

Republic of South Sudan

FY2019 Ex-Post Evaluation of Technical Cooperation Project

Livelihood Improvement in and around Juba for Sustainable Peace and Development

External Evaluators: Yoshiko Ogawa and Yuko Kishino, IC Net Limited

## **0. Summary**

The Project for Livelihood Improvement in and around Juba for Sustainable Peace and Development (hereinafter referred to as the ‘project’) was implemented in the Republic of South Sudan during the period before and after the independence, taking agricultural villages in and around Juba as its model sites. The project aimed to establish a foundation to disseminate the livelihood improvement models<sup>1</sup> in which Community Development Officers (hereinafter referred to as ‘CDOs’) of the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Development, Central Equatoria State (hereinafter referred to as the ‘MCRD/CES’) facilitated villagers’ agricultural production and income generation activities (hereinafter referred to as ‘IGAs’), and introduced agricultural technology packages with the technical support of Agriculture Extension Officers (hereinafter referred to as ‘AEOs’) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Central Equatoria State (hereinafter referred to as the ‘MAF/CES’). The project was in line with the development plan and needs of the Government of South Sudan aiming to increase agricultural production, implement human resource development, rural development, and livelihood improvement, and create employment. It was also highly consistent with Japan’s ODA policy for Sudan.<sup>2</sup> The implementation approach of the project was appropriate with thorough consideration of the condition of the conflict-ridden country. Thus, the relevance is high. Basic tools of the livelihood improvement models were developed, capacity of government stakeholders and community leaders was strengthened, and model projects<sup>3</sup> achieved results. Although the organisational capacity of ministries was relatively weak, the project developed a policy and established networks, and the Project Purpose was almost achieved. The Overall Goal was partially achieved as the livelihood improvement models were applied in some villages other than the model ones despite various difficulties faced by the villages, such as two national crises and an influx of IDPs and refugees, resulting in the discontinuation of community activities. After the completion of the project, the model villages continued their activities without government support. However, only a few villages were still active at the time of the ex-post evaluation while others stopped activities because of increasing insecurity. Thus, the effectiveness and impact are fair because the project

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
<sup>1</sup> The ‘livelihood improvement models’ of the project were a mechanism to promote community development services. This mechanism is primarily based on two processes: 1) a wide range of communication, facilitation and learning activities organised and 2) agricultural technological packages that provide improvement and innovation in agricultural production.

<sup>2</sup> The policy of 2007 when northern and southern Sudan formed one country.

<sup>3</sup> Six model villages in Juba County elaborated a development plan and implemented livelihood improvement activities that considered characteristics and needs of respective villages, using tools created by the project. For the names and locations of the villages, see the Project Location on the following page.

impact is moderate. The project period was as planned. However, the project cost was 127% of the planned amount. This is because some activities were added when the model projects were finalised. The increase in the project cost itself is assessed as fair; however, there was no information to judge if the added amount was fair and within the range of a minimum amount. Thus, the efficiency of the project is fair. Regarding sustainability, there remains issues of financial and organisational sustainability of the government. It is affected by the restructuring of the states resulting in transfer of some CDOs and the lack of government budget for rural development activities. Still, at the community level, part of farmer teachers, Boma<sup>4</sup> Development Committee members, CDOs, and AEOs keep using the techniques and technologies introduced by the project. Technology transfer occurred at the community level and there is possibility that project results will be reproduced and sustained. Thus, the sustainability is rated as fair. In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be moderately satisfactory.

## 1. Project Description



Project Location (Juba County)



A farmer teacher teaching villagers  
(Project completion report, p.63)

### 1.1 Background

After the long civil war in South Sudan, the comprehensive peace agreement was signed in January 2005. Following the agreement, the Japanese government resumed development assistance to help consolidate peace. Restoration of peace brought the influx of repatriating refugees and internal displaced persons (hereinafter referred to as ‘IDPs’) and it became urgent to develop social and economic infrastructure to facilitate resettlement and reintegration of returnees into society. It was also critical to improve livelihoods of the population and develop public services for livelihood improvement in rural areas of South Sudan where 80% of the population was engaged in agriculture. In the agricultural villages near Juba, the country’s capital,

<sup>4</sup> A Boma is the lowest level of the administrative division of South Sudan (state, county, payam, and boma) and translated as ‘village’.

local habitants, IDPs who settled during the civil war, returnees who came back after the comprehensive peace agreement co-existed forming a complex society including both agriculturalists and pastoralists. As a result of the prolonged civil war, they lacked basic knowledge and experience in agricultural production and management.

The Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Development of the Government of South Sudan<sup>5</sup> (hereinafter referred to as ‘MCRD/GOSS’) oversaw policy development, and state-level ministries were responsible for implementing policies. MCRD/CES was in charge of implementing policies in Central Equatoria State where Juba is located. CDOs who provided public services in rural villages belonged to MCRD/CES, and AEOs to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of Central Equatoria (hereinafter referred to as ‘MAF/CES’). From March 2009 to February 2012, JICA implemented the Project for Livelihood Improvement in and around Juba for Sustainable Peace and Development, a technical cooperation project, to develop the capacity of agricultural village population including returnees and IDPs in agricultural production and livelihood improvement in cooperation with MCRD/GOSS, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of the Government of South Sudan (hereinafter referred to as ‘MAF/GOSS’), MCRD/CES, and MAF/CES as counterparts (hereinafter referred to as ‘C/Ps’). Rural development was a prerequisite for restoration and economic and social development of South Sudan, and the project strived to establish livelihood improvement models as the basis of rural development.

## 1.2 Project Outline

Overall Goal		Livelihood of the community people will be widely improved through the adaption of "livelihood improvement models" in and out of Juba County.
Project Purpose		Basic conditions for extension of livelihood improvement models suitable for various communities in and around Juba are established.
Outputs	Output 1	Basic tools for Community Development Services are developed;
	Output 2	Capacity of relevant government staff and community leaders in extension of livelihood improvement models is strengthened.
	Output 3	Institutional Capacity of MCRD/GOSS/CES, and MAF/CES in effective operation of livelihood improvement models is strengthened.
	Output 4	The Model projects adapting livelihood improvement models are implemented.

<sup>5</sup> In South Sudan, ministries at the central government level develop policies and those at the state level are responsible for implementing them. However, there is no consistent one-to-one correspondence between the two levels. During the project implementation, according to the project team, there were difficulties in harmonising policies and management systems, and coordination and communication between the central and state ministries.

Total cost (Japanese Side)	511 million yen
Period of Cooperation	March 2009 to February 2012
Target Area	Juba County, Central Equatoria State
Implementing Agency	<p>[At the time of planning]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ Ministry of Social Development, Gender and Religious Affairs, Central Equatoria State<sup>6</sup></li> <li>◆ Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Resources and Fisheries, Central Equatoria State</li> </ul> <p>[From September 2011 to the end of the project]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ MCRD/CES</li> <li>◆ MAF/CES</li> </ul>
Other Relevant Agencies/ Organisations	<p>Responsible agencies<sup>7</sup></p> <p>[From the beginning of the project to September 2011]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ MCRD/GOSS</li> </ul> <p>[From September 2011 to the end of the project]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ MAF/GOSS</li> </ul>
Consultant in Japan	System Science Consultants Inc. Chuo Kaihatsu Corporation
Related Projects	[Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Project] Project for construction of a primary school in Bungu Boma, Juba County, Central Equatoria State (G/C concluded on 25 February 2011)

### 1.3 Outline of the Terminal Evaluation

#### 1.3.1 Achievement Status of Project Purpose at the Terminal Evaluation

The project activities were conducted based on the livelihood improvement models in six model villages in Juba County and established the foundation to disseminate the models. Such foundation consisted of 1) capacity development of C/Ps, notably CDOs, 2) development of guidelines and manuals to be used by C/Ps as an activity guide, and 3) organisational capacity development of MCRD/GOSS, MCRD/CES and MAF/CES. These were under progress and it was envisaged that the Project Purpose would be achieved by the end of the project.

<sup>6</sup> In 2011, the Directorate of Community Development of the Ministry of Social Development, Gender and Religious Affairs, Central Equatoria State, was separated from the Ministry to form a new ministry, the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Development.

<sup>7</sup> The term 'responsible agencies' was taken from the PDM. These national level ministries are in the position to develop national policies and receive reports from implementing state ministries (i.e. MCRD/CES and MAF/CES).

### 1.3.2 Achievement Status of Overall Goal at the Terminal Evaluation (Including other impacts)

The terminal evaluation had a positive prospect for the achievement of the Overall Goal, that is, the livelihood improvement models applied in a wider area including counties other than Juba County. This judgement was because 1) CDOs and participating villagers intended to retain the knowledge and technology learned through the project activities and continue the activities, and 2) MCRD/CES planned to deploy the trained CDOs to other counties in Central Equatoria State. On the other hand, the terminal evaluation pointed out that, for the models to be sustained and expanded, MCRD/CES had to take over the project activities and support the activities of the CDOs, and the evaluation did not draw a clear conclusion.

### 1.3.3 Recommendations from the Terminal Evaluation

At the time of the terminal evaluation, the community development section of the MCRD/GOSS was going to be integrated in MAF/GOSS as part of the restructuring of South Sudan's ministries. The terminal evaluation team pointed that the community development section needed to be well positioned in the new ministry structure in order for the section to be able to implement the rural development policy developed with the support of the project. In addition, it was suggested to secure community development budget and arrange the environment to deploy CDOs and AEOs for continuing application and development of the livelihood improvement models. For model villages, it was suggested that the villages strengthen their capacity to make and implement their own development plans to continue the activities independently, and to set up a management body to sustain demonstration farms.<sup>8</sup>

## **2. Outline of the Evaluation Study**

### 2.1 External Evaluators

Yoshiko Ogawa and Yuko Kishino (both belong to IC Net Limited)

### 2.2 Duration of Evaluation Study

This ex-post evaluation study was conducted with the following schedule.

Duration of the Study: March 2020 – June 2021

Duration of the Field Study: 26 October 2020 – 31 March 2021 (contract period for a local consultant)

### 2.3 Constraints during the Evaluation Study

It took time to locate the current whereabouts of the people involved in the project because the ex-post evaluation was conducted eight years after the completion of the project. This time lag

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<sup>8</sup> Demonstration farms were set up in Kapuri and Kworjik villages for agricultural technology training.

also led to limited quality and quantity of information because the information sources were limited and the information was often drawn from memories of the informants.

Furthermore, the planned visit by the external evaluator in 2020 was cancelled because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The information collection method was also modified and questionnaires to and interviews with implementing agencies and other stakeholders were conducted by a local consultant under the supervision of the external evaluators. Even the local consultant was unable to visit the model villages, and the plan to invite villagers to Juba was also cancelled because of security concerns; thus, information collection from the model villages was limited to telephone interviews. This situation allowed the external evaluators to gain only limited information, which was insufficient to evaluate the project comprehensively. The information collected in this study certainly represents part of the results of the project; however, even when the obtained information shows some achievement of the project, the information does not represent the entire achievement of the project.

### **3. Results of the Evaluation (Overall Rating: C<sup>9</sup>)**

#### 3.1 Relevance (Rating: ③<sup>10</sup>)

##### 3.1.1 Consistency with the Development Plan of South Sudan

The development goals of the Government of South Sudan at the time of planning, *Expenditure Priorities and Funding Needs 2008-2011*, set six priority sectors, aiming at social and economic development of the country. One of the priority sectors was an increase in productivity and income in rural villages. Development objectives were also set for sub-sectors along with the priority sectors. One of the sub-sectors, ‘social and humanitarian sector’, was relevant to social reintegration, and it included, as major activities, peace building and conflict resolution, gender equality, repatriation and reintegration of IDPs and refugees, and support to and empowerment of the socially vulnerable people. A development policy of the MCRD/GOSS, *Policy Framework and Work Plan 2007-2008*, has seven objectives, of which three were related to community development: (1) to start community-based development projects in cooperation with communities, (2) to promote empowerment of rural population in all aspects including social, economic, cultural and political ones, (3) to develop capacity of communities, CBOs, and CSOs. This shows the policy’s emphasis on community development. A development policy of MAF/GOSS, *Food and Agriculture Policy Framework 2006-2011*, prioritised the issues of capacity development of professionals including AEOs, development of agricultural packages for extension, promotion of poverty reduction through agricultural development in rural communities. The project was in line with the development policies above because it organised communities, working with the vulnerable population such as IDPs and women, and implemented agricultural

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<sup>9</sup> A: Highly satisfactory, B: Satisfactory, C: Partially satisfactory, D: Unsatisfactory

<sup>10</sup> ③: High, ②: Fair, ①: Low

extension and IGAs to improve agricultural productivity and livelihood to promote establishment of stable rural communities.

The *South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013*, which covers the period before and after the completion of the project, set an increase in agricultural productivity as one of the priorities in the area of economic rural development. It regards improvement of livelihood and employment as an important driving force for poverty reduction and peace building of South Sudan. In the area of rural development, after the independence of South Sudan in July 2011, ministry restructuring made MCRD/GOSS absorbed in MAF/GOSS as one Directorate. It was reported that this change decreased the importance of rural development; however, a subsector policy of agricultural production services of the *Agriculture Sector Policy Framework (ASPF) 2012-2017*, a policy framework of the agriculture sector, laid out the objectives and a policy implementation framework on extension services, agricultural village mobilisation, and capacity development. This shows the government's recognition of the importance of rural development. The cooperatives and rural development section of this policy set 'development and implementation of rural development policy', 'establishment of development fund for rural development', 'enhancement of CDOs' roles', and 'capacity development of government officials and community leaders' as a policy implementation framework. The project corresponds with the direction of these policies.

Thus, the project was consistent with the policies on development, agriculture, and rural development of South Sudan at the time of the planning and beginning of the project.

### 3.1.2 Consistency with the Development Needs of South Sudan

When the project was planned, South Sudan was at the beginning of the reconstruction phase. The Project Purpose, that is, agricultural development in rural villages and social reintegration of returnees and IDPs through community development along with strengthening of the capacity of the government, met the needs for enhancement of peace and social stability. Furthermore, while food security was a critical issue in rural villages, farmers did not have knowledge and experience in agricultural technology and had little access to agricultural inputs such as fertiliser and seeds. Thus, there were strong needs for learning agricultural technology and IGAs of farmers for livelihood improvement.

Even at the end of the project, food security was a major issue in South Sudan. During the project, there were many incidents of bad weather and insect damage. From 2011 to 2013, all but one state (Western Equatoria State) had a cereal production deficit.<sup>11</sup> An analysis concluded that this food shortage resulted from intertwined complex structural factors including the lack of agricultural services.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> FAO/WFP (2013) FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan. 22 February 2013. (p.31)

<sup>12</sup> Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Cooperatives and Rural Development (2012) Agriculture Sector Policy

Thus, the project was consistent with the development needs of South Sudan at the time of the planning and beginning of the project.

### 3.1.3 Consistency with Japan's ODA Policy

*Basic policy of the Official Development Assistance of Japan: country by country data book (Sudan)* in 2009 states that the Japanese government would actively support peace consolidation of Sudan and emphasises that the entire population of Sudan should equally receive peace dividends. The JICA guidelines on peace building in 2009 set a few priority areas for undertakings. The project matched one of the priority areas, 'assistance for restoration of economic activities.' The project is also related to the 'assistance for restoration of social infrastructure' because it would lead to stable food supply.

Therefore, the objective of the project was in line with the Japanese ODA policy.

### 3.1.4 Appropriateness of the Project Plan and Approach

#### ① The timing of the project implementation

The project started before the independence of South Sudan. For an evaluation of a project implemented in a conflict-affected country like this one, it is important to examine if it was appropriate to start an ODA project to support the government while the government was still organisationally and financially weak; the project commencement could have been too early. In South Sudan, around the time of the independence, reconstruction started in cities and there was a concern that the gap between cities and agricultural villages in rural areas would raise new dissatisfaction among rural people. Thus, the government's support to rural areas was an important component for stabilising the country and it was necessary to restore government functions for preventing renewed conflicts. People in rural communities lacked both knowledge and experience in agricultural technologies as a result of the civil war and extension of modern agricultural technology was required to ensure food security in rural villages. In fact, the needs for stabilisation and food security in rural villages had existed after the comprehensive peace agreement, even before the independence. An MCRD/CES official stated that the timing of the project implementation had been appropriate and it could have started even earlier. Thus, it can be said that the timing of the project implementation was appropriate.

#### ② Modification of the PDM

During the project implementation, the PDM was modified twice when details of the model project activities were defined. The original PDM did not have outputs regarding implementation of the livelihood improvement models in model villages and capacity development of government personnel through model projects although these two outputs were essential parts of the project

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Framework (ASPF): 2012-2017. 2.3 Problem Statement. (pp.13-14)



in order to achieve the Overall Goal and the Project Purpose. The first modification<sup>13</sup> added ‘implementation of model projects’ as an outcome and set indicators, which clarified the aim of the implementation of model projects. ‘Strengthening of community leaders’ capacity and organisational capacity of ministries at national and state levels’ was also defined as an outcome. These changes strengthened the appropriateness of the logic of the PDM to achieve the goals. The second modification<sup>14</sup> added the indicators regarding CDOs’ and AEOs’ own initiatives and commitment, training of community leaders, development plan of the model villages, and ownership of the communities towards model projects. These changes clearly reflected the community development and capacity development approach and, thus, were aligned with the direction of the project.

It is necessary to pay attention to the indicators that required a sampling survey for monitoring. It is not easy to obtain data of such indicators, especially for a project in conflict-affected countries. Specifically, the numerical target values set for 6 out of the 10 indicators for Output 4, ‘implementation of model projects applying the livelihood improvement models,’ required baseline data and a survey targeting both participating and non-participating community members for evaluation. Monitoring of these indicators would require substantial time and effort. This could be the reason why corresponding data were not gathered even at the end of the project. Some other indicators do not clearly define what is to be assessed (See Table 1). Thus, the PDM as a whole was logically formulated but there seemed to be room for consideration; some indicators could have a clearer target to assess, and others could have more easily measurable numerical target values. Table 2 shows the issues and alternatives of some indicators.

Table 1: Issues in indicators

Example indicators <sup>15</sup>	Issues
Output 4, Indicator 1, 2, and 3	There are many external factors influencing the numerical data of indicators.
Output 4, Indicator 1 and 3	A survey of participating and non-participating households is necessary to get data, which add extra burden to implementers.
Output 2, Indicator 1, Output 3, Indicator 3, and Output 4, Indicator 1, 2 and 3	What and how to assess is not clear.

(Source: external evaluators)

<sup>13</sup> Modification from version 0 to version 1.1.

<sup>14</sup> Modification from version 1.1 to version 1.2.

<sup>15</sup> Output 3, Indicator 3: Through introduction of improved information systems, every CDO and other stakeholders are able to access necessary information; Output 4, Indicator 1: Increase in production of food, incomes and assets of participating household, by at least 50% by the end of project implementation, compared to control groups and pre-project levels; Output 4, Indicator 2: Number of households experiencing hunger is reduced by 50% by 2012; Output 4, Indicator 3: Agricultural productivity of participating households increases by at least 10% by 2012.

Table 2: Alternative indicators

Indicator	Issue	Alternative
Output 4, Indicator 1	A survey of participating and non-participating members is necessary, which would add burden to the project. Assessment and comparison may not be easy because there might be differences among target population regarding areas of cultivated land and crop types.	Assess the benefit per household gained from IGAs. Analyse the magnitude of the benefit from IGAs for each household by comparing the amount of benefit and household monthly income (% of benefit in household income).
Output 4, Indicator 2	‘Experience of hunger’ is subjective judgement and depends on who responds. Even if the number of meals increases, a person may feel hungry.	Assess the percentage of the households where the number of meals, or the amount of food intake per day has increased compared to the previous year. Information is to be sought from a person who prepares family meals.
Output 4, Indicator 3	Even if ‘agricultural productivity’ is defined as amount of crop yield, it is not clear which year’s data would be compared to see if there was a 10% productivity increase. Furthermore, yield is usually influenced by the amount of rainfall and increase would be a result of good weather. Low yield could be a result of ineffective technologies or incorrect application of technologies.	Leave the assessment of increase in income and food intake to indicator 1 and 2, and be sure to assess if participants clearly understand that the introduction of technologies leads to yield increase. <sup>16</sup> Interview participants and calculate the percentage of the participants who understand the relationship between yield and technologies out of all participants.

(Source: external evaluators)

### ③ Community-based approach

The project, with the understanding that cohesion among the community members is essential for both peace building and rural development, took the approach to make a development plan of model villages and establish model projects based on the plan with an emphasis on cooperation among the community members. The project mobilised the villagers, formed Boma Development Committees (hereinafter referred to as ‘BDCs’), and facilitated group activities to strengthen solidarity of the communities. CDOs recognised that BDCs and collaborative activities worked well to increase cohesion of the communities. Community representatives also highly valued agricultural activities in groups and IGAs. Furthermore, village development plans and community activities evolved into donor coordination presented in the box below. This shows effectiveness of the community-based approach.

<sup>16</sup> Indicators for Output 4, ‘The model projects adapting livelihood improvement models are implemented’ are increases in production, income and assets, and improvement of capacity for community development, motivation and ownership of the villagers as a result of model projects implementation. It is understood that the understanding of the advantages of adopted technologies would lead to continuing use of such technologies, and continuing technology use means success of the model projects.

### Enhanced project effects through cooperation among donors and other stakeholders

The community-based approach led to unexpected cooperation with other donors and government agencies. Table 3 shows examples of such cooperation. The village development plans worked as a good information source for donors. Further, CDOs and AEOs working in the villages connected the villages to donors to generate various types of cooperation.

Table 3: Cooperation with donors and support agencies

<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Support</b>
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund)	Support to the Health Centre of Nyamini village, distribution of textbooks through Payam department of education
Ministry of Health, Red Cross	CDO training on health and hygiene (Ministry of Health requested training in model villages)
Ministry of Health	Vaccination in Kapuri village
State Ministry of Education	Primary school constructed based on the community development plan of Bungu village (Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Project) requested deployment of an education officer to improve supervision, which was granted by the state education ministry.
PSI	Distribution of mosquito nets in SIRRIMON, Nyamini, Kansuk and Kapuri villages
ZOA	Agricultural technology extension project in SIRRIMON village
FOFCOD	Candle production support in SIRRIMON village

(Source: Project completion report, CDOs' responses to the questionnaire, interviews with village representatives)

Note : PSI (Population Services International) and ZOA are international NGOs, and FOFCOD (Forum for Community Change and Development) is a local NGO.

The following are the facilitating factors that made such unplanned cooperation possible. The first factor, which is the adoption of the community-based approach, seemed to have contributed much to gaining accurate understanding of the needs of the villages.

- ① The project established a channel to pick up the needs of the villages and connect them to donor support.
- ② The project made donors recognise the project activities.

Community development plans made in the model villages presented the villages' needs clearly. Thus, these plans were useful information sources to agencies and organisations that intended to support the villages. Some donors and organisations came to the villages for feasibility studies for their projects and made their support plans based on the results of the project. CDOs also often visited the villages, once or twice a week, and built trust among the villagers. They played the role of an advisor and were able to learn the needs of the villages accurately. CDOs shared the needs

of the villages at their weekly meeting. Then, the leaders of CDOs conveyed such needs to donors. The Japanese experts of the project also always encouraged such interaction of CDOs with donors.

At the national level, the project conducted meetings such as rural development forum and rural development workshops for information exchange among government stakeholders, donors, and NGOs. These meetings seem to have made the project known by donors and facilitate cooperation.

In a telephone interview, a representative of Bungu village said that ‘after the school planned by the BDC was built, other development partners supported the school. We used the network established during the project and received support to Bungu village from the government and development partners’. This suggests that the project paved the way for further assistance. In this way, using limited resources, the project managed to draw support from other development partners and government agencies to realise effective development support.

#### ④ Selection of the model villages

Prior to the project, the JICA Sudan Office implemented small-scale model projects in Juba County. Based on the results of the model projects, and applying the same implementation structure, the plan of the project was made. JICA agreed with the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Development of the Government of South Sudan and the State Ministry of Social Development, Gender and Religious Affairs of the Central Equatoria that the project would include the model project villages as target villages. In addition, during the preliminary study mission’s visit to South Sudan for the project, a sampling survey with the households in the model project area was conducted to understand the tribal composition, livelihood, and potential and issues of livelihood.

Furthermore, at the beginning of the project, from June to July 2009, a sampling survey on the socio-economic situation was conducted in 30 villages in Juba County. After the discussion on the survey results with the CDOs, the model villages of the project were selected. The criteria for the selection were: 1) security and access, 2) leadership and solidarity in the villages, 3) available local resources, and 4) geographical balance. Criteria 2) looked at if the village leaders took strong leadership; if the villagers live not too far from each other; if the villagers are relatively homogeneous in ethnicity and their lifestyles. Criteria 4) was to avoid geographical concentration of target villages and ensure that people from different cultures, environments, and ethnic backgrounds could benefit. The selection was made after solid consideration to balance geographical and ethnic distribution of the target villages and it was regarded as appropriate from the perspective of peace building.

#### 3.1.5 Avoiding risks caused by destabilising factors

In rural villages of South Sudan, many different tribes co-exist. During the project

implementation as well, there were clashes between farmers and cattle keepers.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, the project had to take careful measures catering to such complexity, while striving to stabilise the communities through livelihood improvement and community-based rural development.

When setting up BDCs in the model villages, the project specifically ensured that the BDCs include diverse members in the committees so that different opinions in the communities could be heard. The project held meetings to facilitate communication within the communities and strengthen community solidarity. Training of community leaders deepened their understanding of equitable development to the socially vulnerable people with consideration for IDPs, women, ethnic minorities, households with orphans, and the disabled. In one of the model villages, Kworjik village, there lived a Bari ethnic group (agriculturalist) and a Mundari ethnic group (cattle keepers) and relations between the groups were tense and possibly destabilising. Formation of an income generation activity group that consisted of Mundari people and produced milk products was consideration to the village's characteristic production and to Mundari people so that Mundari people could also benefit from the project. In Kworjik village, there was a tension among cattle keepers, farmers, and the military over the use of well water. The project built additional wells to alleviate the tension. Understanding that the use of a common well could be an opportunity to nurture better relations among different groups, the project decided to give priority to avoiding the risk of confrontation and providing each group its own well.

Before selecting farmer groups and IGAs, CDOs thoroughly explained to the stakeholders the purpose of the model projects, possible activities, implementation procedures, and told them that the support was not meant for a specific group but for all. The project tried to nurture solidarity, avoiding being seen as unfair. In assisting the rural communities of South Sudan where society was basically complex, conflict-affected, tended to be weak in solidarity, the project strived to prevent risks of destabilising communities by bringing in assistance. Nonetheless, when an ethnic tension intensified, the project stopped activities in villages to ensure safety of C/Ps.

To prevent food shortage and circumvent the risk of bad weather, the project introduced cassava and sweet potatoes for farmers' own consumption. The introduction of cassava and sweet potatoes alleviated food shortage and was highly valued by the beneficiaries.

Thus, the project was highly relevant to the country's development plan and development needs, as well as Japan's ODA policy. It took various measures to cooperate with other donors as well as to avoid risks in the difficult environment of a conflict-affected country. Therefore, its relevance is high.

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<sup>17</sup> This paper calls those who are engaged in animal raising as the main source of living cattle keepers, which include those who settle down and those who lead nomadic life (pastoralists).

### 3.2 Effectiveness and Impacts<sup>18</sup> (Rating: ②)

#### 3.2.1 Effectiveness

##### 3.2.1.1 Achievement of Project Purpose

The project set four Outputs under the Project Purpose. That is, development of basic tools for the livelihood improvement models extension (Output 1: Basic tools for community development services are developed.), capacity development of ministries' officials and CDOs and AEOs who facilitated rural development using the tools (Output 2: Capacity of relevant government staff and community leaders is strengthen.), development of the models and organisational capacity for extension (Output 3: Institutional capacity of MCRD/GOSS/CES), and demonstration of the achievement of rural development practice (Output 4: the model projects adapting livelihood improvement models are implemented). Achievement of these outputs were to lead to achievement of the Project Purpose.

Table 4: Achievement of Project Purpose

Project Purpose	Indicator	Actual
Basic conditions for extension of livelihood improvement models suitable for various communities in and around Juba are established.	Livelihood improvement approaches of Juba County are established by CES.	<p><b>The Project Purpose was almost achieved.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Manuals and guidelines were developed, reflecting the experience and knowledge of C/Ps, and used by C/Ps.</li> <li>• Through training and practices, the capacity of C/Ps, such as CDOs and AEOs, was improved and it was noticed that their attitudes toward work had improved.</li> <li>• The experience of the project was reflected in the rural development policy in 2012 and political foundation was established. Inter-ministerial communication was improved although the organisational capacity was not strengthened.</li> <li>• Agricultural production improved and solidarity was strengthened through group mobilisation of farmers among the participants of the model villages.</li> </ul>

(Source: responses to the questionnaires by Japanese experts and CDOs, interviews with Japanese experts)

For some of the indicators, there is some mismatch between the indicators and collected information at the end of the project. Because of this lack of information, it is not easy to judge if the project achieved the outputs; however, it can be said that Output 1 to 4 were almost achieved based on some qualitative information.

First, regarding Output 1 on the basic tools of the livelihood improvement models, a community development manual and agricultural extension packages consisting of an agricultural technology

<sup>18</sup> Sub-rating for Effectiveness is to be put with consideration of Impact.

manual and an agricultural extension manual were developed and distributed to all State Ministries of Agriculture and Forestry in South Sudan by the completion of the project. The manuals were developed in a participatory process in which the Japanese experts first prepared manuals' outlines and then CDOs and AEOs fleshed out specifics based on their own experiences in the model villages. CDOs valued the manuals, thinking them easily understandable and useful, and used the manuals daily.

As for Output 2, the project provided various learning opportunities for capacity development such as training, workshops, training in Japan, and training in the third countries. During the training in Japan, the participants learned the concept of rural development. In the third country training, the participants were inspired with technology used in the countries having much in common with South Sudan, and started importing agricultural inputs such as seeds using the networks built during the training. The CDOs and AEOs, who had had no experience in rural development before the project, learned from each other in topic-based groups (e.g. health, gender, and water management) among them, and strengthened their practical capacity through the implementation of the model projects. Their motivation was also boosted by building good relations with the communities and being counted on by the farmers. In the communities, along with the BDCs, promising farmers were trained as farmer teachers who, in turn, trained other farmers to facilitate agricultural technology transfer. At the beginning of the project, the farmers tended to depend on aid; thus, the project tried to motivate them in various ways. The project made the farmers realise that they could increase crop yield if they followed the instructions and gave polo shirts to farmer teachers as a token.

Regarding Output 3 on organisational capacity development, the project implemented formulation of the rural development policy<sup>19</sup> of MCRD/GOSS, clarifying roles of CDOs and AEOs, information sharing through a rural development forum and five workshops, and a survey on agricultural villages and rural development. The policy developed at the ministry level was approved in the final year of the project and it can be said that the institutional foundation for extending the livelihood improvement models was established. The policy development exercise facilitated building of networks among the government stakeholders. Given that the government had been still weak at the beginning of the project, this network building must have contributed to establishing the foundation for implementing the livelihood improvement models. Improved communication between ministries at the national and state levels was also reported. It was significant progress in information sharing between state and national ministries because national ministries had known little about the situation in rural areas at the beginning of the project. However, this improved communication tended to depend on individual relationships and was not

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<sup>19</sup> A rural development policy of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Cooperatives and Rural Development (name of the ministry at that time). The experience of the project, such as community mobilisation, connecting communities to external resources, and capacity development of CDOs, were reflected in the policy.

based on better organisation. Thus, it is understood that organisational capacity development was still limited.

Regarding the increase in agricultural production and livelihood improvement through model project implementation, data corresponding to the indicators of Output 4 were not collected. However, from the interviews with village representatives, agricultural production increase, reduction of hunger, use of the technologies of the agricultural packages, enhanced participation by women, and benefits received by the vulnerable population were identified among the participating households. Specifically, at the completion of the project, the technologies of agricultural packages were used by 70 to 95% of the participating farming households of the model villages. As described above, BDCs were organised and community development plans were formulated, and the project achieved much by the time of its completion.

On the other hand, there were still destabilising factors for rural development such as tribal tension. In Kworjik village, because of a conflict between cattle keepers, farmers, and the military, sometimes CDOs had to stop visiting the village. Under such a situation, the project strived to avoid risks with different measures. For example, the project facilitated communication among community members and decision-making mechanisms of BDCs with diverse members, carefully explained the project details, and collected security information. The project also continued to instruct CDOs, AEOs, and village leaders on the importance of equal participation.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, although the strengthening of the organisational capacity of the ministries was limited, the project established the foundation of the livelihood improvement models (that is, tools and technical capacity) and demonstrated the models' good results by the time of its completion. The project mostly achieved its purpose.

### 3.2.2 Impacts

#### 3.2.2.1 Achievement of Overall Goal

The Overall Goal of the project, which is wide application of the livelihood improvement models in Juba County, set the 'number of villages benefiting from practicing the models' as its indicator. Neither a target number of the villages nor the model application criteria (if the models should be applied as a whole or they can be applied partially) was defined. Thus, even partial application of the models in the model villages and non-model villages in Juba County at the time of the ex-post evaluation will be counted as evidence for the increase in the number of villages adopting the livelihood improvement model.

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<sup>20</sup> See 3.1.5. on p.12.



Table 5: Achievement of Overall Goal

Overall Goal	Indicator	Actual
Livelihood of the community people will be widely improved through the adaptation of “livelihood improvement models” in and out of Juba County.	Numbers of villages benefiting through practicing livelihood improvement models increased.	<b>The Overall Goal is partially achieved.</b> Agricultural technologies had been adopted in model villages. Three model villages still continued IGAs at the time of the ex-post evaluation. Application of the technologies was found in four non-model villages. The number of villages benefiting through the models increased.

(Source: CDOs’ responses to the questionnaire, telephone interviews with model village representatives)

At the completion of the project, the Overall Goal was expected to be achieved if (1) policy and budgetary arrangements were made for expansion of application of the livelihood improvement models, (2) there was no frequent transfer of C/Ps, (3) there was no major restructuring of C/P agencies, and (4) there were no major natural disasters. However, after the completion of the project, no budget has been secured for policy implementation and CDOs’ activities. Restructuring of states,<sup>21</sup> drought, and conflicts in 2013 and 2016 brought about major changes in society and security of the country and affected the achievement of the Overall Goal of the project. There were also conflicts between cattle keepers and farmers, and tribal clashes. In 2018, the demonstration farm of Kworjik village was burned down and many villagers fled from the village. In 2019, as a result of the heavy flood in the Eastern part of South Sudan, pastoralists moved into Central Equatoria State, which fuelled the conflicts between settled farmers and pastoralists in many places. Even under these unfavourable conditions, the model villages kept practicing the introduced activities and application of technologies of the livelihood improvement models until the security situation further worsened. Table 5 shows the status of the model village activities at the time of the ex-post evaluation. The BDC of Bungu village continued. Among the two demonstration farms built in Kworjik and Kapuri villages, the Kapuri village demonstration farm is still used by groups and individuals. Joint production and sales of vegetables continue in Kapuri village. In Nyamini, Kapuri and Bungu villages, farmer teachers teach agricultural technologies to both participating and non-participating farmers in their communities.

<sup>21</sup> In 2015, a Presidential decree established 28 states in place of 10 states and Juba County became Jubek State. In 2017, the number of states further increased to 32. In 2020, these were re-organised into 10 States and 3 Areas. Jubek State became Central Equatoria State.

Table 6: Status of model village activities at the time of the ex-post evaluation

Village name	Activities
Kworjik	Application of agricultural technologies, candle and soap production until 2018
Nyamini	Chicken raising until recent (stopped in 2021 when pastoralists came)
Kansuk	Fishing continues despite of attacks of cattle keepers. Farming and bee keeping stopped because of security concern.
Kapuri	Vegetable sales group, bee keeping and chicken raising continue.
Bungu	Application of agricultural technologies and group farming continue. Bee keeping stopped.
Sirrimon	Candle, soap, and improved stove production till 2015. Group bee keeping continue.

(Source: CDOs' responses to the questionnaire, telephone interviews with model village representatives)

As for the model application in non-model villages, according to the responses to the questionnaires for CDOs, some CDOs<sup>22</sup> support farmers and farmer groups in Rokon, Tijor, Mongalla and Rajaf in agricultural technologies learned through the project. Figure 1 shows the location of these villages.

Some CDOs spread the models in the non-model villages after being transferred when the states were re-structured. Some farmers in the model villages also fled their villages and moved to other villages and then disseminated learned technologies. However, further expansion may not be possible because it is difficult to implement rural development activities at the same level of intensity as the project owing to the lack of activity budget and security concerns. On the other hand, some donors are implementing or planning projects and programmes on local governance and public services, and improvement of agricultural technologies and livelihood.<sup>23</sup> It would be possible for the CDOs to use their experiences if a larger number of such projects and programmes were implemented.

<sup>22</sup> CDOs do not receive budget or transport for rural development activities from MCRD/CES and the CDOs who continue activities are doing so on a voluntary basis, if only they have means of transport.

<sup>23</sup> For example, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) is planning a livelihood programme, 'South Sudan Livelihoods Resilience Programme', targeting three states including Central Equatoria State. The programme will take a community-based approach and promote County Development Committees and Boma Development Committees, aiming at improved agricultural technology, development planning, and implementation of sub-projects, which is similar to the methodology of the project. The Project Design Report of the programme says that CDOs will work with BDCs to mobilise communities, select activities and support implementing activities. See IFAD (2000) South Sudan Livelihoods Resilience Programme Project Design Report: Main report and annexes.




Figure 1: Location of the villages adopting the livelihood improvement models

(Source: External evaluators, based on the information from CDOs)

Note: the names in white speech balloons are those of model villages and those in orange balloons are non-model villages.

Despite the hard conditions such as conflicts, natural disasters, and a large-scale movement of refugees and IDPs, even without government budget, part of BDC activities, IGAs, and application of technologies continue. Even in non-model villages, part of the technologies and community development methods of the livelihood improvement models were found to be applied. That community members continued activities and the use of technologies may have largely depended on the usefulness of the agricultural packages, appropriate selection of technologies, and voluntary activities of individual community members and CDOs. The expansion of the models was not planned in the project and did not happen systematically; it seems to have been induced by transfer of CDOs who were keen to disseminate appropriate technologies. Because there is no rural development budget, it is not possible to apply the livelihood improvement models as a whole, including community mobilisation and development of community development plans, in the same way as had been done in the project. The project achieved at a limited level its Overall Goal because of its limited application, while some expansion was identified.

### 3.2.2.2 Other Positive and Negative Impacts

There were no negative impacts. The following are positive impacts in the socio-economic area.

According to the project completion report, open communication within the communities improved. Women and IDPs gained access to land use and participated in decision-making and economic activities, which led to their improved social statuses. The framers of the model villages

independently started importing agricultural inputs such as seeds learned from the project from neighbouring countries. Changes in awareness and behaviour of community members were observed, including better relationships in the model villages such as solidarity and inclusiveness and independent behaviour to take initiative. It was also reported that, when a conflict between cattle keepers and farmers happened in Kapuri village in 2009, BDC<sup>24</sup> established by the project took the initiative in negotiation and resolved the problem. This proved that an effective mechanism for conflict resolution was established in the model village. According to the interview with a Kapuri village representative at the time of the ex-post evaluation, as a result of strengthened solidarity and awareness of self-reliance in the village, it became possible to collect from the villagers the expense for repair and water user fees for the wells built and repaired by the project.<sup>25</sup>

The relation between CDOs and the villagers was not so strong at the beginning; the community members did not know about CDOs. However, after the project started, CDOs visited the villages once or twice a week and contributed to the villages' development by bringing in new technologies and donor support and won trust from the villagers, according to the project completion report. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, interviews with model village representatives confirmed that the villagers had difficulty in communication with CDOs at the beginning of the project but, as the project proceeded, trust was built between villagers and CDOs. Given that, in conflict-affected countries where governments are weak and public services are rare, the population has little trust in the government, such trust building is significant. The relations between CDOs and MCRD/CES also improved; CDOs replied in the questionnaire of the evaluation that their relations had become closer while working together toward common objectives.

CDOs and AEOs, who had no experience in rural development and technically and ethically limited capacity, also developed their skills to the extent that CDOs and AEOs understood the situation and needs of the communities, invited donor support to the communities, and won the trust of the communities. Some of them continued to be active after the project completion even without government budget. That CDOs and AEOs were trained to contribute to mid- and long-term rural development work is also an achievement of the project.

In this way, the project supported the farmers who had been dependent on external aid as a result of the civil war and CDOs and AEOs who had had no rural development experiences. The project helped them become motivated to participate in project activities in a forward-looking fashion and learn agricultural technologies. This helped them to establish the foundation of self-reliant continuation of activities. Diverse membership and leadership introduced and strengthened by the project sometimes had led to conflict resolution in the village. Thus, the project brought

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<sup>24</sup> The BDC of Kapuri village existed until 2014.

<sup>25</sup> The wells were still used at the time of the ex-post evaluation.

not only technological but also positive social impacts to the target villages that contributed to peace building.

Regarding the Project Purpose, organisational capacity development of the ministries was not achieved because the baseline capacity was low and improvement in communication and understanding of rural development was limited to the individual level, while the tools for the livelihood improvement models were developed and used and the capacity of CDOs, AEOs, and community members was strengthened through practice in the model villages. Overall Goal achievement cannot be judged but practice of the livelihood improvement models was continued in some model villages while the security situation worsened. Application of the model was found in non-model villages as well; therefore, the Overall Goal was partially achieved. Some changes leading to peace building, one of the objectives of the project, was also found. However, an influx of refugees and IDPs into the area caused by the nation-wide conflicts negatively affected the achievement of the project's impacts. Even some of the villages that continued activities without government assistance after the completion of the project stopped their activities as a result of the conflicts. Thus, the impact is fair, and the effectiveness and impact are fair.

### 3.3 Efficiency (Rating: ②)

#### 3.3.1 Inputs

Inputs of the project were as follows.

<b>Inputs</b>	<b>Plan</b>	<b>Actual</b>
(1) Experts	6 Long-Term (72 MM*)	9 Long-Term (108.47 MM)
(2) Trainees received	Not defined	Training in Japan: 13 people Third country training: 48 people
(3) Equipment	Vehicles, office equipment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Construction and repair of 7 types of building</li> <li>• Materials needed for implementation of the project and model projects (transport for extension activities, materials for agricultural technology training and IGAs)</li> <li>• Reference books (library room, 4 computers, 200 books on agriculture education, health and hygiene, and peace building)</li> </ul>
(4) Local cost	Amount not mentioned	21 million yen
Japanese Side Total Project Cost	401 million yen	511 million yen

	(including the expense for the detailed design study)	(including the expense for the detailed design study, 11 million yen)
South Sudan Side Total Project Cost	C/P, land, buildings and facilities, project management cost	C/P (50 people, full-time), land for office

\* MM stands for man-month.

### 3.3.1.1 Elements of Inputs

There is a difference between the planned and actual figures of MM for the Japanese experts and the project cost. The major difference came from the expense for the construction of two demonstration farms, finalised model project activities, repair of the buildings of MCRD/CES, and rural development and extension survey of 10 states. This cost increase reflected the activities added to the modified PDM in March 2009. Repair of the buildings of MCRD/CES and the rural development and extension survey of 10 states were a necessary addition to enhance government capacity. Compared to the increase in MM, the increase in the cost was not large; this might be because the project needed personnel to handle additional administrative work whose unit cost happened to be relatively low.<sup>26</sup>

### 3.3.1.2 Project Cost

The planned project cost was 401 million yen and the actual project cost was 511 million yen (both include the cost for the detailed design study, 11 million yen) which is 127% of the planned amount and higher than planned (②). The increase of 110 million yen was, as shown above, for the construction of two demonstration farms, model project activities, MCRD/CES building repair, and rural development and agricultural extension survey in 10 states (detailed information is not available).

### 3.3.1.3 Project Period

The project period, both planned and actual, was from March 2009 to February 2012 (36 months) and the project period was as planned (③).

Although the project period was within the plan, the project cost exceeded the plan: 127% of the planned cost. The increase in the project cost is likely due to the model project activities, which were added during the project plan review after the commencement of the project. This addition was made based on the project's improved understanding of the situation and the

<sup>26</sup> There is no documented information. This was expressed by the Japanese experts.

necessity to achieve the project objectives. Thus, the increase in the project cost is supposed to be justifiable. However, even at the time of planning, it was recognised that the capacity development of the government officials through practice of the livelihood improvement models was an important part of the project to establish the foundation for disseminating the models and it can be assumed that a certain amount of the activity cost in the model villages was factored in. Therefore, detailed information on costing at the planning of the project and at the modification is needed to assess if the increase was fair and a minimum amount required for the addition. Without such information, it is concluded that the efficiency of the project is fair.

### 3.4 Sustainability (Rating: ②)

#### 3.4.1 Policy and Political Commitment for the Sustainability of Project Effects

A national development plan was not identified at the time of the ex-post evaluation; however, the development plan for 2011 to 2013 set improvement of agricultural productivity as one of its priorities.<sup>27</sup> It states that livelihood improvement and increase in employment in rural areas is important for poverty reduction and peace building. Comprehensive Agriculture Master Plan (2015), a long-term road map for agricultural development in 2015, also recognises the need for capacity development of AEOs and their means of transport. The rural development policy developed by the project and approved by the government reflects the project's experiences in rural development and CDOs' work. Thus, it can be said that the policy framework was established to buttress the application of the models developed by the project.

#### 3.4.2 Institutional/Organisational Aspect for the Sustainability of Project Effect

At the state level, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security/CES<sup>28</sup> is responsible for agricultural technology extension and MCRD/CES for rural development. At the national level, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security/GOSS is responsible for agricultural and rural development. The ministries play complementary roles to each other.

A certain number of CDOs trained by the project were transferred to other duty stations because of the re-organisation of the states. As a result, some CDOs introduced the technologies learned from the project in the new duty station. However, some other CDOs still live in camps in and outside the country because of the conflicts. It is not easy to fill the gap of CDOs who changed the duty station or left the office. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, state ministries were under reorganisation and the remaining CDOs were waiting to be assigned. Thus, the government was not in the position to sustain the project effects. The two photos below are the project library taken during the ex-post evaluation. The library supported by the project was not in use. It is said that much of equipment was scattered and lost as a result of the re-structuring of ministries and states,

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<sup>27</sup> South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013

<sup>28</sup> This is the current name of the state ministry. The same applies for the national level.

and not managed properly.



Left: Building of the library

Right: Inside the library

(8 February 2021)

At the time of the ex-post evaluation, farmer teachers of Kapuri, Bungu, Sirmimon and Nyamini villages continued teaching other villagers. Bungu village was affected by conflicts and some villagers fled the village but BDC was still active. All six model villages continued activities after the completion of the project without any material support. The suspension of the BDCs and IGAs resulted from the worsening security situation and it is expected that these activities would be resumed when security improves.

### 3.4.3 Technical Aspect for the Sustainability of Project Effects

According to a CDO, 10 CDOs and one AEO among those trained by the project were active in rural development at the time of the ex-post evaluation. CDOs have engaged in rural development using the manuals. Therefore, it is expected that they would keep the rural development skills detailed in the basic tools. Some CDOs who stopped rural development work use the technology at their own farm. In villages, too, the farmer teachers have kept teaching and the participating farmers continued to use at least part of the technologies introduced by the project. IGAs continued after the completion of the project, until when it became too difficult to continue them because of security concerns. Although it is not possible to specify which technologies among those introduced were still used and to what extent, it is expected that the technical capacity for improvement of agricultural production and IGAs are sustained.

### 3.4.4 Financial Aspect for the Sustainability of Project Effects

After the completion of the project, the Government of South Sudan has not had budget for rural development activities in villages and a community development fund was not established. The government still has difficulty in paying salaries to CDOs and AEOs; salaries were often paid late and not sufficient. The financial situation of the implementing agencies is quite difficult. On the other hand, in the villages, community leaders and members have kept doing activities without external support. A CDO reported that the community members secure funds through a kind of



saving group called merry-go-round,<sup>29</sup> village savings and loan associations, NGOs and agricultural cooperatives.<sup>30</sup>

Some minor problems have been observed regarding the institutional/organisational, and financial aspects. Therefore, the sustainability of the project effects is fair.

## **4. Conclusion, Lessons Learned and Recommendations**

### 4.1 Conclusion

The project was implemented during the period before and after the independence in the Republic of South Sudan, taking agricultural villages in and around Juba as its model sites. The project aimed to establish a foundation to disseminate the livelihood improvement models in which CDOs of MCRD/CES facilitated villagers' agricultural production and IGAs, and introduced agricultural technology packages with the technical support of AEOs of MAF/CES. The project was in line with the development plan and needs of the Government of South Sudan aiming to increase agricultural production, human resource development, rural development, livelihood improvement and increase in employment. It was also highly consistent with Japan's ODA policy for Sudan. The implementation approach of the project was appropriate with thorough consideration of the condition of the conflict-ridden country. Thus, its relevance is high. Basic tools of the livelihood improvement models were developed, capacity of government stakeholders and community leaders was strengthened, and model projects achieved results. Although the organisational capacity of ministries was relatively weak, the project developed a policy and established networks, and the Project Purpose was almost achieved. The Overall Goal was partially achieved as the livelihood improvement models were applied in some villages other than the model ones despite various difficulties faced by the villages, such as two national crises and an influx of IDPs and refugees, resulting in discontinuation of community activities. After the completion of the project, the model villages continued their activities without government support. However, only a few villages were still active at the time of the ex-post evaluation while others had stopped activities because of increasing insecurity. Thus, the effectiveness and impact are fair because the project impact is moderate. The project period was as planned. However, the project cost was 127% of the planned amount and because some activities were added when the model projects were finalised. The increase in the project cost itself is assessed as fair; however, there was no information to judge if the added amount was fair and within the range of a minimum amount. Thus, the efficiency is fair. Regarding sustainability, there remains issues of financial and organisational sustainability of the government. It is affected by the restructuring of the states

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<sup>29</sup> Group members regularly meet (often every week) and each member pays a set amount of money. One member takes all the money. All members take turn and receive the money and each member will receive the same amount of money which she/he put forward.

<sup>30</sup> At the time of the ex-post evaluation, registration of cooperatives was in progress.

resulting in transfer of some CDOs and the lack of government budget for rural development activities. Still, at the community level, part of farmer teachers, Boma Development Committee members, CDOs, and AEOs keep using the techniques and technologies introduced by the project. Technology transfer occurred at the community level and there is possibility that project results will be reproduced and sustained. Thus, the sustainability is rated as fair. The overall rating is ‘partially satisfactory’.

## 4.2 Recommendations

### 4.2.1 Recommendations to the Implementing Agency

#### (1) Recommendations to MAF/CES and MCRD/CES

Some of the CDOs and AEOs trained by the project keep rural development activities in new duty stations and some others has stopped activities owing to security concerns and financial constraints. It depends on the individuals if they continue rural development work or not and the effects of the project have not been fully put to use. Both ministries are recommended that they locate all the trained CDOs and AEOs and secure budget for activities to use the experience and effects of the project (e.g. rural development activities or training of other CDOs and AEOs). MAF/CES and MCRD/CES, when resuming dialogues with the central ministries and development partners working on agriculture, need to promote the project results as a good practice to the international organisations and donors which will develop activities targeting CDOs and communities in rural areas and mobilise external resources.

#### (2) Recommendations to MCRD/CES

Until the government of South Sudan can secure activity budget, MCRD/CES could use the time for preparation to collect good practices of the model villages with the support of CDOs and AEOs, and update the manuals adding such good practices. These good practices could be presented to the national government and development partners to promote the effectiveness of the models and secure budget for rural development.

### 4.2.2 Recommendations to JICA

It is difficult for JICA to find a way to support the government to realise the project effects when there is no government budget. However, it is possible to try not to waste the achievement of application of technology and activities in the model villages and to support the government so that the government can use the project experience when the time is right. Specifically, JICA may be able to support and advise MCRD/CES in collecting good practices and updating rural development directory and manuals, which could be done even with limited resources and form the basis for rural development and agricultural technology extension. Outcomes of such activities could be shared with other development partners.

### 4.3 Lessons Learned

#### Projects can enhance sustainability of effects by striving for community capacity development.

When implementing rural development work in model villages with CEOs and AEOs, the project organised BDCs and trained community leaders to facilitate community owned development work involving diverse people, especially those socially vulnerable such as IDPs and women. The project facilitated agricultural technology extension by identifying farmers eager to learn and training them as farmer teachers based in the villages in place of CDOs and AEOs. The farmers directly experienced and understood the effect of the introduction of new technologies and received benefits of increase agricultural products. This experience enhanced their motivation and sustainability of the project effects at the village level. At the completion of the project, community members expressed their intention to continue the activities and, in fact, continued adoption of technologies and activities introduced by the project without government support until when security problems arose. In conflict-affected countries, governments often have limited technical and financial capacity to provide public services. Thus, it is highly likely that governments can contribute to sustaining project effects to a limited extent. Even in such a case, thorough implementation of community-based activities involving community members on the ground may lead to highly sustainable project effects. When planning a technical cooperation project in countries where governments are weak, such as conflict-affected countries, it would be useful to consider such an approach that directly support beneficiaries on the ground.

#### Projects can actively disseminate project information to stakeholders during the implementation in order to create synergy with government services and other donor assistance and enhance the project effects.

As shown in 3.1.4 ③ above, the project succeeded in connecting the model villages to assistance by other donors and government agencies in the areas of education, health, and income generation. The assistance was not pre-planned but realised through the successful approach to understand needs of the villages accurately and convey them to other agencies. The needs of the villages clarified in the community development plan of each village covers multiple areas. All of them were indispensable for improvement of the life in the villages but it is not possible for one project to address all needs. Therefore, CDOs who understood the needs of the model villages shared that information in CDOs' meetings and CDO leaders relayed the needs to relevant agencies to solicit support. The Japanese experts also instructed and supported CDOs in this. This approach, which involves clarifying and understanding the needs, sharing of the needs and facilitating cooperation, can be applied in other projects.

Projects can build trust in the government through assistance to communities.

During the civil war, community members of South Sudan did not receive sufficient social services from the government or Sudan People's Liberation Army/Sudan People's Liberation Movement.<sup>31</sup> They were not even allowed to go out of their villages and had a very difficult time. These experiences made the government untrustworthy for the communities. At the beginning of the project, community members did not know about CDOs and found it difficult to communicate with CDOs and AEOs. However, as the project activities progressed, community members witnessed an increase in agricultural products and assistance from other donors, and trust towards CDOs and AEOs was gradually built.

In conflict-affected countries, people's trust in the government is critical for social stabilisation.<sup>32</sup> The trust that the project managed to build between the communities and CDOs and AEOs can be the first step to nurture trust in the government and enhance stability of society. In this sense, when planning technical assistance, it would be useful to set activities in which the population can see public services and their benefits in order to facilitate social stabilisation. It is important to make it clear that the project is part of the government public services and assist communities with what they really need. This will require capacity development of the government personnel like CDOs who work with the communities and a favourable environment for them to conduct community-based activities.

Projects should introduce appropriate technologies and activities based on the community needs and available resources.

The contents of the model projects and agricultural technologies to be introduced were carefully selected according to the needs and conditions of each model village. The process of model village selection started with deepening CDOs' understanding of the situation of target agricultural communities through the socio-economic survey of 30 villages in 8 areas of Juba County. Then a community development plan was made in each target village with facilitation of CDOs. Basic technologies such as straight-row method for transplanting was still applied at the time of the ex-post evaluation. Cassava and sweet potatoes introduced as a countermeasure to bad weather were highly valued by farmers. Among two demonstration farms, the one in Kworjik village functioned until 2018 when it was burnt down, and the other in Kapuri village was still functioning at the time of the ex-post evaluation. Some IGAs also continue. That all these activities continue at the time of the ex-post evaluation is a proof that the introduced technology was a good match with the community members' understanding and available resources. This approach to thoroughly pick up needs through a socio-economic survey and introduce appropriate technologies and

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<sup>31</sup> The government army and the party in power at the time after the independence.

<sup>32</sup> Mallett, R., Hagen-Zanker, J., Slater, R., and Sturge, G. (2015). Surveying livelihoods, service delivery and governance: baseline evidence from DRC, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uganda (Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium Working Paper 31). London: ODI.

activities can be applied in other rural development projects.

Projects should use the results of analysis of project impacts and effects on the socially vulnerable, such as gender analysis, to improve project management throughout the project implementation period.

The socio-economic survey conducted at the beginning of the project revealed that women and IDPs did not have access to productive resources such as land and did not participate in economic activities and decision making. These findings were incorporated into model project selection and meeting management. In community leader training, necessity of consideration for IDPs, women, ethnic minorities, and households with orphans or the disabled was emphasised to make the leaders understand equitable development (see 3.1.5. Avoiding risks caused by destabilising factors). As a result, it was reported that women had started participating in economic activities and decision making and their relationships and status within their families improved. This must be a useful approach in a country where gender-based violence is a serious issue like South Sudan.<sup>33</sup> However, although the positive impacts on the socially vulnerable was recognised, some details, such as what was effective and if there were any problems, were unclear. Thus, not only at the beginning but throughout the project, gender analysis and analysis on the socially vulnerable could be conducted as part of monitoring. If the process of the changes becomes clear, such understanding could help establish more effective livelihood improvement models with consideration for diversity of the population. Especially for projects targeting communities with many vulnerable groups like this project, such analysis would provide useful information for more effective project implementation and learning to be used in rural development projects.

Model project village selection needs to be done according to the Project Purpose and capacity of people who manage implementation.

At the beginning of the project, from June to July 2009, a sampling survey was conducted targeting 30 villages in Juba County. Based on the survey results, the project decided on the target villages after discussion with CDOs. The selection criteria were ‘security and access, leadership and solidarity in the village,<sup>34</sup> available local resources, geographical balance, relative concentration of residence, relatively homogeneous ethnicity and lifestyles’. It can be said that the villages with relatively favourable conditions were selected. For target community selection,

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<sup>33</sup> According to a survey conducted by the International Organization for Migration targeting 3,130 women aged 17 or older, 45% of the respondents suffered gender-based violence in their households during the last 12 months. See IOM (2019) Gender-Based Violence: Knowledge, Attitude and Practices Survey in South Sudan. (p.43)

<sup>34</sup> The project visited the villages to assess leadership of the representatives and solidarity of the villages based on mobilisation of the community members, community activities such as road repair and church activities, collaborative work among the community members. Experiences in receiving assistance for community development activities and past conflicts in the villages could be used as well. See Kim, J., Sheely, R., Schmidt, C. (2020). Social Capital and Social Cohesion Measurement Toolkit for Community-Driven Development Operations. Washington, DC: Mercy Corps and The World Bank Group.

different criteria, such as communities having different characteristics from each other, the same number of communities from different geographical areas, or poorer communities, could have been used. When implementing model projects, it may be useful to select communities with different characteristics for comparison. However, in the case of the project, CDOs and AEOs with little rural development experience had to facilitate communities' activities under difficult conditions after conflicts. Therefore, it was decided not to select difficult communities and give priority to CDOs and AEOs' practising and experiencing success.

Finally, at the time of the ex-post evaluation, the only one village where BDC still functioned is Bungu village which, according to the project, under strong leadership, had solidarity and social capital.<sup>35</sup> It is not true that Bungu village has not been affected by conflicts; many villagers have fled the village because of conflicts, just like other villages. Its solidarity from the beginning might have led to sustained project effects. Therefore, when selecting target areas for technical cooperation projects in conflict-affected countries where government officials need capacity development, it would be worth selecting target areas with strong leadership, solidarity, and social capital so that the project, as a capacity development model, can have higher possibility of successful implementation and sustainability of effects. It might be said that this selection criteria are inappropriate if fairness and an experimental aspect are emphasised; however, when C/Ps of a conflict-affected country needed their own capacity building, it would be good to select less problematic targets so that capacity building of the government could be done through the project implementation and a successful model could be presented.

Projects in conflict-affected countries need to set indicators that do not require much work to collect data considering individual situations.

Some indicators of the project required a survey of both participating farmers and non-participating ones to collect data to assess their achievement (see section 3.1.4 ②). Outcome 4 set indicator ② that was supposed to compare participating and non-participating farmers' food production, incomes, and assets. However, the project completion report used perception of the participating farmers on agricultural production and income for this indicator, without presenting quantitative data. It can be assumed that data matching this indicator were not collected because it would not be easy to conduct a survey with community members. Comparison with non-participating farmers was not necessarily required to see if the livelihood improvement models were successful. The models could be regarded as a success if the participating members recognised the introduced technologies were useful (then, it is highly likely that they would keep applying the technologies) and new IGAs brought income increase. It is understandable that setting a control group is desirable for a research design. Nonetheless, it is better and realistic to

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<sup>35</sup> Project completion report. (p.44)

set less demanding indicators, as long as minimum required information is obtained, because projects in conflict-affected countries face far more problems than usual. In addition, some indicators have terms that needed clear definitions to be used in this project, such as agricultural productivity and hunger. These can be replaced with clearly defined terms that can make data collection easier such as the number of meals<sup>36</sup> or the number of households reporting increase in the volume of meals. That can help make accurate assessment. It is recommended that a project in a conflict-affected country with inherent difficulties set indicators that are clearly defined and do not require extra efforts to collect data. That will help conduct accurate monitoring and evaluation.

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<sup>36</sup> The project completion report also uses the decrease in the proportion of the households which have one meal per day to assess if life was improved.