growth of the economy and development across regions. The country's development strategy document for the transport sector *10 Year Transport Sector Investment Program* (TSIP) (formulated in 2008) also prioritized the strengthening of the development and maintenance of international trunk roads. Similarly, Rwanda's development policy documents *Rwanda Vision 2020* (formulated in 2000) and *Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy* (EDPRS) (formulated in 2007) mentioned that developing transport infrastructure is essential for the growth of the economy and ranked the improvement of international roads and the construction of road network as a high priority in the road sector. Besides, the

[3] A: Highly satisfactory, B: Satisfactory, C: Partially satisfactory, D: Unsatisfactory

[4] ③: High, ②: Fair, ①: Low

country's development strategy document for the transport sector *Transport Sector Policy* (formulated in 2008) stressed the importance of improving the national road connectivity and the connectivity with neighboring countries, and mentioned the development of regional roads, including the Rusumo bridge, and the plan of developing OSBP facilities in Rusumo as priority programs. Furthermore, EAC has been undertaking initiatives for improving cross-border transport mobility and reducing transportation cost, and it aimed at the introduction of OSBP in 15 sites, including the Rusumo border, at the time of planning.

Even at the time of ex-post evaluation, Tanzania's *Five Year Development Plan* (FYDP II) (formulated in 2016) places priority on expanding the infrastructure projects, and the *5th Five-Year Strategic Plan* (formulated in 2018) of the Tanzania National Roads Agency (hereinafter referred to as "TANROADS") lists the improvement of the road section between Lusahunga and Rusumo on the Central Corridor as one of the strategic projects. Likewise, in Rwanda, the draft transport sector strategic plan (drafted in 2018) for the *National Strategy for Transformation* (NST), which is under development, continues to regard the construction of OSBP facilities as a priority for reducing border post crossing time and promoting regional transport and cross-border trade facilitation.

In light of the above, this project is consistent with the development policies and road/transport sector strategies of Rwanda and Tanzania.

3. 1. 2. Consistency with the Development Needs of Rwanda and Tanzania

At the time of planning, there were security concerns about the aging Rusumo Bridge, which was built in 1972. And because it was a single lane, the traffic flow was restricted and thus the areas around the bridge were always congested with travelling vehicles. In addition, due to a limited design load capacity, any large truck with a gross vehicle weight of more than 32 tons had to travel through the Northern Corridor rather than the Central Corridor to head for Rwanda. Therefore, to cope with the increasing size of vehicles and the growing traffic volume, replacing the bridge was an urgent issue. Moreover, whereas the vehicle passing through the Rusumo border needed to complete the customs and border-crossing procedures separately both at the Rwandan side and the Tanzanian side, the Rusumo border post had limited parking spaces relative to its traffic volume and had a shortage of the assigned staff, resulting in a long time for the customs and border-crossing procedures. Consequently, the dwell time of cargo trucks heading from Tanzania to Rwanda at the border is believed to have exceeded 24 hours. Thus, there was an expectation that the construction and operationalization of the Rusumo OSBP facilities, together with the reconstruction of the bridge, would resolve the bottleneck at the border post.

Even at the time of ex-post evaluation, traffic volume has significantly increased since the elimination of the bottleneck. Thus, the needs for the expansion and improvement of the border post facilities and connecting roads to Rusumo continue to exist. At the same time, this project has been mutually complemented with the Kigali-Kayonza Road Improvement Project (2005) by the European Development Fund (EDF), the Rusumo-Kayonza Road Improvement Project (2006-) with the Japanese ODA loan, as well as the efforts to introduce OSBP within the EAC region, and so on. It is confirmed that there have existed good coordination and a clear

division of roles with other donors and projects.

In light of the above, this project is consistent with the development needs of Rwanda and Tanzania.

3. 1. 3. Consistency with Japan's ODA Policy

The *Yokohama Action Plan* (formulated in 2008) of the 4th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) declared a policy to support the promotion of trade through expanding regional infrastructure and a goal of promoting OSBP assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Also, at the time of planning, the *Country Assistance Program for Tanzania* (formulated in 2008) stated a focus on assistance in the transport sector such as road, and promised to work actively on the facilitation of international traffic within the surrounding areas. Moreover, *ODA Country Data Book 2009* promises to carry out "the improvement of economic infrastructure in Rwanda both on the construction of physical infrastructure and the provision of technical assistance, while focusing on the road/transport and energy fields."

Therefore, consistency between the project and Japan's ODA policy is high.

In light of the above, this project is highly relevant to the development policies and development needs of Rwanda and Tanzania, as well as Japan's ODA policy. Thus, its relevance is high.

3. 2. Efficiency (Rating:③)

3. 2. 1. Project Outputs

Table 1 shows the actual outputs of this project. Apart from 25 design changes, the outputs such as a bridge, access roads, and border post facilities, have been constructed and procured as planned. The design changes were done appropriately as adjustments to the situations on the ground or compliances with the local regulations by means of responding requests for design improvement made by the Rwandan and/or Tanzanian side, such as cases in the additional installments of sidewalks and drainage ditches.

Table 1. Actual Construction of Facilities and Procurement of Equipment

Facility		Specification
New Rusumo International Bridge	Road Class	National Highway
	Design Speed	50km/hr
	Road Width Configuration	1.5m+0.5m+2×3.25m+0.5m+1.5m=10.5m
	Total Length	Total Length 80.0m
	Type of Superstructure	Simple Composite Steel Box Girder (Use of Atmospheric Corrosion-resistant Steel)
	Type of Substructure	Reversed T-type Abutments
	Type of Concrete Slab	RC Slab
	Pavement Structure	Asphalt Paving (Main Road: 8cm, Sidewalk: 4cm)
	Live Load Conditions	B Live Load (Specifications for Highway Bridges); NA+45NB (SATCC)
New Access Road Pavements on OSBP	Pavement Specifications	Standard Concrete Pavement (Width: 15cm)
	Design Traffic Volume	T<250 vehicles/day
	Total Length	about 2,000m

Premises	Road Width	9.5m (Main Road: 3.5m×2, Shoulder: 1.25m×2)
OSBP Facilities	Total Area ・Administration Building ・Verification Storage ・Control Shed ・Guard House ・Equipment - PCs and Peripheral Equipment - Emergency Generator - Forklift - Internal Telephone System	Rwanda-side: 2.6ha, Tanzania-side: 1.4ha ・Rwanda-side: 1,116m^2, Tanzania-side: 1,116m^2 ・Rwanda-side: 1,408m^2, Tanzania-side: 547m^2 ・Rwanda-side: 560m^2, Tanzania-side: 330m^2 ・Rwanda-side: 63m^2, Tanzania-side: 54m^2 - Rwanda & Tanzania: 20 pcs each - Rwanda & Tanzania: 1 each - Rwanda & Tanzania: 1 each - Rwanda & Tanzania: 1 set (25 telephones) each

Sources: Materials provided by JICA, site visits, face-to-face interviews and questionnaire surveys

With regard to the quality of the outputs, although a damage stemming from a slope erosion of a retaining wall occurred at the OSBP facilities at the Tanzanian side during the defect liability period, it has properly repaired. However, only the section of the slope considered to have a high risk of landslide had become a subject of protection (by mortar spraying), and at the time of ex-post evaluation, a section of the slope that was not a subject of protection has partially collapsed and left unattended. In addition, partial erosion and cracks in a concrete pavement have occurred at a corner of the parking lot because a part of the parking lot where an X-ray scanner for cargo inspection was planned to be installed had not been paved with concrete. Moreover, a capacity shortage of emergency power generators has caused a problem. No other specific quality problem has been found[5].

3. 2. 2. Project Inputs

3. 2. 2. 1. Project Cost

Because data on the actual project cost borne by the Rwandan side and the Tanzanian side could not be obtained except some partial data[6], the project cost has been evaluated using the cost borne by the Japanese side only. The actual cost turned out to be 88% of the plan (see Table 2).

[5] Some officials, however, pointed out that safety measures such as firefighting measures at the OSBP facilities and the construction of sidewalks had been inadequate because of a limited budget and a resulting focus on a simple design. In particular, some have complained that fire hydrants and adequate firefighting equipment have not been put at the OSBP facilities. According to the officials, no clear standards for the installation of firefighting equipment were in place at the OSBP facilities at the time of planning.

[6] According to interviews with the officials from the executing and related agencies, the matters borne by the Rwandan and Tanzanian sides (environment impact assessment (EIA), land acquisition, banking arrangement (B/A), and authorization to pay (A/P)) have been carried out as planned. (The actual EIA expenses borne by Rwanda is USD 69,000, compared to the budgeted amount of USD 75,000. Data on other actual amounts could not be obtained.)

Table 2. Planned and Actual Project Costs

(Unit: million yen)

	Plan	Actual	As Percentage of the Plan (%)
Total Project Cost	3,920	--	--
Cost borne by Japanese side	3,800	3,330	87.6
(Main Work)	3,720	3,251	87.4
Construction cost	--	3,012	--
Equipment cost	--	33	--
Design and supervision cost	--	206	--
(Detailed Design)	80	79	98.8
Cost borne by Rwandan side and Tanzanian side	120	--	--

Source: Materials provided by JICA

As for the reasons why the actual cost had fallen well within the planned cost, officials from the executing and related agencies cited a relatively cheap bidding price by the contractor[7], effective project management, etc[8]. In light of the above, the project cost was within the plan.

3. 2. 2. 2. Project Period

As shown in Table 3, the actual project period was three months shorter than the planned period (93% of the plan). According to interviews with the officials from the executing and related agencies, the factors such as the speedy drawing-up of the detailed design and its implementation, smooth procurement, and the proper project monitoring and prompt attentions to potential problems by the executing agencies and the construction consultant, all contributed to a reduction in the project period. In short, the project period was within schedule.

Table 3. Planned and Actual Project Periods

Plan		Actual		As Percentage of the Plan
March 2011 (signing of D/D contract[9]) – July 2014 (completion)	41 months	November 2011 (signing of D/D contract) – December 2014 (completion)	38 months	−3 months 92.7%

Source: Materials provided by JICA

In light of the above, both the project cost and project period were within the plan, and the efficiency of the project is high.

[7] Since more than one contractors bid, the principle of competition worked and the bidding price became relatively cheaper than the expected one.

[8] In addition, foreign exchange affected it.

[9] According to the Ex-Ante Evaluation Report, the planned period was for 41 months. But the report does not indicate the starting point. The time schedule of the Preparatory Survey Report, on the other hand, shows a 40-month period with the signing of D/D contract as its starting point. Thus, by adopting the latter and counting both months at the start and end of the period, this evaluation assumes that the planned period was 41 months. The construction completion date is regarded as the completion of the project.

The OSBP facilities have been operating smoothly by the time of ex-post evaluation. Yet, after completion of this project, the introduction of the border-crossing procedures based on the OSBP system had to be wait until March 2016 (officially in April), and the 24-hour operation of the OSBP facilities began in October 2017. The primary causes for the delays are the lagged supply of electricity and purchase of furniture such as desks and chairs at the Tanzanian side, and it also took time to secure staff accommodation facilities at Tanzania side. Moreover, because the OSBP facilities started using the water source which had been utilized by the local community, an incident broke out in which the disgruntled local residents sabotaged the water distribution lines to the OSBP facilities, which delayed the operationalization of the OSBP system. Finally, given that the executing agencies of this project were road agencies, sometimes it became less clear which executing and related agencies to take leading roles at the stages of introducing the OSBP system, and thus it took a fair amount of time to coordinate among the stakeholders. Still, at the Rwandan side, the preparation for introducing the OSBP system had been completed by February 2015.

3. 3. Effectiveness and Impacts[10] (Rating:③)

3. 3. 1. Effectiveness

3. 3. 1. 1. Quantitative Effects (Operation and Effect Indicators)

At the time of planning, five quantitative indicators were selected for measuring the effectiveness of this project, and their targets were set (see Table 4). But many of those indicators and targets were not clearly or appropriately defined for measuring the effects of this project, and thus it was not possible to use many of them in their originals. To address the issue, this evaluation has selected alternative indictors.

Table 4. Quantitative Indicators for Effectiveness

Indicator	Baseline (2010)	Target (2017) [Three years after project completion]
Restriction on maximum axle load for the vehicle passing through the Rusumo bridge (t)	8	20
Speed limit for the vehicle passing through the Rusumo bridge (km/h)	5	30
Number of customs/border-crossing procedures (entry points)	5	2
Time to complete border-crossing procedures (hrs)(*)	Approximately 14	Approximately 5 – 10
Transportation cost (for a round trip between the Port of Dar es Salaam and Kigali) (USD/40-foot container)	3,130 (2008)	3,050 Reduction of approximately USD 1.8 million per year

Source: Materials provided by JICA

*Note: According to the Preliminary Survey Report, the introduction of the OSBP system was expected to shorten the border-crossing procedures and thus relieve traffic congestion at the parking spaces through conducing border-crossing examination only at the entry side. In particular, a time reduction was anticipated by consolidating the customs procedures for large vehicles heading from Tanzania to

[10] Sub-rating for Effectiveness is to be made with consideration of Impact.

Rwanda, which had previously been done at the Rusumo border and at the dry port in Kigali. Although this indicator is referred to as "Time to complete a round trip" in the Ex-Ante Evaluation Report, the name of the indicator has been modified to the time to complete border-crossing procedures in this evaluation to make it fit in the way it is described; that is, the time necessary to complete border-crossing procedures for large trucks "heading from Tanzania to Rwanda."

With respect to the indicator "Restriction on maximum axle load for the vehicle passing through the Rusumo bridge," restrictions on the single-axle load, double-axle load, and triple axle road have been revised to 10 tons, 18 tons, and 24 tons, respectively, after completion of the project, in accordance with the EAC's overloading regulations. As long as the single and double axles are concerned, therefore, the easing of the axle load restriction to the target of 20 tons has not been achieved. Yet, according to the face-to-face interviews with the officials from the executing and related agencies, the primary causes that prevented large trucks from passing through the Rusumo bridge at the time of planning were restrictions on gross vehicle weight (32 tons), as well as chronic congestion stemming from the one-lane bridge and security concerns due to its aging. It has nothing directly to do with the axle load restriction. At the time of ex-post evaluation, the restriction on the gross vehicle weight has been relaxed to 56 tons due to the increased design load capacity of the Rusumo bridge. Subsequently, it has become possible for four large trucks to pass through at the same time, and this has greatly contributed to the elimination of the bottleneck at the border post (see Table 5). Therefore, after reinterpreting this indicator as "restriction on gross vehicle for the vehicle passing through the Rusumo bridge," this evaluation has concluded that its target has been achieved.

Table 5. Restriction on Gross Vehicle Weight for the Vehicle Passing through the Rusumo Bridge and Design Load Capacity

(Unit: ton)

Indicator	Baseline (2010)	Actual (2018)
Restriction on gross vehicle weight for the vehicle passing through the Rusumo bridge	32	56
Design Load Capacity of the Rusumo bridge	80	Approximately 200

Sources: Site visits, face-to-face interviews, and questionnaire surveys

With regard to the indicator "Speed limit for the vehicle passing through the Rusumo bridge (km/h)," it is confirmed that a speed limit of 40km/h has been achieved at the time of ex-post evaluation, exceeding the target of 30km/h.

Table 6. Speed Limit for the Vehicle Passing through the Rusumo Bridge

(Unit: km/hour)

Indicator	Baseline (2010)	Target (2017) [Three years after project completion]	Actual (2018)
Speed limit for the vehicle passing through the Rusumo Bridge	5	30	40

Sources: Site visits, face-to-face interviews, and questionnaire surveys

Regarding the indicator "Number of customs/border-crossing procedures (entry points)," its definition is unclear. Despite the interviews with the officials from the executing and related agencies, it has not become obvious which procedures or entry points the baseline value of "5" and the target value of "2" have counted[11]. Yet, as mentioned above, the border-crossing procedures based on the OSBP system were introduced in March 2016, and the 24-hour operation of the OSBP facilities began in October 2017. The site visits and interviews also confirmed that customs and border-crossing procedures have been consolidated into the OSBP facilities at Rwanda and Tanzania sides, and they have been operating smoothly as originally planned (see Photos 1 and 2). Thus, although this evaluation has not adopted the indicator, the project outcome, which the indicator was supposed to measure, is judged to have been achieved.

Photo 1. OSBP Facilities–Administration Building

Photo 2. OSBP Facilities–Control Shed, Guard House

With regard to the indicator "Time to complete border-crossing procedures," no record was available as to under which conditions and assumptions, the baseline and target values had been measured and selected. Since actual data measured immediately after completion of the project were not available either, it was not possible to check directly the extent to which the target of the indicator has been accomplished. Still, according to the time measurement survey conducted by the technical cooperation "Project on Capacity Development for International Trade Facilitation in the Eastern African Region," the average dwell time at the Rusumo border post for the cargo truck heading from Tanzania to Rwanda had decreased by 73% between August 2014 and February 2017 (the median decreased by 68%). Considering that during the same period, the project completed in December 2014 and the operationalization of the OSBP facilities started in March 2016, it is reasonable to assume that the project has significantly contributed to those reductions in the dwell times[12].

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[11] It may have been the case that a total of five locations, being composed of those for customs procedures (2) and immigration procedures (2) at both the Rwandan and Tanzanian sides, as well as that for customs procedures at the dry port in Kigali (1), had been expected to be consolidated into two locations at the OSBP facilities. But, according to the officials, making the baseline "5" is not consistent with the reality of the situation because the border-crossing procedures also include quarantine, security clearance, and others.

[12] However, the Single Customs Territory (SCT) system commenced at the Port of Dar es Salaam in July 2014 and subsequently rolled out to enable uniform processing of the pre-arrival declaration and customs clearance of cargo. The posterior data is likely to have reflected those effects, as well. On the other hand, as of August 2014, large parking spaces had already been constructed by this project, whereas as of February 2017, the 24-hour operation of the OSBP facilities had not started yet. Therefore, there is a possibility that project effects on the reduction in the time to complete border-crossing procedures are actually larger than this before-after data comparison suggests.

Table 7. Cargo Dwell Time at the Rusumo Border Post

(Unit: hours/minutes)

Indicator	August 2014	February 2017	Rate of change (%)
Cargo dwell time at the Rusumo border post, heading from Tanzania toward Rwanda: Average	8h42m	2h20m	-73%
Cargo dwell time at the Rusumo border post, heading from Tanzania toward Rwanda: Median	5h1m	1h36m	-68%

Source: JICA Project on Capacity Development for International Trade Facilitation in the East African Region, *Endline Time Measurement Survey at Rusumo Border Crossing – Final Report* (May 2017).

Similarly, the data from the Central Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency (hereinafter referred to as "CCTTFA") indicate that the average border crossing time at the Rusumo border post for trucks had declined by 59% from 1.70 hours to 0.69 hours between 2015 and 2016[13]. The interviews with the drivers of large trucks carried out at the Rusumo border post also confirmed that the time to complete border-crossing procedures had been dramatically reduced after completion of the project. On a side note, the average border crossing time of 0.69 hours at the Rusumo OSBP is significantly shorter than that of 2 hours at the Mutukula OSBP (Uganda/Tanzania border) and that of 2.27 hours at the Kobero/Kabanga OSBP (Burundi/Tanzania border)[14].

The indicator "Transportation cost (for a round trip between the Port of Dar es Salaam and Kigali)" is not clear on its definition, and thus it was not possible to know which specific expenditure items have been included in the baseline and target values. Since actual data measured immediately after completion of the project were not available either, this evaluation has examined the trend of a similar indicator's available data as an alternative measure. Table 8 shows that the average transportation cost for moving a 40-foot container from Dar es Salaam to Kigali[15] had dramatically decreased from USD 3,700 in January 2016 to USD 2,700 in December 2016. Particularly, the transportation cost dropped sharply after March 2016 once the OSBP system started operating.

Table 8. Average Transportation Cost for Moving a 40-foot Container from Dar es Salaam to Kigali

(Unit: USD)

	2016 Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	Jun.	Jul.	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Transportation Cost	3,700	3,800	3,800	3,500	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	2,800	2,800	2,800	2,700

Source: CCTTFA, *Central Corridor Performance Monitoring Report 2016* (April 2017).

According to the analysis done by a CCTTFA expert, the transportation cost is strongly influenced by the supply and demand of freight cargo transportation at the Port of Dar es Salaam, and the operationalization of the Rusumo OSBP is estimated to have contributed to an approximately USD 200 reduction in the cost at

[13] Source: CCTTFA, *Central Corridor Performance Monitoring Report 2016* (April 2017).
[14] Ibid.
[15] It includes the cost of returning empty containers to Dar es Salaam but excludes terminal charges at the Port of Dar es Salaam and customs duties at Rusumo (about USD 400 in total).

maximum[16]. Still, this is greater than the USD 80-reduction in transportation cost per container expected at the time of planning. Thus, this project is judged to have made a certain contribution to the reduction of the transportation cost, as originally expected

In sum, it is recognized that the constructions of the international bridge and the OSBP facilities have helped ease the traffic restrictions and facilitate the customs and border-crossing procedures. As a result, the time to complete the border-crossing procedures has been dramatically reduced and the transportation cost has also been dropped.

3. 3. 1. 2. Qualitative Effects (Other Effects)

See the "Impacts" section.

3. 3. 2. Impacts

3. 3. 2. 1. Intended Impacts

At the time of planning, the following three indicators were selected as qualitative measures for the indirect effects of this project. Since those qualitative measures are all concerned with the effects on a regional scale and of medium to long-term, this evaluation has treated them as impact indicators.

- Due to the elimination of bottlenecks, such as the restrictions on traffic volume on the aging Bridge and cumbersome border-crossing procedures, the development and improvement of the entire Central Corridor (e.g., Port of Dar es Salaam, roads) will be accelerated.
- Due to the elimination of bottlenecks and the more efficient border-crossing procedures, a large number of vehicles using the Northern Corridor will switch to the more cost-competitive Central Corridor. This will make the distribution of traffic volume, which is currently concentrated in the Northern Corridor, more balanced, and consequently will make possible the smooth and stable logistics and distribution of goods throughout East Africa.
- For Rwanda, a reliable alternative route to the Northern Corridor will make possible the smooth and stable logistics and distribution of goods.

This evaluation has examined the development outcomes of those impacts using administrative data and through the interviews with the officials from the executing and related agencies in both Rwanda and Tanzania, as well as the owners, managers, and truck drivers of the transportation/business companies that have been using the Central Corridor (between Dar es Salaam and Kigali).

(1) Development and Improvement of the Central Corridor as a Whole

While the project was under way, the Single Customs Territory (hereinafter referred to as "SCT") system

[16] A shipper who signs a contract with a carrier (transporter) has agreed to pay an extra USD 200 per day every day the unloading of the container from a truck is delayed after arriving at the destination. According to a survey conducted by the CCTTFA, the expense equivalent to this one day has been saved after completion of the project, contributing to a reduction in the transportation cost.

started to be introduced to the Port of Dar es Salaam in July 2014 and enabled uniform processing of the pre-arrival declaration and customs clearance of cargo. This, coupled with the elimination of the bottlenecks in Rusumo, has contributed to the accelerated development and improvement of the entire Central Corridor including the Port of Dar es Salaam. In the past several years alone, a new investment of approximately USD 600-million has been initiated at the Port of Dar es Salaam to modernize the port facilities[17], and at the Rwandan side, the aforementioned ODA loan project "Rusumo-Kayonza Road Improvement Project" had been implemented. Approximately 95% of the road network along the Central Corridor has already been paved with asphalt, and a plan to improve the road section between the Nyakanazi-Rusumo at the Tanzania side, which is in a poor condition, has been under way through a multi-donor fund led by the African Development Bank. A large majority of the managers and truck drivers who work for the transport/warehouse/customs services companies in Dar es Salaam have also spoken highly of the contribution of the improved Central Corridor infrastructure on the more efficient transportation and enhanced security[18]. On a side note, the average transit time from Dar es Salaam to Kigali was 3.76 days in 2016[19].

(2) Smooth and Stable Distribution of Goods throughout East Africa through the Balanced Distribution of Traffic Volume and Logistics

According to the data from the Northern Corridor Transit Transport Coordination Authority (hereinafter referred to as "NCTTCA"), Rwanda's exports and imports through the Port of Mombasa declined significantly from 2015 to 2016, whereas those through the Port of Dar es Salaam increased (see Table 9). One possible cause would be that the elimination of bottleneck and the streamlined customs/border-crossing procedures have helped shift the distribution of goods from the Northern Corridor to the Central Corridor[20].

Table 9. Exports and Imports of Rwanda by Port over Time

(Unit: dead weight tonnage)

	Port	2015	2016	Change
Exports	Dar es Salaam	19,847	22,348	12.6%
	Mombasa	18,109	13,741	-24.1%
Imports	Dar es Salaam	819,935	840,292	2.5%
	Mombasa	273,815	180,281	-34.2%

Source: NCTTCA, *Northern Corridor Transport Observatory Report, 10th Issue* (May2017).

Data on the number of trucks passing through the Rusumo border per day also show an 81% increase from

[17] Source: CCTTFA, *Central Corridor Performance Monitoring Report 2016* (April 2017).

[18] The total number of respondents was 24, of which nine were the managers of the transportation/warehouse/customs services companies, one was an employee of the transportation company, and 14 were truck drivers. They were all males. On average, the truck drivers have worked as a driver for 15.8 years (minimum four years, maximum 35 years), the average number of employees of the transportation/warehouse/customs services companies is 226 (minimum 10 persons, maximum 600 persons). The samples of those face-to-face interviews, however, were not selected randomly based on a probability mechanism. The sample size is also limited. Therefore, those survey results should be treated only as secondary reference information.

[19] Source: CCTTFA, *Central Corridor Performance Monitoring Report 2016* (April 2017). The transit time has increased in recent years due to the stricter enforcement of speed limit regulations in Tanzania.

[20] According to a Japanese company located in suburban Kigali, its transport cost per 20-foot container was reduced by about USD 200-300 after having changed the transport route for export goods from the Northern Corridor to the Central Corridor in the latter half of 2016.

80 vehicles in 2012 to 145 units in 2016[21], and corroborate that the number of vehicles using the Central Corridor has been increasing. The customs collection at the Rwandan side of the Rusumo border post had increased by about 50% from 2014/15 to 2016/17, and the collection at the Tanzanian side had increased more dramatically than that[22].

(3) Smooth and Stable Logistics and Distribution of Goods in Rwanda

In the global ranking of the World Bank's Logistics Performance Index (hereinafter referred to as "LPI"), Rwanda made a big leap from the 151th place in 2010 to the 62nd in 2016 and to the 57th in 2018 (see Table 10). A part of Rwanda's significantly improved performance in logistics may be attributable to Rwanda's stabilized smooth logistics through the development and improvement of the Central Corridor[23].

Table 10. Rwanda's Ranking in the World Bank's Logistics Performance Indicators Index (LPI)

	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Global Ranking	151	139	80	62	57
LPI Score	2.04	2.27	2.76	2.99	2.97
Customs	1.62	2.19	2.50	2.93	2.67
Infrastructure	1.62	1.88	2.32	2.62	2.76
International Shipments	2.88	2.27	2.78	3.05	3.39
Logistics Competence	1.85	2.06	2.64	2.87	2.85
Trucking & Tracing	1.99	2.39	2.94	3.04	2.75
Timeliness	2.05	2.76	3.34	3.35	3.35

Source: World Bank LPI (2018)

In short, the development and improvement of the Central Corridor has been accelerated and the number of vehicles using the Central Corridor has relatively increased. At the same time, Rwanda's performance in logistics has been getting better. Through eliminating the bottlenecks and streamlining customs/border-crossing procedures in Rusumo, this project is considered to have contributed to those positive outcomes of the impacts.

3. 3. 2. 2. Other Positive and Negative Impacts

(1) Impacts on the Natural Environment

Through the face-to-face interviews and questionnaire surveys with the officials from the executing and related agencies, no permanent negative impact of this project on the natural environment has been confirmed. The Rwandan side conducted the Environmental Impact Assessment (hereinafter referred to as "EIA") in May 2011 and approved the plan in January 2012. To minimize any undesirable environmental effects during

[21] Data provided by Rwanda Transport Development Agency (RTDA).
[22] No specific figures are disclosed in this report as they are internal data.
[23] Press release of the World Bank report *Connecting to Compete 2016: Trade Logistics in the Global Economy* (2016) (http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.worldbank.org/ja/news/press-release/2016/06/28/germany-tops-2016-logistics-performance-index) remarks that "for the first time in the history of the *Connecting to Compete* reports, landlocked countries are no longer automatically disadvantaged, as shown by the performances of both Rwanda and Uganda, which benefit from regionally coordinated efforts to improve trade corridors."

the construction period, they have also taken mitigation measures and carried out monitoring activities as planned[24]. It has also been confirmed that the Tanzanian side had taken the appropriate steps, which were in line with the mitigation measures set through the EIA, although no specific document and data related to the EIA have been provided.

(2) Land Acquisition and Resettlement

Rwanda and Tanzania both formulated the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) and implemented land acquisition and resettlement as planned, in accordance with their respective laws. In Tanzania, 48 households were compensated for land acquisition and resettlement, whereas 25 households were compensated in Rwanda[25]. One of the residents in Rwanda, who had received compensation, subsequently filed a lawsuit complaining the amount of the compensation. However, the court ruled that the amount of the compensation had been adequate. In the meanwhile, it is now possible for the residents who live around the border post to go back and forth across communities using a border pass (rather than a passport) to cross borders. This was made possible to minimize any impact of tightening border control on dividing the communities. According to the officials from immigration and the police, the residents have stopped complaining against the tightened border control, because crackdowns on illegal border-crossing and smuggling activities dramatically reduced crime.

(3) Effects on Poverty Reduction in the Neighboring Areas

Regarding the effects of the project on poverty reduction, group discussions and face-to-face interviews with shop owners and shop clerks of roadside groceries, food stands, clothing stores, general stores, and such had been conducted at Rwanda side in the town of Kirehe, which borders the Rusumo border, and in the regional city of Kayonza, which is located in the middle point between Rusumo and Kigali[26]. The surveys assessed changes in the variety and prices of goods being distributed, as well as employment opportunities and others, before and after the project. Yet, except for the perception that traffic volume has increased, no other specific trends on the variety of goods, prices, employment opportunities, and such have been confirmed.

(4) Synergy with Technical Cooperation Projects

This project had no training component for capacity building. However, through the separately implemented technical cooperation projects of the "Project for Capacity Building for the Customs Administrations of the Eastern African Region" (2007–2009), the "Project for Capacity Building for the Customs Administrations of the Eastern African Region (Phase 2)" (2009–2013), and the "Project on Capacity Development for International Trade Facilitation in the Eastern African Region" (2013–2017),

[24] Specifically, mitigation measures, such as minimizing oil spillage, requiring workers to wear personal protective equipment, marking site boundaries clearly, cleaning fully furnished toilets routinely, and spreading water regularly to minimize dust, had been taken.
[25] The total amount was approximately 286 million Tanzanian shillings and 124 million Rwandan francs, respectively.
[26] The total number of respondents was 15, of which seven persons were in Kirehe and eight persons in Kayonza, 11 males and four females. By age group, five were in their 20's, four were in their 30's, four were in their 40's, and two were in their 50's.

capacity development has been carried out for both Rwandan and Tanzanian officials working at customs and immigration at the Rusumo border facilities. According to the interviews with the officials from the related agencies, the training programs provided by the technical cooperation projects have helped improve the operational capacity of the OSBP staff, which had been an issue when introducing the OSBP system. Thus, they are found to have played a complementary role to this project.

Summarizing effectiveness and impact, this project helped relax traffic restrictions on the bridge and enabled large trucks to pass through, with regard to effectiveness. Moreover, the introduction of the OSBP system and the 24-hour operation of the OSBP facilities significantly reduced the time to complete border-crossing procedures. The transportation cost between Dar es Salaam and Kigali also declined as expected. Furthermore, with regard to impacts, the development and improvement of the Central Corridor has been accelerated, and the number of vehicles using the Central Corridor has increased accordingly. At the same time, Rwanda's performance in logistics has improved. Therefore, the effectiveness and impact of the project are high.

3. 4. Sustainability (Rating:②)

3. 4. 1. Institutional / Organizational Aspect of Operation and Maintenance

In this project, there are a number of executing and related organizations that have been involved in its operation and maintenance. TANROADS is responsible for the maintenance of the bridge and roads at Tanzania side, whereas Rwanda Transport Development Agency (hereinafter referred to as "RTDA") is responsible for that at Rwanda side. In addition, the operation and routine maintenance of the OSBP facilities at Tanzania side is done by the organizations that make use of the facilities, such as the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) and the Immigration Department, whereas the operation and management of the OSBP facilities at Rwanda side is taken care of by the organizations such as the Rwanda Revenue Authority (hereinafter referred to as "RRA") and the Directorate General of Immigration and Emigration (hereinafter referred to as "DGIE").

As for the operation and maintenance of the bridge and roads, the executing agencies both at the Rwandan and Tanzanian sides have had adequate manpower, and no problems has been found. For the maintenance of the Rusumo bridge, TANROADS and RTDA have been making inspections on a regular basis. And the system is in place so that if any problem is found, it is jointly dealt with and the cost is also split between the two sides. As for the operation and maintenance of the OSBP facilities, on the other hand, the number of the staff working for customs and immigration control at the Tanzanian side tends to be in short supply because their workloads have expanded along with the rapidly increased traffic volume. Although the manpower situation has been getting tight at the Rwandan side as well, no specific problem on organizational structure or staffing level has been confirmed at the time of ex-post evaluation. The number of RRA staff increased from nine persons (2013/14) to 16 persons (2018), whereas that of DGIE increased from six persons (2014) to 13 persons (2018).

3. 4. 2. Technical Aspect of Operation and Maintenance

No technical problems have been found for the executing and related agencies of both countries on the operation and maintenance of the Rusumo bridge, access roads, and OSBP facilities. Both TANROADS and RTDA have sufficient numbers of qualified professional engineers. No technical difficulties have occurred in the maintenance of the bridge, either.

For the offering of in-house training, the executing and related agencies depend heavily on donor support, and the passing of necessary skills has been done primarily through on-the-job training (OJT). As mentioned above, the training programs provided by the technical cooperation projects have helped improve the operational capacity of the staff working for customs and immigration controls, and others. The operation manuals and built drawings provided by the Japanese construction consultant and construction contractor have been made use of by the executing and related agencies.

3. 4. 3. Financial Aspect of Operation and Maintenance

Both TANROADS and RTDA have secured adequate budget for the operation and maintenance of the bridge and roads, and no specific problems have been identified. With regard to the operation and maintenance of the OSBP facilities, TRA and the Immigration Department have had minor budget issues on staffing, as their workloads have expanded along with a dramatic increase of traffic volume. Also, the budget necessary for arranging the housing and commuting minibuses for the staff working at the border post is rather in short supply[27]. As mentioned, Tanzania's customs collection at the Rusumo border post has sharply increased from 2014/15 to 2016/17, even compared to that of the Rwandan side. The rapidly expanding workload at the Tanzanian side after the introduction of the OSBP system may be one of the factors that have caused its relative shortage of manpower and funding.

3. 4. 4. Status of Operation and Maintenance

Through the site visits and interviews, it has been confirmed that those constructed and procured by this project, such as the bridge, the OSBP facilities, and the access roads, have been utilized as originally planned. The border-crossing procedures based on the OSBP system was introduced in March 2016 (officially in April 2016), and the 24-hour operation of the OSBP facilities began in October 2017, as described earlier.

Most recommendations made by the Japanese side for the maintenance of facilities at the time of planning and during the defect liability period, have been carried out by the executing agencies of both Rwanda and Tanzania. (Though, the frequencies of maintenance tasks to be conducted and such have been determined flexibly by respecting the judgment of the workers who are familiar with the circumstances in the field.) On the other hand, X-ray scanners for cargo inspection have not been installed at the border post of neither Rwanda nor Tanzania side, primarily due to budgetary reasons[28]. Since both TRA and RRA officials are aware

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[27] The detailed personnel and financial data at the customs and immigration control of the Rusumo border facilities could not be obtained from the agencies concerned of both countries as they are internal information.

[28] Since the introduction of the Single Customs Territory (SCT) at the Port of Dar es Salaam, the number of cargoes needed to be inspected at the Rusumo border post has been decreased. This may have somehow reduced priority on the installation of the X-ray scanners.

of the importance of using X-ray scanners, they should be installed at the earliest possible time.

In light of the above, there are some minor problems on the institutional and financial aspects of the operation and maintenance of this project, as well as its status. Therefore, sustainability of the project effects is fair.

4. Conclusion, Lessons Learned and Recommendations

4. 1. Conclusion

The objective of this project is to ease the traffic restrictions and facilitate the border-crossing procedures at the Rusumo border between Rwanda and Tanzania through the reconstruction of the Rusumo International Bridge and the construction of the OSBP facilities, thereby contributing to the smooth and stable logistics and distribution of goods along the Central Corridor.

Since the project was consistent with the national development policies and road/transport sector strategies of Rwanda and Tanzania and their development needs at the times of planning and ex-post evaluation, as well as Japan's aid policy at the time of planning, its relevance is high. The outputs, such as the constructions of a bridge, roads, and border post facilities, had been produced as planned, and the project period and the project cost were both within the plan. Therefore, the efficiency is high. By reconstructing the Rusumo bridge, this project has eased gross weight and speed restrictions for travelling vehicles and enabled large trucks, which could not cross the bridge before, to pass through smoothly. Moreover, owning to the development of the OSBP facilities, the border-crossing procedures based on the OSBP system and the 24-hour operation of the OSBP facilities have been implemented by the time of ex-post evaluation. And the time necessary for customs and border-crossing procedures has been dramatically shortened, and the transportation cost for a cargo for a round trip between Dar es Salaam and Kigali has also been reduced as expected. Furthermore, due to the elimination of a bottleneck, the numbers of vehicles passing through the Rusumo border and the Central Corridor have substantially increased, and it has helped accelerate the development and improvement of the entire Central Corridor. Thus, the effectiveness and impact of the project are high. As for the operation and maintenance, no specific problem has been identified in terms of its technical aspect. However, there is a concern about the staffing level and operational budget for customs and immigration as their workloads at the OSBP facilities have been expanding along with the increasing traffic volume. In addition, X-ray scanners for cargo inspection, which were to be borne by the Rwandan and Tanzanian sides, have not been installed yet due to budgetary reasons. Therefore, the sustainability of the project is fair.

In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be highly satisfactory.

4. 2. Recommendations

4. 2. 1. Recommendations to the Executing Agency

None

4. 2. 2. Recommendations to JICA

None

4. 3. Lessons Learned

Selecting Indicators for Evaluation through the Collaboration with the Executing Agencies

Many of the indicators for quantitative effects, set at the time of planning for measuring effectiveness, were not appropriate nor clearly defined, and thus could not be used for the ex-post evaluation. In addition, the officials from the executing and related agencies, even those project engineers who had engaged in the project from the planning stage, had not been involved in the selection of those evaluation indicators. The officials even did not recognize that those indicators had been selected. Therefore, when setting the evaluation indicators at the time of planning, it should have been fully discussed and agreed with the officials from the executing and related agencies as to whether the selection of the indicators and the setting of their targets are appropriate, and their definitions must have been made clear and specific as needed. Moreover, the rationales, logic, and assumptions made when selecting the indicators and settings of their targets should have been documented for future reference in order to make the indicators useful for the ex-post evaluation.

Implementing a Technical Cooperation Project or a Training Component for Capacity Building for a Similar Project for the Development of OSBP Facilities

Although the project had no training component for capacity building, capacity development for both Rwandan and Tanzanian officials working at customs and immigration at the Rusumo border facilities has been carried out through the separately implemented technical cooperation projects. For any project for the development of OSBP facilities, it is essential to train the officials concerned to become familiar with OSBP guidelines and manuals and master the operating procedures necessary for running the OSBP system, which must go far beyond just building facilities and procuring equipment. The technical cooperation projects have played that important complementary role in this project. When implementing a similar project for the development of OSBP facilities in the future, therefore, it is desirable to carry out a similar technical cooperation project or a training component for capacity building.