

Republic of the Philippines

FY2022 Ex-Post Evaluation Report of Technical Cooperation Project

“Comprehensive Capacity Development Project for the Bangsamoro”

External Evaluator: Takako Haraguchi, OPMAC Corporation

0. Summary


In this project, known as the Comprehensive Capacity Development Project for the Bangsamoro (CCDP), two plans were implemented with the aim of transitioning to the Bangsamoro Government set to be established in Mindanao. The first is the CCDP for the Bangsamoro (hereinafter referred to as “CCDP-B”), implemented by the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC),¹ and the second is the CCDP for the Autonomous Regional Government (hereinafter referred to as “CCDP-A”), implemented by the then-existing Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) government. Each plan aimed at foundational construction of governance, enhancement of administrative service provision and community development, and promotion of economic growth. Specifically, CCDP-B aimed to accelerate the transition process to the Bangsamoro Government, and CCDP-A aimed to promote the institutional reform process of the ARMM.

The project plan is relevant and coherent, aligning well with the development policies and needs of the Philippines and the target regions, as well as with Japan’s aid policy. It also has synergy and mutual linkage with other projects. As a result of the project implementation, the objectives of both CCDP-B and CCDP-A were mostly achieved. Many of the various activities introduced in the project continue even at the time of the ex-post evaluation, contributing to the preparations for the transition to the Bangsamoro Government, indicating high effectiveness and impacts. Regarding efficiency, although the project cost exceeded the plan due to additional components, the project period remained within the plan revised after extension due to stagnation in the peace process and delays in the transition process. Thus, it is rated as high. Sustainability is high, although there are minor issues in personnel placement and technical acquisition by staff other than the counterpart personnel of this project. The establishment of the Bangsamoro Government has been postponed from what was assumed during the project implementation. There are risks in the peace and transition processes, but as of the time of the ex-post evaluation, both the transitional autonomous government and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as “the Philippine government”) continue to address these issues.

In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be highly satisfactory.

¹ The original name at the time of its establishment was the Transition Commission (TC).

1. Project Description



Project Location



Image 1 Upland rice cultivation in a Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) camp (source: Photographed by the local research assistant)

1.1 Background

The southwestern and central regions of Mindanao Island, located in the southern Philippines, grappled with issues such as high poverty rates, lack of basic social services, and insufficient infrastructure due to the impact of a conflict that spanned over 40 years between Islamic forces seeking separation and autonomy and the Philippine government.

Intermittent peace negotiations were conducted between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which represented Islamic anti-government forces, and the Philippine government. In 1990, the ARMM was established by Philippine legislation, and a final peace agreement was reached with the MNLF in 1996. However, armed conflicts continued between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which separated from the MNLF in 1984, and the Philippine government. As a result of peace negotiations between the MILF, which became a key group of the opposing force, and the Philippine government, a ceasefire agreement known as the *Tripoli Agreement* was signed in 2001, and further progress was made under the Aquino III administration that began in 2010. In October 2012, the *Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro* (FAB) was signed, aiming for permanent peace and development in the conflict areas of Mindanao. It was agreed to establish a new Bangsamoro Government by 2016 to replace the ARMM government. Various other plans were also scheduled, such as initiating deliberations on the *Bangsamoro Basic Law*, which

would define the framework for the new autonomous government, in 2014, conducting a plebiscite in 2015 to determine the territory of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), and holding the first Bangsamoro parliamentary elections in 2016. In December 2012, the BTC was established as a transitional institution to draft the *Bangsamoro Basic Law* (BBL). Under these circumstances, the urgent tasks were the development of systems and institutions for the new autonomous government and the capacity building of administrative personnel.

The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) had been providing support to Mindanao since the 1970s, and numerous activities focusing on peace and development in Mindanao were implemented in the 2000s. While the support was mainly directed toward the Philippine government or the ARMM government, new plans were made in this project to support the BTC, which was responsible for preparing the new autonomous government.

1.2 Project Outline

As mentioned above, this project consisted of two plans: CCDP-B and CCDP-A.

For a better understanding of the project, it is important to note the situation in Mindanao as described in “1.1: Background.” After the start of this project, the *Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro* (CAB), which consolidated the FAB signed in 2012 and its accompanying documents, was signed in September 2014. Based on this agreement, the BBL (also known as BBL1) was drafted as planned in 2014 but was abandoned in 2015 due to delays in deliberation and worsening conditions.² Following the inauguration of the Duterte administration in 2016, a revised version of the BBL (BBL2) was enacted as Republic Act No. 11054 (commonly known as the *Bangsamoro Organic Law*, or BOL) in 2018. Plebiscites to determine the territory of BARMM were held in 2019, and the first Bangsamoro parliamentary elections were initially scheduled for 2022 but were later postponed to 2025.³ In February 2019, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) was established to govern the BARMM area until the said elections. Consequently, the ARMM government was abolished, and the BTC completed its role in preparing for the establishment of the BTA and was dissolved.

This project was initially planned to run until 2016. However, it became clear that the BBL would not be enacted by that time, leading to an extension until July 2019. (The table below is based on the final version of the project plan, which was revised after the extension.) Additionally, with the establishment of the BTA, both CCDP-B and CCDP-A

² See “3.1.1.3 Appropriateness of the Project Plan and Approach” for details.

³ According to reports, the Philippine government explained that the preparation for the establishment of the new autonomous government was delayed, partly due to the outbreak of COVID-19.

had this body as their new implementing agency. A timeline summarizing these events is included in the Appendix at the end of this report.

		CCDP-B	CCDP-A
Overall Goal		Foundation for the Bangsamoro Government is built.	(Not set)
Project Purpose		Transition process to the Bangsamoro Government is accelerated.	ARMM institutional reform process is promoted.
Output(s)	Output 1	[Building Foundation of Governance] Preparation in governance for transition to Bangsamoro Government is progressed.	[Building Foundation of Governance] Human resources and institutional capacity of ARMM and Local Government Units (LGUs) are strengthened.
	Output 2	[Strengthening Public Service Delivery and Community Development] Community development activities are implemented in conflict affected areas.	[Strengthening Public Service Delivery and Community Development] Delivery of public services in specific sectors is improved.
	Output 3	[Economic Enhancement] Formulation of Bangsamoro Development Plan is accelerated.	[Economic Enhancement] The environment is improved for promotion of local industries through promotion of selected products.
Total cost (Japanese Side)		1,607 million yen	
Period of Cooperation		July 2013 – July 2019 (Extension: July 2016 – July 2019)	
Target Area		Areas stated in “V. TERRITORY in the Framework Agreement” signed between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on 15 October 2012	
Implementing Agency		Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC)	Autonomous Regional Government in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
		Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) (Since February 2019)	

	CCDP-B	CCDP-A
Other Relevant Agencies/ Organizations	Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA), Bangsamoro Leadership Management Institute (BLMI), Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, ARMM (DAF-ARMM), Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), Philippine Rice Research Institute (PhilRICE), Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP), and others	Executive Secretary, Office of Regional Governor, ARMM (ORG-ARMM), Department of the Interior and Local Government, ARMM (DILG-ARMM), Department of Public Works and Highways, ARMM (DPWH-ARMM), Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, ARMM (DAF-ARMM), Department of Trade and Industry, ARMM (DTI-ARMM), Local Government Units (LGUs), Agricultural Training Institute (ATI), Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP), and others
Consultant in Japan	RECS International Inc. / Oriental Consultants Global Co., Ltd. / CTI Engineering International Co., Ltd. / IC Net Limited (JV), UNICO International Corporation ⁴	
Related Projects ⁵	<p><u>JICA Technical Cooperation</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Study for Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development of Conflict Areas in Mindanao (SERD-CAAM) (2007–2009) • ARMM Human Resource Development Project (2004–2007) • ARMM Human Capacity Development Project (2008–2013) • Development Study on Promotion of Local Industry in ARMM (2010–2012) • Community Development in the Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao (CD-CAAM) (2012–2015) • Capacity Development Project for Bangsamoro (CDPB) (2019–2025) 	


⁴ Each of the organizations listed served as contracted entities responsible for executing certain components, while the remaining components were directly managed by JICA.

⁵ JICA projects in the target area of this project are numerous (a comprehensive list of JICA projects at the time of implementation of this project can be found on page 12 and elsewhere in the “Comprehensive Review of JICA’s Assistance in Mindanao,” 2021 [URL: <https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/1000044367.pdf>, accessed on July 9, 2023]). However, in this section, only the projects that are specifically mentioned in the main body of this report, as they have notable relevance to this project, are listed.

	CCDP-B	CCDP-A
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Industry Cluster Capacity Enhancement Project (2012–2015) <p><u>Japanese ODA Loan</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Road Network Development Project in Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao (2019) <p><u>Japanese Grant Aid</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Project for Improvement of Equipment for Power Distribution in Bangsamoro Area (2017) <p><u>Others (International Organizations, Development Assistance Organizations, etc.)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facility for Advisory Support for Transition Capacity (FASTRAC) (World Bank / United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2013–2016) Support to Bangsamoro Transition (SUBATRA) (European Commission (EU) and others, 2020–2024) 	

About Related Organizations

There are numerous organizations related to this project, but the relationships between the core organizations are organized as shown in the figure on the right. The activities of CCDP-B were mainly carried out by the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) or the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), which was the socio-economic development agency of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The activities of CCDP-A were mainly carried out by various departments/ministries of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). While not included in the figure, local government units (LGUs)⁶ and communities participated



Source: Created by the ex-post evaluator based on materials provided by JICA

Note: Organizations that exist as of 2023 are indicated in green.

Figure 1 Key Organizations Involved in This Project

as beneficiaries of some activities. Service providers included domestic Philippine agencies such as the Philippine Rice Research Institute (PhilRICE), the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP), and the Agricultural Training Institute (ATI), as well as local consultants. From the Philippine government, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process

⁶ In this report, unless otherwise noted, LGU refers to the municipality level.

(OPAPP) was involved, and the Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA), responsible for regional development planning, participated in some activities.

It is important to note what the BTA refers to. The BTA has both a legislative and an executive branch, but in the Philippines, the term “BTA” is often used to refer to the legislative branch (the parliament). The executive branch (the current government governing the BARMM area as confirmed by the 2019 plebiscites as of 2023) is referred to as “BARMM (government).” For the sake of accuracy in this report, the current government is formally referred to as “BTA,” but in cases where this could lead to confusion, it will be noted as “Parliament” or “BARMM government.”

With the abolition of the ARMM government, staff in sectors other than education, health, and social welfare services, the continuation of which were especially important, were separated,⁷ and some former staff applied for and were hired by the BTA. A comparison of related organizations is shown in the table below.

Table 1 Comparison of ARMM and BTA Organizations Related to This Project

ARMM organizations	BTA organizations that took over the functions of the ARMM
Office of Regional Governor, ARMM (ORG-ARMM)	Office of the Chief Minister, BARMM (OCM-BARMM)
Department of the Interior and Local Government, ARMM (DILG-ARMM)	Ministry of Interior and Local Government, BARMM (MILG-BARMM)
Department of Public Works and Highways, ARMM (DPWH-ARMM)	Ministry of Public Works, BARMM (MPW-BARMM)
Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, ARMM (DAF-ARMM)	Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Agrarian Reforms, BARMM (MAFAR-BARMM)
Department of Trade and Industry, ARMM (DTI-ARMM)	Ministry of Trade, Investment and Tourism, BARMM (MTIT-BARMM)

Source: Materials provided by JICA, BTA website

About Components

The outputs of both CCDP-B and CCDP-A were set along three pillars: “Foundation-building for Governance,” “Strengthening Public Services Delivery and Community Development,” and “Economic Enhancement.” The groups of activities or subprojects included in each output, hereinafter referred to as “components,” are as follows. As will be discussed later, all of these components were realized.

⁷ According to the BBL, staff in the education, health, and social welfare sectors were to be absorbed and transferred to the Bangsamoro Government. Based on this provision, staff from these sectors were transferred to the BTA, which is the transitional governing body until the establishment of the Bangsamoro Government.

Table 2 List of Project Components

Plan	Output	Component	Main Related Organizations	Remarks
CCDP-B	Output 1 (Governance)	a) Support for drafting the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL)	BTC, MILF, OPAPP	
		b) Human Resources Mapping (HRM, Bangsamoro Talent Database)	BTC	
	Output 2 (Strengthening Public Service Delivery and Community Development)	c) Quick Impact Project (QIP)	BTC, BDA	Added in the first half of the project
		d) Upland Rice-based Farming Technology Transfer Program for the Bangsamoro (URTP-B, agricultural extension subproject)	BDA, BLMI, DAF-ARMM, PhilRICE*	Added during the extension period
	Output 3 (Economic Enhancement)	e) Formulation of the Bangsamoro Development Plan (BDP)	BTC, BDA, MinDA	
CCDP-A	Output 1 (Governance)	f) ARMM Government Staff Training	ORG-ARMM, Various Departments, DAP*	
		g) Human Resources Information System (HRIS)	ORG-ARMM	
		h) Revenue Enhancement Assistance for ARMM LGUs (REAL, local revenue enhancement subproject)	DILG-ARMM	Added during the extension period
	Output 2 (Strengthening Public Service Delivery and Community Development)	i) Road maintenance management through the Dynamic Response Intelligent Monitoring System (DRIMS) / Expanded ARMM Roads Mapping and Management (E-ARMM)	DPWH-ARMM	
		j) Livelihood Improvement for the Transformation of Underserved Population (LIFT-UP, agricultural extension subproject)	DAF-ARMM, ATI*	Added during the extension period
	Output 3 (Economic Enhancement)	k) ARMM Regional Industry Cluster Capacity Enhancement Project / Market Driven Local Industry Promotion (AICCEP/MDLIP, local industry development subproject)	DTI-ARMM	

Source: Materials provided by JICA

Note: The asterisk (*) indicates service providers.

1.3 Outline of the Terminal Evaluation

1.3.1 Achievement Status of Project Purpose at the Terminal Evaluation

Both CCDP-B and CCDP-A were assessed to have a high likelihood of achieving their project purposes. For CCDP-B, the outputs of this project were evaluated as having served as a “push factor” for the transition to the Bangsamoro Government. As for CCDP-A, it was assessed at the time that further efforts would be needed for some subprojects that were initiated after the extension of the project period. However, there were already initiatives that had become entrenched in the ARMM organization, and these were evaluated as having facilitated reforms in the ARMM organization that could prove beneficial to the Bangsamoro Government.

1.3.2 Achievement Status of Overall Goal at the Terminal Evaluation

(Including other impacts.)

The likelihood of achieving the overall goal (set only for CCDP-B) was assessed to be high. Although there were uncertainties in the transition process and concerns about the security situation at the time of the assessment, both CCDP-B and CCDP-A were evaluated as having contributed to the foundation-building of the Bangsamoro Government. Caution was advised for future political and security conditions at the project sites.

1.3.3 Recommendations from the Terminal Evaluation

For CCDP-B, the handover and follow-up of the project's activities and outputs from the BTC to the BTA were recommended and addressed. For CCDP-A, the completion of ongoing subprojects was recommended and was largely achieved before the project's completion. Additionally, the handover of assets of this project from the ARMM government to the BTA was recommended and addressed.

2. Outline of the Evaluation Study

2.1 External Evaluator

Takako Haraguchi, OPMAC Corporation⁸

2.2 Duration of Evaluation Study

This ex-post evaluation study was conducted with the following schedule.

Duration of the Study: October 2022 – November 2023

Duration of the Field Study: February 8 – 22, 2023 and May 28 – June 3, 2023

2.3 Constraints During the Evaluation Study

The target area of this project remained a security concern during the ex-post evaluation, limiting the sites and duration of visits that external evaluators and local research assistants could safely undertake. As a result, information gathering beyond the few sites visited by local research assistants was conducted through interviews in Cotabato City (where various BARMM organizations, including the OCM-BARMM, are located) or online with stakeholders who were involved at the time and are currently involved in the ex-post evaluation. Due to the wide scope of the project compared to the limited evaluation period, there were aspects that could not be fully understood during the ex-post evaluation.

The purpose of this project was to support the transition to the Bangsamoro Government. However, due to the fluid nature of the transition process and its susceptibility to

⁸ Reinforcement participation from i2i Communication, Ltd.

significant political influences, the definitions of the project purpose of accelerating “the transition process to the Bangsamoro Government” and the overall goal of building “the foundation of the Bangsamoro Government” under CCDP-B have become unclear. According to materials from JICA, “accelerating the transition process” means that this project contributes to the preparations for establishing the new autonomous government, and “the foundation of the autonomous government” refers to the content specified as indicators for the overall goal in the preparations for the new autonomous government. Based on this explanation, conducting any activity that can be positioned as part of “preparation for establishment” can be evaluated as “the transition process has been accelerated” and “the foundation has been built” (meaning there is a wide scope for interpretation), making the evaluation of goal achievement inevitably vague. In this ex-post evaluation, it was considered difficult to eliminate such ambiguity in a project with many uncertain elements. Therefore, if the outputs of this project mentioned in each indicator could be confirmed to specifically contribute to the progress of preparations for establishing the new autonomous government, it was considered as achieved. Additionally, issues that are not reflected in the rating criteria for JICA’s ex-post evaluation were also described.

3. Results of the Evaluation (Overall Rating: A⁹)

This ex-post evaluation not only follows the standard JICA ex-post evaluation framework but also aligns with JICA’s perspectives of the project evaluation in conflict-affected countries and regions. As many of these perspectives were applicable to this project, they are summarized in a box under each respective section below.

3.1 Relevance/Coherence (Rating: ③¹⁰)

3.1.1 Relevance (Rating: ③)

3.1.1.1 Consistency with the Development Plan of the Philippines

Both at the time of the ex-ante evaluation and upon completion of the project, this project was consistent with the Philippines’ development plans and agreements related to the Mindanao peace process and peacebuilding. In terms of national development plans, the Philippine government outlined its commitment to the continuation of the Mindanao peace talks and efforts to address the root causes of conflict in the *Medium-Term Development Plan* (2011–2016) and the *Philippine Development Plan* (2017–2022). The *Philippine Development Plan* also explicitly mentioned the protection and development of communities in conflict-affected and vulnerable areas. As for regional development

⁹ A: Highly satisfactory, B: Satisfactory, C: Partially satisfactory, D: Unsatisfactory

¹⁰ ④: Very High, ③: High, ②: Moderately Low, ①: Low

plans, the priorities set forth in the *Reform Agenda* (2016–2019) by the ARMM Governor at the time of the ex-ante evaluation, such as “functionalization of LGUs,” “responsive ARMM government,” “development of agriculture and fisheries,” and “enterprise and business development,” were aligned with the outputs set in CCDP-A.

In terms of agreements related to the peace process and peacebuilding, the FAB (2012), the CAB (2014), and the BOL (2018) can be cited. This project aimed to support the transition process based on these agreements. Notably, the project was implemented immediately after the signing of the FAB and before the conclusion of the CAB. It included providing technical assistance to some of the members drafting the BOL. This had the effect of supporting the political process related to the transition itself, making the timing of the project appropriate.

The project also aligns with JICA’s perspectives of project evaluation in conflict-affected countries and regions.

JICA’s Perspectives of Project Evaluation in Conflict-Affected Countries and Regions
(1) Consistency with the Development Plan

▪ **Timing: Starting the project at an appropriate time, considering the progress of the peace process and the local political, security, and social conditions.**

Deemed appropriate. Although initiating the project before the conclusion of the CAB poses potential security risks, the timing is considered suitable for supporting peace attainment. This assessment is based on the Aquino III administration’s aim to achieve peace during its term since its inception in 2010. A successful high-level meeting between the President and the MILF chairman, facilitated by the Japanese government in 2011, and the signing of the FAB in 2012 further support this judgment.

▪ **Political and Policy Significance: Implementing this project in the respective country or region, conferring political and policy relevance as well as policy implications from the perspective of peacebuilding.**

Deemed appropriate (found to be significant). The project’s aim of supporting the transition process under CCDP-B has political and policy contributions, and the overall project carries the nature of supporting peacebuilding in Mindanao, lending it relevance.

3.1.1.2 Consistency with the Development Needs of the Philippines

The project was aligned with the development needs of the Philippines both at the time of the ex-ante evaluation and at project completion. Regarding the challenges mentioned in the “Background,” the project as a whole addressed deficiencies in basic social services and infrastructure by focusing on capacity building in administrative and socio-economic development. For the new autonomous government, the MILF, based on the FAB and CAB, needed to transition from an armed group to a governance structure and advance normalization processes such as the demobilization of MILF fighters, disarmament, and socio-economic development. CCDP-B primarily focused on enhancing the capabilities of BTC members related to the transition to the new autonomous government and on socio-economic development led by the BTC’s socio-economic office and the BDA, including livelihood improvement for combatant farmers.

Gratitude was repeatedly expressed by former BTC leadership and other former counterparts to JICA for being one of the first donors¹¹ to support the MILF in its smooth transition to the Bangsamoro Government in collaboration with the Philippine government, always prioritizing dialogue and providing support based on identified needs.

After the project commenced, the transition process to the new autonomous government also changed along with shifts in political administration and the progress status of the peace process. However, the project continuously maintained its alignment with development needs as much as possible through the extension of the project period and the addition of components. It included areas of cooperation that were less susceptible to changes in the structure on the Philippine side and had high needs, such as improving local government revenue, promoting agriculture in communities, and nurturing local industries targeting regional producers and markets.

From the perspective of peacebuilding, this project effectively balanced the needs of both the BTC (an organization comprising the MILF and the Philippine government, leading to a transitional autonomous government) and the ARMM government (the autonomous government that existed at the time). By addressing a wide range of needs, the project aimed to reduce multiple factors of instability and promote factors of stability. Additionally, through the Quick Impact Project (QIP), the development of small-scale facilities in 20 community sites played a significant role in quickly impressing upon people the progress of the peace agreement process. This helped build trust in the MILF, aligning well with the needs for peace not only of the site residents but also of the people in the region. According to former counterparts, local people recognized the QIP criteria and high development priority of the selected villages based on the criteria, and the message that the peace process and peacebuilding were advancing was effectively conveyed throughout the region.

In beneficiary targeting, the perspective of considering those who are hindered from fair social participation was emphasized in the site selection for each component, such as setting the use of selection criteria that consider social inclusivity and regional balance as an indicator of output in QIP. No evidence was found that any specific group suffered a disadvantage.

The project also aligns with JICA's perspectives of project evaluation in conflict-affected countries and regions.

¹¹ While JICA was not the first donor to provide support to MILF-affected areas, as there are numerous multilateral and bilateral donors, it is a fact that this project was the first donor support to comprehensively address a wide range of capacity building from governance to socio-economic development through the BTC. Although it cannot be said that the project had an effect in encouraging other donor support, it can be considered a forerunner in socio-economic development led by MILF's transitional organizations in terms of timing.

JICA's Perspectives of Project Evaluation in Conflict-Affected Countries and Regions
(2) Consistency with the Development Needs

▪ **Clarifying the Relationship Between Instability/Stability Factors and the Project**

Addressed. Specific factors were identified in the ex-ante evaluation report, clarifying which factors this project aimed to address. Specifically, the identified instability factors affecting the consolidation of peace in the region were: (1) the absence of a final agreement between the Philippine government and the MILF, (2) the possibility that the peace process may not progress in accordance with the FAB, (3) insufficient administrative service delivery capabilities, (4) lack of trust in the government among the people, (5) deterioration of security due to conflicts among clans or MILF factions, (6) the presence of internally displaced persons due to conflict or natural disasters, (7) the potential deterioration of relations between the transitional government and local governments due to revisions in local governance codes, (8) the existence of groups opposing the progress of peace (spoilers). This project was designed to reduce instability factors (2)(3)(4)(7).

▪ **Selection of the Target Areas and Beneficiary Groups: Consideration to Minimize Instability Factors, Measures to Avoid Risks that Could Exacerbate Instability Factors**

Addressed. In selecting activity sites, criteria were set to ensure that not only Muslims but also Christians, indigenous people, and those affected by conflict were appropriately included as beneficiaries.

3.1.1.3 Appropriateness of the Project Plan and Approach

The project plan and approach for this project were generally appropriate. Notably, the decision to divide the project into two planning documents (Project Design Matrices, or PDMs), CCDP-B and CCDP-A, based on the local context, was crucial for smooth project implementation. It is worth noting that the initial plan drafted by JICA headquarters included both the MILF side (the BTC) and the ARMM government in a single PDM, with the BTC leading the implementation. However, after local consultations, an alternative plan was developed to divide the PDM into two. Although the result was ultimately appropriate, the ARMM side strongly opposed the single PDM plan. This prolonged the planning process and temporarily affected trust in JICA, which should be noted from a peacebuilding perspective. According to records and stakeholders at the time,¹² the single PDM plan was considered “unthinkable” by JICA staff on the ground. Although the headquarters was fully aware of the importance of having two PDMs, it was a secondary option for negotiation. The primary approach was to present a single PDM plan that prioritized mitigating divisions between the ARMM and the BTC by jointly strengthening their capabilities (see also “5.1.2 Subjective Perspective (retrospective)”). One contributing factor could be that the latest Peacebuilding Needs and Impact Assessment (PNA)¹³ was conducted at the regional level in 2007, and no

¹² In this ex-post evaluation, interviews were conducted with Japanese stakeholders, including former experts (chief advisors and several other experts), as well as staff from the JICA Philippines Office and the Cotabato Project Office.

¹³ The definition of JICA's PNA is as follows: It is a process that analyzes the current political, administrative, security, economic, and social conditions, and instability factors. The aim is to minimize and avoid the negative impacts caused by instability in the political, security, and social sectors, as well as to avoid exacerbating

systematic PNA report analyzing the situation at the time of the project's ex-ante evaluation (2012) was produced. At that time, the situation was fluid, and although no formal PNA was conducted, information collection, analysis, and sharing were carried out through regular reports from JICA staff assigned to the Internal Monitoring Team and visits from headquarters. The analysis mainly influenced the consideration of the content of the project. As mentioned above, the initial single PDM plan focused on the objective of reconciling the divisions between the MILF and ARMM sides, but it seems that it did not fully reflect one of the designated reporting items in the PNA, which is whether the proposed implementation structure would exacerbate instability factors.¹⁴

Changes in the project content due to plan modifications and the extension of the project period are considered appropriate for this project, which started amid significant uncertainties and needed to respond to political and situational changes as they occurred. In the process of these changes, the project purpose at the start of the project (building the foundation for the new autonomous government) shifted to an overall goal, and a lower-level project purpose (accelerating the transition process to the autonomous government) was established. This was due to the delay in transitioning to the new autonomous government caused by the stagnation of the peace process. The direct cause, the Mamasapano incident (an armed engagement between the Philippine National Police Special Forces and the MILF in the MILF-controlled town of Mamasapano on January 15, 2015, where the Philippine government side was said to have violated the ceasefire), can be considered an external factor beyond what was anticipated as a risk at the planning stage, according to interviews with stakeholders.¹⁵

Lessons learned from past similar projects were utilized, and positive results were obtained. In the ex-ante evaluation report for this project, it was stated that lessons from

instability factors (consideration for conflict prevention). It also aims to eliminate or reduce instability factors (promotion of peace). This process is implemented in alignment with the management of projects, from the formulation of country assistance plans and individual projects to implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.¹⁴ Although a survey mission report at the time (provided by JICA) stated that "it is necessary to formulate [this project] while considering the balance and perception between the ARMM and the BDA," no specific proposals for an implementation structure to achieve this were observed. Besides, during the project implementation, even without a formal project-level PNA, experts continuously monitored and analyzed the situation, and monthly reports were submitted to JICA headquarters.

¹⁵ The "preconditions for project implementation" listed in the ex-ante evaluation sheet stated that "the security situation in the conflict-affected areas of Mindanao and relations among stakeholders will not deteriorate due to stagnation in the peace process or other factors." However, there was no specific mention of the extent of "stagnation" or "deterioration" that was anticipated. Interviews with stakeholders revealed that a violent conflict resulting in numerous casualties between the MILF and the national military would have exceeded the assumptions at that time. At the time of planning, the FAB had been concluded, and discussions were actively underway toward the CAB. There were no signs that this would suddenly be overturned. According to the investigation report at the time of planning (provided by JICA), the outlook for security trends stated that "while the possibility of future conflicts remains due to clashes between hardline forces that have branched off from the MILF and the national military, as long as the MILF and the Philippine government are in step, they are not expected to become significant opposing forces to peace." Therefore, it was judged that the large-scale conflict between the MILF and the Philippine government, as occurred in the Mamasapano incident, exceeded the assumptions.

the terminal evaluation of the ARMM Human Resource Development Project (2004–2007) would be utilized to conduct system and institutional building based on the problem analysis on the ARMM government. From the existing documents, it was confirmed that each activity of this project was implemented based on the problem analysis of the target organizations.

The project also aligns with JICA’s perspectives of project evaluation in conflict-affected countries and regions.

<p>JICA’s Perspectives of Project Evaluation in Conflict-Affected Countries and Regions (3) Appropriateness of the Project Plan and Approach</p>
<p>▪ <i>Fairness: Consideration for Different/Conflicting Ethnic Groups, Community Groups with Different/Conflicting Political Backgrounds, Residents of Areas Under Effective Control and Other Areas, Differences Among Beneficiaries, Formulation and Implementation of Projects to Achieve Equitable Outcomes, Measures for Risk Avoidance</i></p> <p>Addressed. As noted in the section “JICA’s Perspectives of Project Evaluation in Conflict-Affected Countries and Regions (2) Consistency with Development Needs” above.</p>
<p>▪ <i>Project Content: From the Project’s Formation Stage, Consideration of Political and Security Situation Forecasts and Risk Assumptions, Incorporation of Measures to Minimize the Impact of Situational Changes into the Project Plan, Presentation in the Ex-ante Evaluation Report for Sharing with Implementers, Managers, and Evaluators, Clear Explanation of the Relevance and Significance of Implementing the Project Under Such Circumstances, Direct and Indirect Contributions to Reducing Instability Factors Through Project Content (For example, deliberately setting a broad target area for the project, and advancing the project in a multi-sectoral manner across multiple fields)</i></p> <p>Largely addressed. While explicit strategies for mitigating the impact of situational changes were not outlined during the ex-ante evaluation, regular situational analysis appears to have been conducted. According to experts and JICA personnel at the time, the policy was to adapt flexibly to numerous uncertainties, which was executed (e.g., through multi-sectoral approaches, additional components), and is believed to have led to high effectiveness.</p>
<p>▪ <i>Implementation Structure: By Making the Relevant Institutions the Implementing/Cooperating Institutions, Risks of Negative Political and Social Implications and of Exacerbating Instability Factors, Positive Impacts of Implementing the Project with the Relevant Institutions (Avoidance of Instability Factors and Promotion of Stability Factors), Appropriate Reflection of JICA and Implementing Institutions’ Risk and Crisis Management, Safety Management, etc., in a Plan that Minimizes the Impact of Conflict on the Entire Project</i></p> <p>Addressed. Particularly appropriate were the following points:</p> <p>i) By establishing separate implementation structures with the MILF side (the BTC) and the ARMM government as respective counterparts, the project successfully avoided instability factors stemming from their relationship.</p> <p>ii) Since the MILF is not a government institution, designating the BTC (a committee formed by the Philippine government and the MILF) as the counterpart for the implementation of CCDP-B enhanced the legitimacy of support to the MILF, thereby avoiding factors that could lead to instability.</p>

3.1.2 Coherence (Rating: ③)

3.1.2.1 Consistency with Japan’s ODA Policy

During the ex-ante evaluation, this project was aligned with Japan’s development cooperation policy. In the *Country Assistance Policy for the Republic of the Philippines* (2012), “Peace and Development in Mindanao” is identified as one of the three priority

areas. This project aligns with this priority area by providing support for governance and socio-economic development. Additionally, in the *JICA Country Analysis Paper for the Republic of the Philippines* (2012), “peacebuilding in conflict-affected areas in Mindanao” is highlighted as a key issue. Specifically, the paper positions seamless support for regional stability and development toward the establishment of a new autonomous government after the peace agreement as a medium-term goal, which is consistent with the purpose of this project.

The project also aligns with JICA’s perspectives of project evaluation in conflict-affected countries and regions.

JICA’s Perspectives of Project Evaluation in Conflict-Affected Countries and Regions
(4) Consistency with Japan’s ODA Policy

▪ ***Attaching Political and Policy Significance from the Perspective of the Japanese Government and Policy Significance and Implications from the Perspective of Peacebuilding***

Addressed (significant). Since particularly 2006, the Japanese government has been directly involved in peace negotiations and advising the parties to the peace in Mindanao, even before the CAB was reached, through participation in the International Contact Group. This project is positioned as part of such involvement and is recognized to have high political and policy significance.

3.1.2.2 Internal Coherence

During the ex-ante evaluation, collaborations and coordination were anticipated as follows and were largely realized, yielding certain concrete results. First, the outputs of the Development Study on Promotion of Local Industry in ARMM (2010–2012) and the National Industry Cluster Capacity Enhancement Project (2012–2015) laid the foundation for local industrial promotion in this project, namely output 3 of CCDP-A, contributing to the generation of this output. Additionally, although the collaboration with the Community Development in the Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao (CD-CAAM) (2012–2015), which aimed to strengthen the capacity of the BDA and establish mechanisms for community development, did not result in the adoption of the livelihood improvement model from that project because of differences in implementation structures, it did contribute indirectly, primarily to the outputs of CCDP-B, through the capacity enhancement of stakeholders centered around the BDA.

Collaborations and coordination not anticipated during the ex-ante evaluation can be cited as follows.

Firstly, around 2018, the JICA Philippines Office provided an updated version of the organizational structure proposal and transition roadmap for the transitional government and the new autonomous government. In CCDP-B, an organizational structure proposal and transition roadmap for the transitional government and the new autonomous government were initially created based on the first draft of the BBL1 around 2014.

However, the peace process stalled, and the draft law was abandoned, rendering the project-supported proposals ineffective. Subsequently, when the BBL2 (BOL) was enacted in 2018, the situation changed significantly. This project was, however, nearing completion, and an update of the 2014 proposal could not be made. In response to this, JICA, through its Philippines Office's initiative, collaborated with the Coordination Team for the Transition (CT4T), consisting of the Philippine government, the ARMM government, and the MILF, to create an updated proposal. This was submitted from the Implementation Panel (a forum for peace negotiations and implementation between the Philippine government and the MILF) to the BTA in May 2019. This activity was important in complementing this project and promoting the transition process, the project purpose of CCDP-B.

Secondly, JICA's Knowledge Co-Creation Program (programs to accept trainees), particularly the Project for Human Resource Development Scholarship (JDS), a grant aid scholarship project established in 1999, included specialized programs for Mindanao support, such as the Regional Development Administration in Mindanao (2011–2014) and the Regional Development Administration in Mindanao / Support for Establishment of Bangsamoro Autonomous Government (2015–2018) (a total of 34 individuals were trained). Furthermore, within the latter program, the Prioritized Slots for Bangsamoro was implemented from 2015 to 2017, targeting nine individuals for human resource development aimed at the future establishment of the Bangsamoro Government. These programs were utilized in this project's activities. During the project implementation, contributions were made to the promotion of the industrial cluster approach (output 3 of CCDP-A). At the time of the ex-post evaluation, contributions were observed in road administration (continuation of the output 2 of CCDP-A) and agricultural administration (continuation of output 2 of both CCDP-B and CCDP-A) (See Box 1). Additionally, projects under the JICA Partnership Program such as the Hiroshima Peacebuilding Human Resource Development Project for the Bangsamoro Government in Mindanao (2014–2016) and the Hiroshima Peacebuilding Human Resource Enhancement Project for the Bangsamoro Government in Mindanao (2015–2018), implemented by Hiroshima University and Hiroshima Prefecture, are considered complementary to this project. Staff from the ARMM government, the BDA, and other young talents were dispatched to Japan. While the specific contributions of these trainees to the project's outcomes could not be investigated, they are expected to shoulder the future Bangsamoro Government. Therefore, if follow-up surveys of the graduates, including those from the JDS and short-term trainee programs, could be conducted, further synergistic effects may be confirmed.

Thirdly, some of the infrastructure projects proposed within the Bangsamoro

Development Plan (BDP)¹⁶ (output 3 of CCDP-B) were implemented as other JICA projects. For example, the Project for Improvement of Equipment for Power Distribution in Bangsamoro Area (grant agreement in 2017) was one of the bases for achieving the project purpose indicators of CCDP-B.

Additionally, although not the subject of this section, the seamless series of Mindanao peace and development support by JICA in the past also contributed to the achievement of this project's outputs and purposes through the utilization of nurtured human resources and collected data.

The project also aligns with JICA's perspectives of project evaluation in conflict-affected countries and regions.

JICA's Perspectives of Project Evaluation in Conflict-Affected Countries and Regions
(5) Internal Coherence

▪ ***Attaching Policy Significance and Implications from the Perspective of Peacebuilding through Collaboration***

Addressed (Significant). The series of support activities discussed in the main text include peacebuilding as an objective.

Box 1 Example of Synergistic Effects between This Project and JDS
(Rural and Fishing Village Inventory Using GIS)

Mr. Ismail, who was a civil engineering staff member at the BDA, studied at Hiroshima University's Graduate School from 2017 to 2019 through the JDS, specializing in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and earning a master's degree. After returning to his home country, he joined the MAFAR-BARMM and utilized the GIS technology he learned in Japan to create an inventory and georeferencing system for agricultural and fishing workers in the BARMM area. He also had this system integrated with the national Registry System for Basic Sectors in Agriculture (RSBSA). Field registration is now conducted by farmers themselves, who walk through the fields with smartphones. The MAFAR-BARMM plans to utilize this system for providing and monitoring support programs and services, including the maintenance and expansion of the agricultural extension component outcomes of this project (Image 2 Mr. Ismail explaining the system. source: Photographed by the ex-post evaluator).



3.1.2.3 External Coherence

Collaboration with the technical assistance program, the Facility for Advisory Support for Transition Capacity (FASTRAC) (2013–2016), led by the World Bank and UNDP, was anticipated during the ex-ante evaluation, and was realized. By sharing responsibilities for awareness-raising activities related to the draft BBL1 (output 1 of CCDP-B) and support for the formulation of the Bangsamoro Development Plan (output

¹⁶ To distinguish between the BDP supported by this project and the BDP formulated by the BTA, the former will be referred to as “the BDP supported by this project,” and the latter as “the BDP formulated by the BTA.”

3 of CCDP-B), the collaboration contributed to the achievement of the respective outputs.

Coordination between this project and other projects was carried out within the following collaborative frameworks. First, coordination of Japan's support for Mindanao was conducted through the Mindanao Task Force, consisting of the Japanese Embassy, JICA, and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC).¹⁷ Next, Mindanao support by other donors was coordinated through the Mindanao Working Group, a sub-organization under the Philippine Development Forum, which is a framework for donor support to the Philippines.

The perspectives from the *Guidelines for Project Evaluation in Conflict-Affected Countries and Regions* are also largely addressed. According to those involved at the time, the collaboration with FASTRAC was carried out under the initiative/coordination of the Philippine side (the BTC), and it is believed that this project/JICA did not take the initiative to realize donor coordination.

JICA's Perspectives of Project Evaluation in Conflict-Affected Countries and Regions
(6) External Coherence

▪ **Execution of JICA's Role within the Framework of Donor Coordination**

Largely addressed (role was present). As mentioned in the main text, although it was led by the Philippine side rather than donor-driven, the role was clearly defined.

▪ **Demonstration of JICA's Areas of Expertise and Strengths**

Partially addressed. In terms of project content (long-standing trust with the Philippine government and the MILF, support for human resource development), it is a 'Yes,' but nothing specific can be noted in the context of donor coordination.

▪ **Demonstration of JICA's "Inclusivity" from the Perspective of "Supporting Fragile Governments through Donor Coordination"**

Not particularly present. As mentioned in the main text, the initiative was strongly led by the Philippine side, and it does not appear that JICA necessarily involved other donors.

In light of the above, this project is consistent with the development policies and development needs of the Philippines and Japan's aid policies. Synergistic effects and mutual coordination with other projects both within and outside JICA were considered, and concrete results have been confirmed. The perspectives outlined in the *Guidelines for Project Evaluation in Conflict-Affected Countries and Regions* were also addressed. Therefore, its relevance and coherence are high.

¹⁷ In addition to JICA's support, other assistance included the dispatch of Japanese experts to the International Monitoring Team and Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects.

3.2 Effectiveness and Impacts¹⁸ (Rating: ③)

3.2.1 Effectiveness

3.2.1.1 Achievement of Project Purpose

In both CCDP-A and CCDP-B, the outputs were mostly achieved, contributing to the general achievement of the respective project purposes. It should be noted that the assessment of the project purpose achievement in this evaluation is based on the performance up to February 2019, when the BTA was inaugurated, and the previous implementing agencies, the BTC and the ARMM government, were dissolved, rather than as of the project's completion in July 2019. While the project purpose and indicators of CCDP-B were not affected by the dissolution of the BTC, those of CCDP-A were predicated on achievements within the ARMM government.¹⁹

CCDP-B It was confirmed that all three indicators were achieved. The BBL, which outlines the transition process to the new autonomous government, was drafted (Indicator 1). The agency responsible for the transition, the BTC, formulated a development plan and strengthened its capabilities for the same (Indicator 3). The communities directly supported by this project recognized the contribution of this project to building peaceful and productive communities (Indicator 2). All of these can be positioned as part of the preparations for establishing the Bangsamoro Government, indicating that the transition process to the Bangsamoro Government was accelerated. However, there are issues of ambiguity in the evaluation, as mentioned in “2.3 Constraints During the Evaluation Study.”

Considerations for each indicator are as follows. For Indicator 1, it is important to note that this project's contribution was indirect and limited.

Regarding Indicator 1, although the BBL was drafted, the drafting and review of the bill were not conducted by this project, and its achievement was largely due to factors outside of this project. The project's contribution was originally indirect, such as providing training/seminars to those involved in drafting the BBL1 and supporting the organization of public hearings in communities. However, this became even more indirect when the original bill was abandoned and the revised BBL2 was enacted as the BOL. According to ex-post evaluation interviews with stakeholders at the time and documents provided by JICA, the BBL2 is based on the BBL1, and some of the drafting members are the same. Therefore, it can be said that the experience and intellectual input from the BBL1 were to some extent utilized in the drafting of the BBL2.

Regarding Indicator 2, in a survey conducted by this project among the beneficiaries of

¹⁸ When providing the sub-rating, Effectiveness and Impacts are to be considered together.

¹⁹ In Tables 3 (CCDP-B) and 4 (CCDP-A), the status of each indicator at the time of project completion (after the establishment of the BTA) is also noted.

the community development components (QIP and the Upland Rice-based Farming Technology Transfer Program for the Bangsamoro (URTP-B (subproject))), responses indicated that these subprojects contributed to the establishment of peaceful and productive communities. In the same survey, factors that facilitated this included capacity development of community organizations before actual construction in QIP and taking ample time to explain the purpose and progress of the construction to the residents. In the URTP-B subproject, the target site being in MILF-controlled areas (MILF camps) necessitated pre-activity social preparation activities, such as explanations from field coordinators affiliated with the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), whom the residents of MILF camps trust, and thorough needs assessments to gain the understanding and hear the needs of the residents. During the ex-post evaluation, former counterparts repeatedly emphasized the importance of these social preparation activities.

As for Indicator 3, although the formulation and promotion of the BDP is not directly related to the preparation for the establishment of the new autonomous government, the purpose of the BDP is to prepare “useful technical materials for the development planning of the new autonomous government” and “capacity enhancement through the planning process” (according to JICA-provided documents). Therefore, it is considered to be connected to the project purpose.

Table 3 Achievement of Project Purpose (CCDP-B)

Project Purpose	Indicator	Actual
<p>Transition process to the Bangsamoro Government is accelerated.</p> <p>* Note to the PDM: The word “accelerated” means that this project contributes to the preparation of establishment of the Bangsamoro Government. The process of preparation is not defined and the project is required to contribute to flexible responses toward the preparation efforts.</p>	<p>1. BBL is drafted.</p>	<p>Achieved (indirect contribution by this project)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The BBL1 (the initial draft of the BBL) was submitted to the Congress in 2014 but was not adopted and became obsolete. The BBL2 (the revised draft of the BBL) was submitted to the President in July 2017, passed through congressional deliberations, was renamed to BOL, and was signed by the President in July 2018. No change in performance of this indicator due to the establishment of the BTA.
	<p>2. Majority of beneficiaries* of the project evaluate that the project contributes to building peaceful and productive community in selected communities.</p> <p>* Note from the ex-post evaluator: The evaluation follows the definition of “(project) beneficiaries” used during the project implementation and makes judgments based on the evaluations of the beneficiaries of QIP and URTP-B.</p>	<p>Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The results of the assessment conducted in June 2016, after the construction of QIP facilities, for the members of the beneficiary communities are as follows: (i) Out of 223 respondents, 221 (99%) answered that “QIP met their needs.” (ii) Responses included observations that “the community has become more active,” “cohesion has increased,” and “ownership by community organizations has strengthened.” According to a social survey conducted in October 2018, changes were observed in the living conditions and income, as well as in the relationship between the beneficiary farmers of URTP-B (members and supporters of the MILF) and government-related agencies. Excerpts from the responses (collected from 310 out of 480 beneficiaries): (i) 96.2% responded that their living conditions changed due to the knowledge and skills gained from URTP-B; (ii) 97.4% responded that their current income as farmers is better than before the peace agreement (with 82.7% attributing this to a peaceful community and 67.5% to no longer feeling fear); (iii) 74.8% responded that they have built relationships with agricultural extension officers and technicians, as well as with PhilRICE; (iv) 76.8% responded that they get along well with other farmers. No change in performance of this indicator due to the establishment of the BTA.
	<p>3. A part of the BDP is drafted and promoted.</p>	<p>Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The BDP1 (2015–2016) and the BDP2 (2016–2022) were formulated. As of June 2019, the projects listed in the BDP2 that had been operationalized include the following: (i) the Project for Improvement of Equipment for Power Distribution in Bangsamoro Area (preparatory survey completed, grant aid in progress), (ii) the Road Network Development Project in Conflict-affected Areas in Mindanao (preparatory survey completed, approved by the Philippine government as a Japanese ODA loan project), (iii) Ambal-Simuay River and Rio Grande de Mindanao River Flood Control Projects (approved by the Philippine government as a China loan project). The establishment of the BTA made it necessary to develop a new development plan.

Source: Materials provided by JICA

CCDP-A All six indicators were achieved. It was confirmed that the systems and services introduced into various ministries/departments of the ARMM government were utilized until the dissolution of the government in February 2019, suggesting that the institutional reform process (including improvement in administrative services) was promoted. Although the achievement levels for the indicators were not clearly defined, the achievements can be considered sufficient when viewed qualitatively. Factors promoting these achievements are thought to be activities aligned with the needs of the ARMM government and LGUs, as well as being based on JICA's past cooperation with the ARMM government.

CCDP-A had the nature of general technical cooperation aimed at supporting institutional reform in the existing regional government (autonomous government). Therefore, it did not face issues like CCDP-B, where the project purpose could not be clearly defined, leading to ambiguous evaluations of the achievement of objectives.

Although not set as a project purpose, the significance of CCDP-A in supporting the transition process was also observed. In the ARMM organizations that were counterparts for this project, staff had to be dismissed and then reapply for positions in the newly established BTA. Experts for this project turned over the project's achievements to the new ministers of the BTA (BARMM government). Due to this, and the fact that some of the counterparts from CCDP-A joined the BTA, the improved administrative systems/services were transferred to the BTA. This contributed to the continuity of administrative services and became part of the BTA's organizational setup, including the utilization of personnel information when hiring former ARMM government staff (and as will be discussed later, many of these are still being utilized by the BTA during the ex-post evaluation).

Table 4 Achievement of Project Purpose (CCDP-A)

Project Purpose	Indicator	Actual
ARMM institutional reform process is promoted.	1. HRIS is installed and utilized.	<p>Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Human Resources Information System (HRIS), which was developed in JICA’s ARMM Human Capacity Development Project (2008–2013) and improved in this project, was in use as of November 2018. It had enhanced functionalities, such as the ability to instantly access information. It was also utilized for the transition of personnel information to the BTA, making it easier to grasp important HR data like the number of retirees. This facilitated quick reporting to the Civil Service Commission and was highly praised by the ARMM government for smoothing the transition to the new government. • After December 2018, when the likelihood of the ARMM government being abolished increased and personnel movements ceased, updates to the HR information were suspended. If it was decided to continue using the system in the BTA, modifications to organization names and positions would be made once the BTA finalized its organizational structure. • After the establishment of the BTA, efforts were made within the OCM-BARMM to utilize HRIS in the BTA. The new Information Technology Officer of the Administrative Management Service (AMS) began an effectiveness assessment of the software.
	2. 5S activities ²⁰ are implemented and part of Good Governance Conditions (transparency shield, compliance of Administrative Order 25) is recognized among ARMM staff in target institutions.	<p>Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In this project, the DAP conducted various training sessions. Following the training, the ORG-ARMM took the lead in promoting 5S activities, achieving the implementation of 5S across all ARMM organizations. In addition to 5S, as a result of the training, the Citizen’s Charter was revised in all ARMM institutions, and improvements were made in the electronic procurement system, performance-based HR system, and asset-liability management system, thereby strengthening the foundation of the ARMM institution. Furthermore, as a result of such efforts, the ORG-ARMM obtained ISO 9001 (an international standard related to quality management systems) for three consecutive years since 2016. • Activities were halted after the establishment of the BTA.
	3. Program of ARMM government on LGU revenue generation capacity development is prepared.	<p>Achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In this project, revenue enhancement activities were carried out in five pilot LGUs under the Revenue Enhancement Assistance for ARMM LGUs (REAL). Achievements included the establishment of new tax and fee collection items, preparation and enactment of revised revenue codes, increased revenue, and securing interest from other LGUs for the expansion of REAL. • After the inauguration of the BTA, the REAL Guidebook for program expansion was completed in May 2019 and turned over to the MILG-BARMM.

²⁰ A workplace improvement slogan derived from the initial letters of five Japanese words: Seiri (Sort), Seiton (Set in order), Seiso (Shine), Seiketsu (Standardize), and Shitsuke (Systematize).

Project Purpose	Indicator	Actual
	4. Road maintenance activities are planned utilizing the Road Database System.	Achieved <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The DPWH-ARMM utilized the Expanded ARMM Roads Mapping and Management system (E-ARMM) developed in this project to formulate road construction and maintenance plans. According to officials from the department, almost all roads in the ARMM region had been surveyed for roughness using the Dynamic Response Intelligent Monitoring System (DRIMS) developed in this project. Additionally, after the Marawi crisis in May 2017,²¹ the condition of the roads was surveyed using DRIMS. In May 2019, following the inauguration of the BTA, the Expanded Bangsamoro Roads Mapping and Management system (E-BARMM) was established as an advancement of the E-ARMM.
	5. LLS in target municipalities is conducted with support of MAO/AT. * The term “conducted” was used in line with the original text and its Japanese translation provided by JICA, although “operated” might be a more appropriate expression than “conducted” for describing the use of LLS.	Achieved <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In this project, under the Livelihood Improvement Project for Stability in Conflict-Affected Areas of Mindanao (LIFT-UP), training for agricultural extension officers (Municipal Agricultural Officers: MAOs and Agricultural Technicians: ATs) and farmer leaders was conducted. This was followed by the implementation of Farmer’s Field Schools (FFS) at 16 sites by these trained officers, and the transformation of these sites into Livelihood Learning Sites (LLS). To sustain these efforts and continue agricultural technical guidance in the target areas, all 16 farmer leaders who owned LLS created an LLS Sustainability Plan under the guidance of the MAFAR-BARMM before the conclusion of LIFT-UP. The plan included a regular visitation schedule and guidance points by MAOs and ATs, integrating not just the self-help efforts of the farmer leaders but also the active support of MAOs and ATs. After the inauguration of the BTA, activities by agricultural extension officers were halted.
	6. Cluster approach is understood and recognized as a tool of industry promotion.	Achieved <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In this project, under the ARMM Industry Cluster Capacity Enhancement Project (AICCEP) / Market Driven Local Industry Promotion (MDLIP), one cluster approach target industry was selected in each of the six provinces. Industrial promotion activities were carried out by producers, intermediaries, and support organizations (government, universities, etc.). Given that various stakeholders were investing resources in cluster activities, it was considered that the cluster approach was recognized as a tool for industrial promotion. This was also explicitly stated in the <i>ARMM Regional Development Plan (2017–2022)</i>. After the inauguration of the BTA, support from the MTIT-BARMM was halted.

Source: Materials provided by JICA

In the light of above, the project mostly achieved its purposes. It also aligns with JICA’s perspectives of project evaluation in conflict-affected countries and regions.

²¹ Military operations and armed conflicts by the national army against Islamic extremist groups. The city of Marawi, the provincial capital of Lanao del Sur, and its surrounding infrastructure suffered significant damage.

JICA's Perspectives of Project Evaluation in Conflict-Affected Countries and Regions
(7) Achievement of Project Purpose

▪ **Response to Risks in the Implementation Process**

Addressed. Measures such as project period extension and additional activities were taken to respond to the possibility of external conditions and assumptions being disrupted due to deteriorating security and changing circumstances (as described in "3.1.1.2 Consistency with the Development Needs of the Philippines").

▪ **Consideration for Differences in Results and Project Effects Among Beneficiaries**

Addressed. By providing support tailored to the needs of both the ARMM side and the MILF side (the BTC), instability factors were avoided and stability factors were promoted.

▪ **Re-examination of the Appropriateness of Indicator and Objective Setting, and Response in Case of Changes in Outcomes Due to Major Changes During Implementation**

All were addressed within the revisions to the PDMs. Although the setting of objectives and indicators could not entirely eliminate ambiguity, particularly for CCDP-B (as described in "2.3 Constraints During the Evaluation Study"), it was judged to be an unavoidable response given the fluid situation.

3.2.2 Impacts

3.2.2.1 Achievement of Overall Goal

The overall goal of CCDP-B, which is the foundation building of the Bangsamoro Government, was mostly achieved at the time of the ex-post evaluation. Although the three indicators are not clearly defined in terms of their achievement levels, they were mostly achieved (Indicators 1 and 2) or partially achieved (Indicator 3), when viewed qualitatively, in the sense that the conditions expressed in the indicator statements have been realized. According to the definition of the "foundation of the Bangsamoro Government" as mentioned in these three indicators (as part of the preparations for the establishment of the government), the overall goal can be considered largely achieved.

Considerations for each indicator are as follows. It is particularly important to note that the contribution of this project is indirect and limited for Indicator 1, and that the significance of Indicators 2 and 3 has diminished at the time of the ex-post evaluation.

Regarding Indicator 1, the legislation of related codes to the BOL has progressed, and it was confirmed that former counterparts of this project were involved in drafting some of the enacted bills (the *Bangsamoro Administrative Code* and the *Parliamentary Rules, Procedures, and Practices*). However, the contribution of this project is limited to intellectual input to these counterparts, and other factors have played a significant role in achieving this.

Regarding Indicator 2, it can be said that the building and enhancement of cooperative relationships among stakeholders have been realized at the time of the ex-post evaluation. However, this indicator was more meaningful as a preparatory step for the transition during the project implementation. Specifically, cooperative relationships were built between the MILF and ARMM sides, which had been in a confrontational relationship at the time, and between the MILF side and institutions under the jurisdiction of the

Philippine government (national research institutes and LGUs), which had been a thin relationship, through participation in this project. However, at the time of the ex-post evaluation, the situation is such that the BTA has been established mainly by individuals affiliated with the MILF, former ARMM employees have also been employed to carry out their duties, and as a regional government, they have relations with the Philippine government agencies. In this context, it can be said that they are simply working within the same or affiliated organizations. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that particularly for CCDP-A, stakeholders from that time still maintain the cooperative relationships for the continuation of components initiated by this project (for example, between the Administrative Management Services under the OCM-BARMM (AMS/OCM-BARMM) and the DAP and between the MTIT-BARMM and local industry cluster stakeholders). While this ongoing cooperation may be considered natural given the respective authorities of these institutions, it can also be said that the establishment of appropriate relationships by this project has served as a facilitating factor.

Indicator 3, which is about the implementation of projects included in the BDP (the BDP supported by this project), was also more meaningful during the time of project implementation (before the establishment of the BTA) than at the time of the ex-post evaluation. At the time of project implementation, the fact that the BTC and the BDA were able to prepare and implement regional development plans through the BDP1 (short-term plan) and the BDP2 (medium-term plan) supported by this project was significant in terms of promoting socio-economic development by MILF members. However, these BDPs have completed their roles since the establishment of the BTA and the formulation of the new BDP1 (2020-2022). Although it was confirmed that some of the projects within the BDP2 supported by this project are also included in the BDP1 formulated by the BTA, the fact that they have become part of a different plan makes it difficult to determine whether the implementation status is sufficient. Therefore, this indicator was considered partially achieved.

Table 5 Achievement of Overall Goal (CCDP-B)

Overall Goal	Indicator	Actual
Foundation for the Bangsamoro Government is built.	1. Draft related codes are formulated.	<p>Mostly achieved (indirect contribution by this project)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Among the codes related to the BOL, particularly the six priority codes and the indigenous people’s rights act, the <i>Bangsamoro Administrative Code</i>, the <i>Bangsamoro Civil Service Code</i>, and the <i>Bangsamoro Education Code</i> have been enacted as of the time of the ex-post evaluation. The <i>Electoral Code</i>, the <i>Bangsamoro Local Governance Code</i>, and the <i>Indigenous People’s Rights Act</i> are expected to pass through the parliament in 2023, while the <i>Revenue Code</i> is currently being drafted. Additionally, the <i>Parliamentary Rules, Procedures, and Practices</i> (Resolution No. 6) was adopted and promulgated in May 2019. Intellectual input from this project has contributed to some of the drafting members, at least in the case of the administrative code and the parliamentary rules.
	2. Cooperation among different stakeholders is built and enhanced.	<p>Mostly achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> During the project implementation, the relationship between MILF stakeholders and ARMM organizations included: a) cooperation between the BDA and the DAF-ARMM in the URTP-B subproject, and b) collaboration between the BTC, the BDA, and the DPWH-ARMM in the formulation of the BDP. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, both a) and b) continue to maintain their relationships, as they are now part of or related to BTA-affiliated organizations.
	3. Development projects from the BDP2 are implemented.	<p>Partially achieved</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are at least four development plans referred to as the BDP: the BDP1 (2015–2016) supported by this project, the BDP2 (2016–2022) supported by this project, the BDP1 (2020–2022) formulated by the BTA, and the BDP2 (2023–2028) formulated by the BTA and supported through the BTA advisor on budget and development planning. Among these, the one referred to in this indicator is the BDP2 supported by this project, while the valid development plan at the time of the ex-post evaluation is the BDP2 formulated by the BTA. The BDP1 formulated by the BTA, which precedes the current BDP2, was developed by the Bangsamoro Planning and Development Authority (BPDA) under the OCM-BARMM in 2019 after consultations with states, the private sector, and academia. It has no direct relationship with the BDP1 and the BDP2 supported by this project. According to the BPDA, the BDPs supported by this project, particularly the BDP2, were referenced along with other existing development plans when preparing the BDP1 formulated by the BTA. It is explicitly stated in the BDP1 formulated by the BTA that efforts were made to align it with the BDPs supported by this project. The project list for the BDP1 formulated by the BTA is an extensive paper list, and it was not possible to confirm the overall picture of how many projects proposed in the BDP supported by this project are included. However, several projects that were also listed in the BDP2 supported by this project were found to be included. Among them are projects supported by Japan, such as the Project for Improvement of Equipment for Power Distribution in Bangsamoro Area (grant aid) and the Road Network Development Project in Conflict-affected Areas in Mindanao (ODA loan). (The BDP2 formulated by the BTA was implemented after the field survey for this ex-post evaluation, so it was not included in this analysis.)

Source: Materials provided by JICA, materials provided by the BTA, interviews with former counterparts and experts

At the time of the ex-post evaluation, most of the outputs/components of this project are being continued or utilized in some form. While none of the components directly contribute to the indicators of the overall goal, they are contributing to the preparation for the establishment of the Bangsamoro Government in the sense that they form part of the measures to strengthen BTA's governance, public services delivery, community development, and economic promotion.

The table below summarizes the status of each component, and all components except for Human Resource Mapping (HRM) have been continued or utilized. In particular, agricultural extension, LGU revenue enhancement, road planning and maintenance using DRIMS/E-ARMM, known as E-BARMM at the time of the ex-post evaluation, and local industry promotion have become established as programs within the respective BTA ministries. ARMM staff training (such as 5S and other quality management) was not carried over to the BTA, but in 2022, phased implementation was initiated by the OCM-BARMM as part of their own independent initiative for constructing a BTA Quality Management System.

As factors promoting the continuation or utilization of the project's components, stakeholders appreciated the activities initiated by this project, indicating that these components aligned with their needs. Efforts were also made by those involved to ensure the continuity of administrative services. Additionally, comments from former counterparts in both the BTA and the BDA emphasized the importance of the government's (BTA's) role in taking over and sustaining (i.e., mainstreaming) the outcomes of one-off projects by donors and the BDA.

As for the challenges related to the continuation of the components, two points are raised. First, concerning the agricultural extension components, within the scope confirmed by this ex-post evaluation, the continuation of introduced technologies is largely attributed to the self-help efforts of the farmers. At the sites targeted by the URTP-B subproject, which focused on upland rice cultivation, and the Livelihood Improvement for the Transformation of Underserved Population (LIFT-UP subproject), which supported agricultural production suitable for each site, transferred technologies are being practiced. Monitoring is also being conducted by the MAFAR-BARMM. However, it was confirmed that only a limited number of the sites have received technical and agricultural input support from the ministry.²² The ministry has agricultural support programs that target the entire BARMM area, including upland rice cultivation. However, to receive the provision of facilities and materials, certain conditions must be met, such

²² In fact, there are interview results from the BDA indicating that in Barangay Pabrika, Marogong Municipality, Lanao del Sur Province, measures against damage from rats were carried out with the assistance of agricultural technology officers.

as the existence of a functioning agricultural organization. Comments were made suggesting that the sites targeted by this project—particularly those in the URTP-B areas under MILF control—may not yet meet these criteria. According to the ministry, there are also communities in former MILF-controlled areas that have formed cooperatives and are receiving support from the ministry.²³ This project was the first external support immediately following the CAB. At a time when public trust in the governance by the MILF was not yet fully formed, it is considered appropriate that the project focused on the dissemination of production technologies based on the results of needs assessments. However, at the time of the ex-post evaluation, it appears that the next step should be to strengthen the organizational capabilities of the farmers. The MAFAR-BARMM has established an agricultural association task force and has begun considering support for improving organizational capabilities. Meanwhile, the follow-up technical cooperation project, “Capacity Development Project for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Government” (CDPB), continues to provide support for agricultural extension in other villages in the LGUs targeted for extension activities under this project. While the focus of this project was on production technologies, CDPB has incorporated the Smallholder Horticulture Empowerment & Promotion (SHEP) approach and has begun to develop a model that also improves sales. Regarding upland rice, there were also farmers in places like Barira Municipality, one of the URTP-B sites, who reported switching to banana cultivation because the upland rice was not selling well (according to a 2022 survey by the BDA), highlighting the importance of marketability.²⁴

Second, the HRM aimed to create a database of over 5,000 local professionals who could potentially become talent for the new autonomous government, including those from the private sector. The database was intended to be used for encouraging applications to the new government. The direct reason it was not utilized was that it had become outdated by the time the BTA was established just before the project’s completion, as it had not been updated since its creation in the first half of the project. Additionally, interviews with multiple stakeholders revealed that some people hesitated to register in the database due to the potential perception that doing so would be a declaration of support for the MILF. There were also observations about the database’s structure, which made it difficult to extract data for mass emailing. While the concept was deemed effective, there were challenges in both the political and operational aspects.

²³ In fact, a former member of the BIAF who served as a field coordinator in URTP-B was organizing an agricultural cooperative association in his hometown at the time of the ex-post evaluation.

²⁴ Stakeholder interviews indicated that upland rice supported by this project has lower productivity and higher transportation costs compared to paddy rice or lowland upland rice, making it less competitive in terms of price. However, some mentioned its potential for sales targeting affluent urban consumers due to its unique aroma, provided that post-harvest and distribution processes are improved.

Table 6 List of Project Components

Output	Component	Handover recipient	Continuation/utilization of the outcome/output at the time of ex-post evaluation
CCDP-B Output 1 (Governance)	a) Support for drafting the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL)	BAGO ²⁵	Continued <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Currently effective as the BOL. This project has contributed indirectly in some respects.
	b) Human Resources Mapping (HRM)	BPDA	Not utilized <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Created around 2015 and not updated since. It was expected to be used for encouraging applications to the new autonomous government, but by the time the BTA was established in 2019, the information had become outdated.
CCDP-B Output 2 (Strengthening Public Service Delivery and Community Development)	c) Quick Impact Project (QIP)	Target communities	Utilized <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Due to the dispersed locations of the sites, it was not possible to grasp the situation at all sites. However, the BDA believes that most of the QIP facilities are being utilized (see also Box 2).
	d) Upland Rice-based Farming Technology Transfer Program for the Bangsamoro (URTP-B)	MAFAR-BARMM	Continued <ul style="list-style-type: none"> According to a survey by BDA and interviews with the MAFAR-BARMM and some LGUs, many farmers continue to engage in upland rice cultivation. There are also reports of farmers switching to cash crops due to issues such as rat damage and low marketability. At the Barangay Togaig, Municipality Barira, site there were reports that the soil was not suitable for upland rice cultivation (which should have been investigated beforehand), but on the other hand, interviews in the same municipality indicated that upland rice is still being cultivated at that site. From other sites, there were mixed reports: Some said that cultivation was hindered during restrictions on movement due to COVID-19, while others mentioned that being able to cultivate upland rice during that period was helpful for food security. According to a survey for the ex-post evaluation among farmers at some sites (see Box 3), they are using the cultivation techniques transferred through this project. While cultivating upland rice, farmers are also practicing intercropping or double cropping with corn, bananas, vegetables, etc. Upland rice is mainly for self-consumption due to its low price competitiveness, but it is considered important for family livelihoods. Challenges include poor seed germination, weather conditions, pests and diseases, and high input costs. At another site within the same LGUs, CDPB is currently implementing subsequent initiatives.
CCDP-B Output 3 (Economic Enhancement)	e) Formulation of the Bangsamoro Development Plan (BDP)	BPDA	Partially continued <ul style="list-style-type: none"> See Indicator 3 for the overall goal in Table 5.

²⁵ The official name is the Bangsamoro Attorney General's Office (BAGO), under the OCM-BARMM.

Output	Component	Handover recipient	Continuation/utilization of the outcome/output at the time of ex-post evaluation
CCDP-A Output 1 (Governance)	f) ARMM Government Staff Training	AMS/OCM- BARMM	Not continued but reintroduced <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5S was discontinued due to the dissolution of the ARMM government, but BTA staff who were former ARMM employees recognized its effectiveness. In 2022, as the transition of administrative services to the BTA reached a certain stage and focus could be placed on quality management, it was resumed as part of the AMS's efforts to build a quality management system. As of June 2023, with the cooperation of the DAP, its implementation is progressing in some departments of the OCM-BARMM. According to the AMS, they are considering its future implementation across all BTA agencies.
	g) Human Resources Information System (HRIS)	AMS/OCM- BARMM	Utilized as a past information source <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The HRIS was taken over by the BTA and was initially used as a provisional system right after the BTA was established. As of the time of the ex-post evaluation, a new system is being developed through the Support to Bangsamoro Transition (SUBATRA) (2020–2024) funded by the European Union (EU) and others. Until its completion, temporary personnel information management is being done using spreadsheets and other tools. The HRIS from this project is available for reference as a source of information from the time of the ARMM government for staff who have been rehired.
	h) Revenue Enhancement Assistance for ARMM LGUs (REAL)	MILG- BARMM	Continued <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The MILG-BARMM is expanding the model built during this project (Information, Education, Communication (IEC), tax maps, revenue code amendments, etc.) to other LGUs under the same program name "REAL," which runs until 2028. The REAL Guidebook created by this project is also being used as a basic material after updates. Implementation has started initially in 25 municipalities where only training was conducted during this project. The five pilot LGUs from this project are also continuing with IEC and efforts to promote tax and fee collection, resulting in increased revenue (see Box 4).

Output	Component	Handover recipient	Continuation/utilization of the outcome/output at the time of ex-post evaluation
CCDP-A Output 2 (Strengthening Public Service Delivery and Community Development)	i) Road maintenance management through the Dynamic Response Intelligent Monitoring System (DRIMS) / Expanded ARMM Roads Mapping and Management (E-ARMM)	MPW-BARMM	Continued <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • According to the MPW-BARMM, the construction and maintenance of national roads are to be carried out by the Philippine government (Department of Public Works and Highways) as stipulated by the BOL. Therefore, the BTA is responsible for the construction and maintenance of local roads. DRIMS is being utilized for measurements for this purpose. • E-BARMM is operated as a web-based database system and is constantly updated. The MPW-BARMM monitors the status of all projects and takes action where there is no movement. To avoid duplication with projects being implemented by other ministries (e.g., farm road construction by the MAFAR-BARMM), it requests other ministries to input their projects in the system and has established an inter-agency committee for coordination.
	j) Livelihood Improvement for the Transformation of Underserved Population (LIFT-UP)	MAFAR-BARMM	Continued <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • According to the MAFAR-BARMM, Livelihood Learning Sites (LLS) led by farmer leaders continue to operate at the sites targeted by this project, and 70% of the beneficiary farmers are still using the techniques they learned. However, further details are not available. In the successor project, CDPB, activities are ongoing at different sites within the same target LGUs as this project.
CCDP-A Output 3 (Economic Enhancement)	k) ARMM Regional Industry Cluster Capacity Enhancement Project / Market Driven Local Industry Promotion (AICCEP/MDLIP)	MTIT-BARMM	Continued <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • While the activities were not taken over by the BTA, a former counterpart from the DTI-ARMM later joined the MTIT-BARMM, reviving the program as a regular initiative called the Growth Enhancement Approach toward Regional Economic Development (GEARED). • Although there was a hiatus in activities under the BTA, industrial promotion continued at the local level in areas other than Lanao del Sur Province (see Box 5). While the successor project, CDPB, is providing some support, the former counterpart is continuing orientations and training by securing other sponsors. There was one cluster per province during the time of this project (two clusters in Maguindanao only) and the program has expanded it to two clusters per province (adding coffee in three provinces and coconut in two provinces). Mindanao State University Maguindanao Campus is also involved, providing students with practical learning opportunities.

Source: Materials provided by JICA, materials provided by the BTA, materials provided by the BDA, interviews with former counterparts and experts

Box 2 Utilization Status of Quick Impact Project (QIP) Facilities

According to surveys conducted by the BDA and others, the utilization status of some QIP facilities is as follows (as of February 2023).

- School in Barangay Kibleg Barangay, North Upi Municipality, Maguindanao Province: In good condition and has been utilized since its opening in 2015. The school administrator collaborates with LGU staff and teachers for maintenance.
- Multipurpose hall in Barangay Kabengi, Datu Saudi Ampatuan Municipality, Maguindanao Province: Used for indigenous people activities/rituals, accommodating visitors related to indigenous people activities (such as from the BARMM Ministry of Indigenous Peoples), and for barangay and sitio (community units within a barangay) meetings.
- Multipurpose hall in Barangay Sinsimen, Pigkawayan Municipality, North Cotabato Province: Used for tribal, MILF, and NGO meetings, weddings, and COVID-19 vaccinations. Used by the barangay LGU until a new office facility was established by the BTA. Some repainting and repairs are needed (the ceiling fan is broken).
- Multipurpose hall in Barangay Makadaag Talagian, Masiu Municipality, Lanao del Sur Province: Used for MILF, United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP, a political party established by the MILF) activities, barangay activities, graduations, weddings, and other celebratory events. Ceiling needs repainting. There is soot on the walls and ceiling due to cooking local dishes with an oven. Also, there is low voltage (a problem throughout the province). Water facilities are broken, so water is sourced from nearby houses.
- Multipurpose hall in Barangay Kala-Kala, Buadiposo-Buntong Municipality, Lanao del Sur Province: Managed by the barangay captain and used for barangay activities, Arabic school for grades 1–3 (twice a week), community meetings, and weddings among other events.
- Multipurpose hall in Barangay Mungit-Mungit, Talipao Municipality, Sulu Province: Being utilized.

Box 3 Results of Interviews with Beneficiaries of the Upland Rice-based Farming Technology Transfer Program for the Bangsamoro (URTP-B)

In February 2023, semi-structured interviews were conducted with residents of two target communities by a team of local research assistants. The interviewees included farmers who had received training under this subproject (referred to as “participant farmers”) and those who had not (referred to as “non-participant farmers”). The main results are summarized below. Buldon Municipality was the site where the project had the most widespread adoption of techniques taught during its implementation. It was heard in Buldon that the community has the capacity to produce more upland rice, and that they are only cultivating what is necessary for their own consumption due to weak price competitiveness, which is attributed to high transportation costs.

No one explicitly stated that this subproject had a direct impact on peace. However, multiple farmers mentioned that before the project, they had fears that outsiders coming into the area might take away their land. These fears dissipated after the project. All respondents expressed satisfaction with having learned new techniques through this project, which have contributed to their livelihoods. There were many requests for support in terms of agricultural machinery and drying facilities.

Site	Respondents	Status of upland rice cultivation as of February 2023 (Figures are average per respondent)
Barangay Bugansan Sur, Matanog Municipality	10 participant farmers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All have been cultivating upland rice since before the project and continue to practice the techniques disseminated by this project. • All have shared the techniques with other farmers (an average of 11 people). • The cultivation area has remained at 0.6 ha from before the project to the present. • All have consistently cultivated once per planting season. • Harvest yield was 780 kg before the project and 888 kg in 2022.
Barangay Cabayuan,	8 participant farmers and 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All have been cultivating upland rice since before the project and continue to practice the techniques disseminated by this project.

Buldon Municipality	non-participant farmers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All have shared the techniques with other farmers (an average of 4 people). • The cultivation area was 1 ha before the project, 1.2 ha immediately after the project, and 1.1 ha in 2022. • All cultivated once before the project, twice immediately after the project, and 1–2 times in 2022. • Harvest yield was 1,910 kg before the project, 5,955 kg immediately after the project, and 4,902 kg in 2022. They could cultivate and harvest more, but due to low market demand, they only produce what is needed. • Non-participants learned the techniques from the participants and are practicing them. Their cultivation area, planting frequency, and harvest yield are almost the same as those of the participant farmers.
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Box 4 Status of Pilot LGUs of the Revenue Enhancement Assistance for ARMM LGUs (REAL)

During the ex-post evaluation, interviews were conducted with officials from Barira and Matanog Municipalities in Maguindanao Province to confirm the effects of this project. As another factor enhancing the project’s effectiveness, both municipalities and the MILG-BARMM pointed out the cooperation of religious leaders. In Muslim communities, there is already a system of charitable giving known as Zakat, and some residents feel that paying taxes is like being charged twice. However, religious leaders have explained the difference between Zakat and taxes to the people. Both local governments have received the Seal of Good Local Governance (SGLG) from the Philippine Department of the Interior and Local Government, awarded based on revenue growth rate, for multiple years.

Comments from Barira Municipal Officials “Through the training provided by this project, we gained passion and dedication in increasing tax revenue. Many people do not come forward to pay taxes, so we are making visits for collection and awareness activities. Due to the intensified tax collection efforts in this project, newly introduced revenue items such as the business registration fee, the franchise fee, and the public facility fee have increased. Specifically, the business registration fee and the pre-existing property tax have seen an increase. As a result, our revenue, which was in deficit until 2017, has been increasing since 2018, even amid the COVID-19 pandemic.”

Comments from Matanog Municipal Officials “Some activities like the one-stop shop were temporarily halted due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but there are plans to resume them in 2023. The revenue has increased by 1 million pesos (approximately 2.4 million yen) annually due to taxes including the business tax initiated by this project. These additional funds are being used for college scholarships, salaries for volunteer teachers, school repair costs, the establishment of 24-hour outpatient clinics, and others.”

Box 5 Status of the ARMM Regional Industry Cluster Capacity Enhancement Project (AICCEP) / Market Driven Local Industry Promotion (MDLIP)

According to the officer in charge from the MTIT-BARMM, the status of the clusters initiated by this project at the time of the ex-post evaluation is as follows:

Product	Province	Status as of February 2023
Abaca	Lanao del Sur	An outbreak of Panama disease in 2019 resulted in some farmers losing interest and switching to banana cultivation. The MTIT-BARMM reestablished contact in 2021, provided some inputs, and resumed training.
Coffee	Sulu	The province independently established the Sulu Coffee Federation, with 10 cooperatives participating. Results are already evident, as they ranked 5th in the Philippine Coffee Expo held in Davao in 2022. Sulu competes on quality due to high transportation costs.
Rubber	Basilan	The Governor is proactive, and the industry was already established and growing even without support from the MTIT-BARMM.

Coconut, Palm oil	Maguindanao	Selling de-husked nuts directly, and the cooperatives have purchased 22 turner trucks. Supported by the Philippine Coconut Authority and has received a budget of 10.9 million pesos from the Philippine government's Coconut Farmers and Industry Development Plan (CFIDP). An information caravan based on the same plan was implemented in February 2023.
Seaweed	Tawi-Tawi	Received loans from partner companies, leading to increased buying and selling and price competition within the province. As a result, many homes have become concrete, and motorcycles are more commonly seen. The MTIT-BARMM also provided concrete-made drying facilities.



Image 3 Office of a pilot municipality for revenue enhancement (REAL subproject). Signboard encouraging tax payment (provided by this project) and commemorative plaques from the Philippine government (on the wall) (Matanog Municipality) (source: Photographed by the local research assistant)



Image 4 Dynamic Response Intelligent Monitoring System (DRIMS) provided under the road maintenance component. Used by the MPW-BARMM for measuring road roughness. The condition is good, and it is easy to transport. (source: Photographed by the ex-post evaluator)

As described above, the Project has mostly achieved its overall goal. It also aligns with JICA's perspectives of project evaluation in conflict-affected countries and regions.

JICA's Perspectives of Project Evaluation in Conflict-Affected Countries and Regions
(8) Achievement of Overall Goal

▪ **Consideration of Changes in Overall Goal Targets and Alternative Indicators**

No issues. There are no observed indicators for which data was either difficult to obtain or underwent changes, specifically in a conflict-affected country or region.

After the completion of this project, the planned establishment date for the new Bangsamoro Government was postponed from 2022 to 2025. The overall goal is defined as preparing for the new autonomous government, and the establishment of it is not a necessary condition. Therefore, it can be said that the postponement has no impact on the achievement of the overall goal. Although the ambiguity in setting the overall goal could not be eliminated (as described in "2.3 Constraints During the Evaluation Study"), it was judged to be an unavoidable response given the fluid situation.

3.2.2.2 Other Positive and Negative Impacts

1) Impacts on the Environment

As the project was judged to have minimal undesirable effects on the environment, it was classified as Category C based on the *JICA Guidelines for Environmental and Social Considerations* (April 2010).

No negative impacts on the natural environment have been reported from the commencement of the project to the time of the ex-post evaluation.

2) Resettlement and Land Acquisition

In this project, small-scale land acquisition occurred for the construction of QIP facilities. Detailed information could not be obtained, but according to the records at the time and the person in charge at the JICA Philippines Office at that time, the BDA handled the matter in accordance with Philippine domestic laws, and it was generally completed without any issues. No resettlement has occurred.

3) Gender Equality, Marginalized People

As mentioned in “3.1.1 Relevance,” consideration was given to fairness and inclusivity throughout the project. Activities targeting people who had not previously received services, such as in QIP and LIFT-UP subprojects, were also included. Points raised in interviews with former counterparts included the following. First, many women participated in various training of this project. At the time of the ex-post evaluation, former trainees are still engaged in related activities in departments like the MPW-BARMM, the MTIT-BARMM, the MinDA, and LGUs. Second, in the local industry promotion component, many women in the processing sector received training in both the coffee and seaweed clusters. In the coffee cluster, women play a role in quality improvement through the selection of raw beans. Additionally, the promotion of the seaweed cluster has provided more women with employment opportunities. Third, members of the Bangsamoro Islamic Women Auxiliary Brigade (BIWAB) also participated in the farmer training of the URTP-B subproject.

4) Social Systems and Norms, Human Well-being and Human Rights

The establishment of the CAB and the BOL has advanced peace and development in Mindanao, and this project has positively impacted the transition process by strengthening the capabilities of organizations and individuals involved, in terms of governance and socio-economic development. For example, the contributions of the project that were repeatedly highlighted in interviews with former counterparts include

the improvement of governance capabilities among MILF stakeholders, building trust in the MILF among the people through QIP, and contributing to the livelihoods of former combatant farmers through the URTP-B subproject. Additionally, according to the MILG-BARMM and LGUs, the creation of tax maps in the revenue enhancement (REAL) subproject has clarified land ownership and boundaries, reducing land disputes, which have been a major cause of deteriorating security in the region.

5) Unintended Positive/Negative Impacts

As a positive impact of JICA's support in Mindanao, the framework of assistance organized in this project—governance, public services delivery and community development, and economic enhancement—has been adopted as the three pillars of JICA's subsequent peacebuilding support in Mindanao. This project served as a precursor to support for the BTA, enhancing capabilities across a wide range of fields and gaining the trust of the BTA. In subsequent JICA support, particularly in the direct successor project known as CDPB, the outputs and outcomes of this project are being utilized. For other projects as well, trust and basic collaborative practices gained through this project are considered to be valuable.

Impacts on economic development and poverty reduction in the BARMM area have been confirmed in the target areas of the subprojects, including increased agricultural production, higher tax revenue for LGUs, and promotion of local industries. According to the *Philippine Development Plan (2023–2028)*, the overall GDP growth rate (YoY) for the BARMM area rose from 0.3% in 2016 to the second highest in the country at 7.5% in 2021, and the poverty rate decreased from 61.8% in 2018 to 37.2% in 2021. While the impact of this project on these figures cannot be quantified due to its indirect support through subprojects or training at specific sites, it is believed that the outcomes of this project are contributing to such improvements in socio-economic conditions. At the same time, it is noted that the poverty rate in remote islands like Sulu and Tawi-Tawi has increased since 2018, and the results of the expanded support led by the BTA are awaited. According to the JICA Philippines Office, it is challenging to enhance the project's effectiveness in remote areas due to safety constraints that limit the locations where Japanese experts can directly visit.

JICA's Perspectives of Project Evaluation in Conflict-Affected Countries and Regions
(9) Other Positive and Negative Impacts

▪ **Impact on Instability Factors, Consideration and Assurance of Fairness for Marginalized People**

Addressed. Consideration for gender, marginalized people, social systems and norms, human well-being, and human rights contributes to mitigating instability factors and promoting stability factors (also mentioned under Relevance).

An impact on reducing instability factors, not explicitly stated at the time of the ex-ante evaluation, is the reduction in land disputes, often a trigger for deteriorating security, due to the clarification of land ownership rights through the REAL subproject.

▪ **Contribution to Peacebuilding**

Contributions were made. QIP fostered people's expectations for peace and built trust toward the MILF. While no direct references to peace were obtained in other components, efforts by the BTA to gain people's trust were observed through individual administrative services, community development, and economic promotion activities.

This project has mostly achieved the project purpose of accelerating the transition process to the Bangsamoro Government under CCDP-B and of promoting the ARMM institutional reform process under CCDP-A on the whole, while some components of the project contributed in an indirect or limited manner. Then, the project has mostly achieved the CCDP-B overall goal, as the preparations for the transition to the Bangsamoro Government have been confirmed. While CCDP-A did not have a set overall goal, the continuation/utilization of the project's outputs is contributing to the transition preparations. It also aligns with JICA's perspectives of project evaluation in conflict-affected countries and regions. Therefore, the effectiveness and impacts of the project are high.

3.3 Efficiency (Rating: ③)

3.3.1 Inputs

Table 7 Inputs

Inputs	Plan	Actual
(1) Experts ^(a)	3 Long-Term (Chief Advisor, Project Coordinator) 10 Short-Term (Human Resources, Local Industry, Road, Water Supply, Development Planning, Sectoral Planning)	8 Long-Term (Chief Advisor, Project Coordinator, Human Resources Development / Project Coordinator, Governance / Project Coordinator, Public Service & Community Development, Economic Promotion & Peacebuilding) 7 Short-Term (Human Resources Mapping (HRM), Institutional and Organizational Assessment, Bangsamoro Development Plan, Facility Design (QIP), Human Resources Information System (HRIS), Road Inventory, Local Industry) Japanese consultants through Consulting Services Contracts ^(b) (Development Planning, Local Industry Promotion)
(2) Trainees received	In-Country Training (Training for Administrative Personnel, etc.) Third-Country Training (Aceh, Indonesia, etc.) Training in Japan (Training for drafting the BBL, etc.)	70 Trainees for Training in Japan 14 Trainees for Third-Country Training (Aceh, Indonesia) 15,750 Trainees in In-Country Training (Training for Administrative Personnel, etc.)

Inputs	Plan	Actual
(3) Equipment	Provision of equipment, etc., if deemed necessary for the efficient implementation of the project and technical transfer	(Computers, conference systems, cameras, software, DRIMS, IEC materials, furniture, etc., were procured using the Overseas Activity Cost.)
(4) Overseas Activity Cost	Project office operating expenses ^(c)	Local consultant fees, subproject expenses, in-country travel expenses, project management costs (including the activity expenses of the project coordinator in the BTC's Socio Economic Office, security measures, and the project office)
Japanese Side Total Project Cost	782 million yen	1,607 million yen
Philippine Side Total Project Cost	Not available	Not available

Source: Ex-ante Evaluation Report, Materials provided by JICA

Note: a) The planned number of experts is not listed in the ex-ante evaluation report, so the number and fields described in the implementation plan for the first year are described. b) Number is unknown. c) Since it is not listed in the ex-ante evaluation report, the contents of the implementation plan for the first year are described.

3.3.1.1 Elements of Inputs

The type, amount, and timing of inputs are linked to the implementation of activities and the production of outputs. Notable points are as follows.

- On the Philippine side, key personnel and high-potential young talents from both the MILF and the ARMM were assigned as counterparts, contributing to capacity-building before the launch of the BTA.
- On the Japanese side, personnel with experience in the Mindanao peace process and in supporting conflict-affected countries and regions were deployed, enabling a response tailored to the situation.
- The placement of Coordinators from the BIAF, the military arm of the MILF, for the activities at the MILF camp made it possible to safely carry out the activities.
- Filipino staff at the JICA Cotabato Project Office (employed as Field Coordinators under local consultant services) coordinated between the Japanese experts, Cotabato-based staff, and the counterparts. They also ensured the continuity of activities during the evacuation periods of Japanese experts.
- By designating the BTC as the counterpart organization for CCDP-B, it became possible to support individuals from the MILF, which is not a government agency. However, due to a shortage of personnel to carry out the project's activities, the project covered the salaries and operational expenses of four Project Coordinators from the BTC's Socio Economic Office, contributing to the outputs of CCDP-B.

3.3.1.2 Project Cost

The actual project cost was 1,607 million yen, which exceeded the planned 782 million yen due to the addition of components accompanying the extension of the project period.²⁶

3.3.1.3 Project Period

The initial project period was planned for 36 months from July 2013 to June 2016. However, due to an extension, it was changed to 72 months from July 2013 to July 2019. The actual project period was the same as that of this revised plan (within the plan). The project period was extended, as it became evident that the enactment of the BBL would not be feasible under the Aquino administration, given the changes in security and political conditions since early 2015. In October 2015, it was agreed to extend the project period by three years to July 2019 after consultations with the BTC and the ARMM government. As noted in “3.1.1.3 Appropriateness of the Project Plan and Approach,” the deterioration in security and political conditions can be considered an external factor, and appropriate agreement and procedures for plan changes were made. Therefore, it is appropriate to evaluate the efficiency based on a comparison of the revised plan and actual performance. Additionally, the activities initially planned were completed within the original timeframe.

Therefore, the efficiency of the project is high. The project also aligns with JICA’s perspectives of project evaluation in conflict-affected countries and regions.

²⁶ The sub-rating for project cost (project period) is determined on a four-tier scale: “[4] Within the plan (100% or less),” “[3] Slightly exceeded the plan (over 100% but less than 125%),” “[2] Exceeded the plan (over 125% but less than 150%),” and “[1] Significantly exceeded the plan (over 150%).” When there is an increase or decrease in the output, the evaluation is adjusted by comparing the degree of increase or decrease in the output with that of the project cost (period), assuming that the change is linked to the project purpose or overall goal. For this project, as already mentioned, the content of the additional components is highly aligned with the project purpose and overall goal, so such an adjustment was attempted. Since we could not obtain the total and breakdown of the planned and actual inputs during implementation, we examined whether the increase in the total project cost was proportional to the increase in the number of components. The number of components increased from the initial 7 to 11 (see Table 2). Therefore, the average cost per component is approximately 112 million yen for the plan (782 million yen ÷ 7) and approximately 146 million yen for the actual (1,607 million yen ÷ 11), resulting in an actual/plan ratio of 130%, falling into category [2]. Even if the costs for each component were not uniform, it is reasonable to judge it as category [2] for the following reasons. First, if we assume that the increase in project cost was almost entirely used for the initial seven components, a simple comparison between the planned 782 million yen and the actual 1,607 million yen would result in an actual/plan ratio of 205%, and the judgment should remain at category [1]. However, such an assumption is considered to be an underestimate since, at the point when the project cost was increased, the initial components had made significant progress, and five of them were almost complete. On the other hand, if we assume that the increased project cost was almost entirely used for the additional components, there is a possibility that it could be evaluated as category [3] or [4]; however, making such an assumption without data is considered to be an overestimate.

JICA's Perspectives of Project Evaluation in Conflict-Affected Countries and Regions
(10) Efficiency

▪ **Output and Input**

It is appropriate to conduct performance verification considering the characteristics of conflict-affected areas. Although there were delays and extensions, as well as an increase in scope (components), due to changes in the situation and deteriorating security, appropriate plan modifications were made. The additional scope (components) was to contribute to peacebuilding.

▪ **Comparison of Cost and Period Before and After the Project**

It is appropriate to make comparisons considering the characteristics of conflict-affected areas. Since the validity of the plan changes is acknowledged, the comparison of planned and actual project period was made using the revised plan. Specifically, the Mamasapano incident, which was the direct cause of the major plan changes, appears to correspond to “major external factors such as large-scale civil wars or disturbances that occurred during the implementation of the project,” and “cases where events anticipated in the PNA had an impact so significant that it was unforeseeable,” as specified in this *Guidelines*. Therefore, the extended period of three years was subtracted from the project duration for comparison with the actual performance.

3.4 Sustainability (Rating: ③)

This section defines the effect of this project that should be sustained as “the outputs in governance, public services delivery and community development, and economic enhancement by the transitional autonomous government (the BTA), which should continue at least until the planned establishment of the new autonomous government in 2025, thereby contributing to a smooth transition to the new government,” and examines whether the various conditions for sustaining this effect have been established.

3.4.1 Policy and System

In the *Philippine Development Plan (2023–2028)*, the national development plan at the time of the ex-post evaluation, one of the strategic objectives in the field of peace and security is to ensure the full transition to the Bangsamoro Government (the new autonomous government). The plan outlines support for institution building, personnel development, and economic management. The transition process is proceeding based on the BOL, which is listed as an indicator of the overall goal of this project, and BOL-related codes are also being enacted in sequence.

The *Bangsamoro Development Plan 1 (2020–2022)* (the BDP1 formulated by the BTA), the development plan for the BARMM area, aims to uplift the lives of the Bangsamoro and establish the foundation of self-governance through moral governance. It outlines measures for governance, peace, security, public order, human rights, and economic development. The subsequent BDP2 (2023–2028) has also been initiated. These plans were formulated in coherence with the BDP that this project supported before the establishment of the BTA, and they align with the project's outcomes related to governance and socio-economic development. They are also consistent with the development plan for Mindanao. The MinDA of the Philippine government is coordinating between the regional


development plans of Mindanao's six regions, including the BDP formulated by the BTA. Additionally, it is in the process of formulating the *Mindanao Peace and Development Agenda* (2023–2028). This agenda is designed to harmonize with the *Philippine Development Plan* and contribute to national development goals.

At the time of the ex-post evaluation, the Philippine government pointed out that JICA's support, including the successor project of this project, is not positioned within the framework of the Philippine government's Mindanao peace process. While the direction of the support aligns with the aforementioned development plans, it appears that JICA's engagement with the Philippine government (through the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation, and Unity, or OPAPRU) has not been sufficient, and this has not been fully recognized by the Philippine government. Since the outputs of this project have already been handed over to the Philippine side, this does not affect the sustainability of this project; it is, however, noted as a point for consideration.

In this way, the policies and systems necessary to sustain the project effects is secured.

3.4.2 Institutional/Organizational Aspect

Many of the outputs of this project were transferred to the BTA following its establishment. The organizational structure of the BTA has been established as shown in the diagram below. As of September 2020, the total number of staff, including both permanent and temporary employees, was 35,555. Of these, the number of rehired former ARMM employees (excluding approximately 23,000 in the education, health, and social welfare sectors who were not subject to separation) was 2,237, achieving about 58% of the target of 3,998 (data provided by the BTA; data for 2021 and beyond is still being compiled). The hiring of former ARMM employees who have left their positions has been delayed due to travel restrictions associated with the spread of COVID-19, as explained. The BTA continues to rehire according to its *Human Resource Development Plan*, and the fulfillment rate at the time of the ex-post evaluation was around 70% in the OCM-BARMM, for which data was available.



Source: Material provided by JICA

Figure 2 Organization Chart of the BTA

The status of each organization related to the continuation/utilization of individual components of this project is summarized in the table below. Activities of this project that have been turned over to the BTA are institutionalized/mainstreamed in each ministry/department (budget and permanent staff are allocated as regular government tasks or programs). As of the time of the ex-post evaluation, for all these turned-over activities, the original counterparts remain in the organization and are taking the initiative. Therefore, there is no certain outlook for the continuation of activities in the case of future personnel changes. However, new permanent staff who had no prior connection to this project have also been placed, and the original counterparts are in managerial positions and are guiding and nurturing the staff.²⁷ Although there are remaining challenges, such as a shortage of staff for the follow-up and expansion of the agricultural extension components and the local industry promotion component, improvements are being made, such as the completion of the appointment of agricultural extension officers to LGUs in May 2023.

For the pilot LGUs involved in the revenue enhancement (REAL) subproject, at least in the two municipalities where interviews were conducted, the same structure as during the

²⁷ Several counterparts from the MILF side, including former members of the BTC and the BDA, have been appointed to cabinet-level and parliamentary positions in the BTA (BARMM government). These include the Interim Chief Minister, Deputy Speaker of the Bangsamoro Parliament, Attorney General, Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Agrarian Reforms, Minister of Basic, Higher and Technical Education, Minister of the Interior and Local Government, Minister of Trade, Investment, and Tourism, and the Director General of the Bangsamoro Planning and Development Authority. In addition, key counterparts from the ARMM government continue to serve in roles such as directors and division chiefs. Furthermore, many of their key staff members are former counterparts or training participants. These personnel are carrying forward the knowledge and experience gained from this project.

implementation of this project is in place, and Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) activities introduced by this project are being carried out. The overall picture of the operation and maintenance system for QIP handed over to residents' committees (organized through this project) in the respective communities is unclear. However, individual cases have been reported where these committees (with designated managers), an LGU head (who also serves as the commander of the BIAF), and village chiefs (barangay captains) are taking on management responsibilities.

In this way, while there are some concerns, the organizational structures and systems necessary for sustaining the project effects are largely in place.

Table 8 List of Project Components

Organization	Component	Organizational, Technical, and Financial Aspects for the Continuation/Utilization
BPDA	b) Human Resources Mapping (HRM) e) Formulation of the Bangsamoro Development Plan (BDP)	<u>Overall</u> : No particular issues.
AMS/OCM-BARMM	f) ARMM Government Staff Training g) Human Resources Information System (HRIS)	<u>Organizational Aspect</u> : No particular issues. <u>Technical Aspect</u> : No particular issues. Training new staff remains a challenge, but donor support is being received (from JICA's CDPB, SUBATRA by the EU and others, among others). For the re-introduction of the quality management system, including 5S, cooperation from the DAP is being obtained. <u>Financial Aspect</u> : Donor support is available. Budgetary measures from the government are in place for the quality management system, but they are insufficient to cover all BTA organizations.
MAFAR-BARMM	d) Upland Rice-based Farming Technology Transfer Program for the Bangsamoro (URTP-B) j) Livelihood Improvement for the Transformation of Underserved Population (LIFT-UP)	<u>Organizational Aspect</u> : As of May 31, 2023, the appointment of agriculture and fisheries extension officers (one MAFAR Agriculture Officer, two Agriculturalists (technicians), two Fisheries Technicians, and one Land Reform Officer, totaling six officers to each municipality) to all LGUs has been completed, which could potentially invigorate future activities. There is a MAFAR rice cultivation support program that has taken over the support from this project and CDPB (providing seeds, agricultural tools, and facilities). However, to receive this support, certain conditions such as the existence of a properly managed cooperative must be met. If there is a cooperative in the village, there are options to support its operation. <u>Technical Aspect</u> : No particular issues. <u>Financial Aspect</u> : Support from CDPB was received until 2023. The budget for the MAFAR rice cultivation support program from 2024 onwards has already been secured in the <i>Bangsamoro Investment Development Plan</i> .
MILG-BARMM	h) Revenue Enhancement Assistance for ARMM LGUs (REAL)	<u>Overall</u> : No particular issues. Permanent staff and budget have been allocated under REAL, the MILG's program.

Organization	Component	Organizational, Technical, and Financial Aspects for the Continuation/Utilization
MPW-BARMM	i) Road maintenance management through the Dynamic Response Intelligent Monitoring System (DRIMS) / Expanded ARMM Roads Mapping and Management (E-ARMM)	<p><u>Organizational Aspect and Budget:</u> No particular issues. The operation of DRIMS and E-BARMM has become a regular activity of the province, with permanent staff and a budget allocated to each team.</p> <p><u>Technical Aspect:</u> No particular issues. The engineers responsible for the operation and maintenance of DRIMS/E-BARMM possess the necessary skills and have also received training through this project.</p>
MTIT-BARMM	k) ARMM Regional Industry Cluster Capacity Enhancement Project / Market Driven Local Industry Promotion (AICCEP/MDLIP)	<p><u>Organizational Aspect:</u> The MTIT's program known as GEARED, which took over from AICCEP/MDLIP, has allocated a dedicated team of permanent staff and a budget, led by the former counterpart team leader. The team leader is extremely busy, as there are few staff members with experience.</p> <p><u>Technical Aspect:</u> Many members of the GEARED team are young staff newly hired by the BTA and do not yet have enough experience to act as local industry promoters on the ground. The team leader (former counterpart) is providing guidance.</p> <p><u>Financial Aspect:</u> In addition to the MTIT budget, external funding has also been secured through networking with other partners, both domestic and international.</p>
BDA	–	<p><u>Overall:</u> Although not incorporated into the BTA and remaining as an NGO, the BDA is led by the former counterpart. Leveraging the NGO's characteristic of higher agility compared to the government, it is executing development projects in close collaboration with the BTA.</p>
LGUs	h) Revenue Enhancement Assistance for ARMM LGUs (REAL)	<p><u>Organizational Aspect:</u> No particular issues. Although all the mayors of LGUs that received training under the REAL subproject have been replaced, the current mayors are all either the spouses or children of the former mayors, ensuring political continuity. At the operational level, staff who participated in this project continue to be assigned.</p> <p><u>Technical and Financial Aspects:</u> No particular issues.</p>
Target communities	c) Quick Impact Project (QIP)	<p><u>Overall:</u> The full picture is unclear. Cases have been reported where community resident committees, an LGU head (who also serves as commanders of the BIAF), and village chiefs (barangay captains) are taking on management responsibilities.</p>

Source: Materials provided by JICA, materials provided by the BTA, interviews with former counterparts and experts

3.4.3 Technical Aspect

While numerous donor-supported initiatives, including the successor project, CDPB, are being implemented to enhance the capabilities of BTA staff, it is difficult to determine whether sufficient technical support is being provided to ensure the continuation of this project's activities. This is due to the high number of young staff and the likelihood of staff turnover due to political factors. However, some former counterparts are utilizing the skills and knowledge acquired through this project in various organizations within the BARMM area. They are also imparting these skills and knowledge to their subordinates (see also Table 8). Therefore, it is unlikely that the continuation or utilization of this project's components will be immediately compromised due to a lack of technical expertise.

In this way, while there are some concerns, the technical expertise necessary for the sustainability of the project effects is generally secured.

3.4.4 Financial Aspect

The majority of the BTA's budget comes from the Philippine government budget and is allocated annually as the Block Grant, based on the provisions of the BOL. In addition to this, the central government also allocates the Special Development Fund (SDF), which is allocated for 10 years from the approval of the BOL for the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and development of communities affected by conflict. As for local revenue sources within the BARMM area, there are shares from national taxes/fees/charges collected within the BARMM area and local tax revenues. The recent budget is as shown in the table below; although there are variations in the annual amounts and breakdowns, the total amount is on an increasing trend.

Table 9 BTA Budget

Unit: Million pesos

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023
Revenue	75,629	79,862	85,359
of which:			
Block Grant	71,670	66,964	64,756
BTA share from national taxes/fees/charges	3,614	2,788	4,595
Local tax revenues	345	377	567
Special Development Fund (SDF)	0	500	500
Carry-over, etc.	0	9,233	14,941
Expenditure	NA	67,020	68,082
of which:			
OCM-BARMM	NA	8,082	5,984
MTIT-BARMM	NA	364	470
MPW-BARMM	NA	16,379	16,480
MILG-BARMM	NA	1,274	1,269
MAFAR-BARMM	NA	1,505	1,495

Source: Materials provided by the BTA

The sustainability of the effect of this project requires budget allocation from the BTA in several areas: the MTIT-BARMM's GEARED program to promote local industry; the operation and maintenance of the MPW-BARMM's Road Surface Monitoring / Road Management System (DRIMS/E-BARMM); the MILG-BARMM's REAL program to enhance revenues; the MAFAR-BARMM's agricultural extension services; and the AMS/OCM-BARMM's quality management system training. It was reported that all these areas are managing within the scope of the budget they receive. Donor support is also available. However, concerning agricultural extension, although the budget for providing seeds and agricultural machinery to farmers has been allocated, the project sites, as far as information could be gathered, do not meet the criteria for receiving such support (such as the existence of a cooperative). Therefore, the farmers have been sustaining the transferred technologies through their own efforts. It is unclear whether the funds needed for the repair costs of the QIP facilities can be raised at the community level (see also Table 8).

In this way, while there are some concerns, the financial resources needed for the sustainability of the project effects is generally secured.

3.4.5 Environmental and Social Aspect

While no sustainability risks from environmental or social aspects are recognized in the continuation of the activities introduced by this project, it is believed that among the infrastructure projects transferred from the BDP supported by this project to the BDP formulated by the BTA, there are those that have environmental impacts or involve land acquisition. In both the BDP supported by this project and the BDP formulated by the BTA, environmental and social considerations were among the basic strategies for Bangsamoro development. Therefore, appropriate considerations are expected to be included, although the actual performance is unknown.

3.4.6 Preventative Measures to Risks

After the completion of this project, events such as the postponement of the establishment of the new autonomous government and the emergence of the Marcos administration have occurred, causing the transition process to lag behind the expectations at the time of project completion. While risks of deteriorating security and setbacks in the peace/transition process continue to exist, responses are being carried out in accordance with the framework of the BOL by both the MILF and the Philippine government. Based on interviews with multiple stakeholders, news articles, and information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the situation at the time of the ex-post evaluation is as follows.

- While the frequency of terrorist acts by Islamic extremist groups has been decreasing due to the Philippine government's counter-insurgency operations and the weakening of the Islamic State (IS), sporadic small-scale guerrilla activities and kidnappings continue to occur. Multiple assassinations and bombings took place around the time of the general elections in May 2022.
- Overall, the peace process between the Philippine government and the MILF is progressing, and disarmament efforts within the MILF are underway. However, the situation remains volatile, with a high likelihood that political and clan-based conflicts could escalate into armed confrontations.
- In November 2022, a clash occurred between the MILF and the national army in Basilan Province. According to reports, the conflict was triggered when MILF members harbored a group engaged in illegal activities such as the manufacturing of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in a village where the national army was conducting counter-insurgency operations. To prevent a setback in the peace process, both the MILF and the OPAPRU took corrective measures such as by immediately

dispatching the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), their peace negotiation mechanisms, to the area.

- It is analyzed that small-scale Islamic extremist groups are engaging in activities like extortion, kidnapping, and robbery, or being hired for clan conflicts, not necessarily due to ideological reasons but often due to poverty.

In this way, while there are risks to the sustainability of this project, ongoing measures are being taken, and it is believed that these risks will not immediately impact the sustainability.

3.4.7 Status of Operation and Maintenance

Regarding the operation and maintenance status of the QIP facilities, during the monitoring survey conducted from March to May 2019, it was found that the 20 facilities constructed are generally in good condition and are being utilized effectively. As of the time of the ex-post evaluation, the condition of the facilities is generally good based on the available information, although there have been reports indicating the need for repairs at some facilities (see Box 2). While the issues do not seem to render the facilities unusable, the status and outlook for repairs are unclear.

The major equipment provided through this project and subsequently handed over to the BTA is being utilized effectively and is in good condition. To cite an example from the MPW-BARMM, the E-BARMM system provided to the ministry is being updated and utilized. Besides, during the surveys conducted as of the time of the ex-post evaluation, the GPS receivers are mainly being used for demonstration purposes because the consultants hired for the surveys bring and use more up-to-date equipment.

Thus, the status of operation and maintenance is generally good, although there are some challenges.

JICA's Perspectives of Project Evaluation in Conflict-Affected Countries and Regions
(11) Sustainability

▪ ***Sustainability of the Project Effects (Policy/System, Institutional/Organizational, Technical, and Financial Aspects)***

No special notes in the context of conflict-affected areas.

▪ ***Response to Risks and Handling of External Factors***

Addressed. The transition process is experiencing ongoing delays compared to what was initially expected at the completion of this project. However, there has been no significant setback, and progress is being made within the framework of the BOL.

Small-scale bombings, threats, and kidnappings, as well as armed conflicts between the national military and MILF, are occurring intermittently. These pose risks to the regression of the peace process, but efforts by both the Philippine government and the MILF are ongoing.

Slight issues have been observed in the institutional/organizational, technical, financial, environmental, and social aspects including preventative measures to risks; however, there are good prospects for improvement/resolution. Therefore, sustainability of the project effects is high.

4. Conclusion, Lessons Learned and Recommendations

4.1 Conclusion

In this project, known as CCDP, two plans were implemented with the aim of transitioning to the Bangsamoro Government set to be established in Mindanao. The first is CCDP-B, implemented by the BTC, and the second is CCDP-A, implemented by the then-existing ARMM government. Each plan aimed at foundational construction of governance, enhancement of administrative service provision and community development, and promotion of economic growth. Specifically, CCDP-B aimed to accelerate the transition process to the Bangsamoro Government, and CCDP-A aimed to promote the institutional reform process of the ARMM.

The project plan is relevant and coherent, aligning well with the development policies and needs of the Philippines and the target regions, as well as with Japan's aid policy. It also has synergy and mutual linkage with other projects. As a result of the project implementation, the objectives of both CCDP-B and CCDP-A were mostly achieved. Many of the various activities introduced in the project continue even at the time of the ex-post evaluation, contributing to the preparations for the transition to the Bangsamoro Government, indicating high effectiveness and impacts. Regarding efficiency, although the project cost exceeded the plan due to additional components, the project period remained within the plan revised after extension due to stagnation in the peace process and delays in the transition process. Thus, it is rated as high. Sustainability is high, although there are minor issues in personnel placement and technical acquisition by staff other than the counterpart personnel of this project. The establishment of the Bangsamoro Government has been postponed from what was assumed during the project implementation. There are risks in the peace and transition processes, but as of the time of the ex-post evaluation, both the transitional autonomous government and the Philippine government continue to address these issues.

In light of the above, this project is evaluated to be highly satisfactory.

4.2 Recommendations

4.2.1 Recommendations to the Implementing Agency

- 1) It is recommended that the BTA continue to strive for political and socio-economic stability within the region, while also focusing on the placement and skill enhancement of its staff.

- 2) It is recommended that the MILG-BARMM execute its revenue enhancement (REAL) program, the MTIT-BARMM carry out its local industry promotion (GEARED) program, the MPW-BARMM proceed with road planning and maintenance management using the Road Surface Monitoring / Road Management System (DRIMS/E-BARMM), and the MAFAR-BARMM continue to support agricultural extension, including at URTP-B and LIFT-UP subproject sites, according to their respective plans (these are the activities initiated by this project and continued and developed by each agency). During this, it is recommended to share knowledge and skills within the organization so that not only the original counterparts from this project but also newly added staff can acquire knowledge and experience. This will ensure that activities continue as organizational practices even when there are future staff changes.
- 3) It is recommended that the MAFAR-BARMM ensure that outreach to the URTP-B and LIFT-UP sites is included in the activities of the agricultural extension officers who have been placed in the LGUs. Given that many of these sites have not yet initiated cooperative activities and do not meet the conditions for receiving support such as seeds, agricultural machinery, and post-harvest facilities from the ministry, it is also recommended to consider capacity building, including organizational support. Moreover, given the current practice at URTP-B sites of intercropping upland rice (mainly for self-consumption due to its low price competitiveness) with corn, coconuts, and fruit trees (for cash crops), more comprehensive livelihood support for mountainous areas would be appropriate. As the introduction of market-oriented agricultural promotion (SHEP) is planned in the successor project, CDPB, it is recommended that its outcomes also be utilized for follow-up support at the sites of this project.

4.2.2 Recommendations to JICA

- 1) The 5S training was disseminated to all ARMM organizations through this project's CCDP-A. Although it was not continued due to the abolition of the same autonomous government, it has recently been resumed in some offices by the AMS/OCM-BARMM as part of BTA's independent initiatives. During the ex-post evaluation, many voices in other BTA ministries also highly valued the 5S training. However, according to the AMS, it would be difficult to roll it out to all government agencies on their own. It is recommended that JICA's sectoral department, the Philippines Office, and CDPB consider the possibility of supporting this within the current framework of CDPB.

- 2) It is recommended that the JICA Philippines Office intensify information sharing and consultations with the OPAPRU. This will help ensure that JICA's support is appropriately positioned within the framework of the Philippine government's peace process and peacebuilding efforts. It will also help make the impact of this project visible within the current framework from the perspective of the Philippine government.
- 3) It is recommended that the JICA Philippines Office actively promote networking among JDS alumni and other former training participants who are actively involved in the BTA and related agencies. This is in line with the office's current considerations for networking. The aim is to effectively utilize the developed human resources and thereby amplify the synergistic effects with JICA projects. Additionally, while the office individually tracks the performance of former training participants, there is no systematic database. Conducting follow-up surveys on these individuals could potentially confirm further synergistic effects.
- 4) As of the time of the ex-post evaluation, many infrastructure projects are being implemented or planned in the BARMM area in accordance with the BDP formulated by the BTA. Some of these projects were proposed in the BDP supported by this project. JICA is already supporting some of these projects, and support for new projects is anticipated to continue. In this context, it is recommended that special attention be paid to the selection of project sites and land acquisition issues to ensure that JICA's involvement does not create new instability factors such as divisions among diverse groups and land disputes. Additionally, to ensure the effective realization of support, it is recommended to expand, as much as possible while ensuring safety, the areas that Japanese experts can visit.

4.3 Lessons Learned

(1) Social preparation for building trust in conflict-affected areas

A recurring point emphasized by stakeholders as a factor that facilitated the achievement of community-focused components was the meticulous social preparation carried out by this project. This included needs assessments, awareness-raising, and community organization. By thoroughly conducting social preparation for building trust in conflict-affected areas—such as detailed needs assessments accompanied by trusted local figures and JICA personnel—the project was able to implement activities in a manner suited to the needs and circumstances of the residents. This not only enhanced the trust of the community but also mitigated potential instability factors. Furthermore, it ensured the relevance of subsequent local institutional follow-up, contributing to the sustainability of the project's effects.

(2) Utilizing local resources for uninterrupted support

In this project, there were many sites where JICA staff and Japanese experts could not visit due to safety management reasons. However, the project continued its activities by utilizing service providers and local consultants in the Philippines. Even in areas where Japanese personnel could visit, they were forced to evacuate due to the martial law imposed across the island following the Marawi occupation crisis in 2017. During the evacuation period, the field coordinator of the JICA Cotabato Project Office continued the activities while frequently communicating with Japanese experts remotely. In this way, by utilizing local resources, activities could be carried out without interruption in areas where Japanese personnel could not enter or during periods when they had to evacuate. (However, as noted in “4.2.2 Recommendations to JICA,” it is believed that the effectiveness of the support would be higher if Japanese personnel could visit the local areas.)

(3) Comprehensive analysis of external factors in project evaluation in conflict-affected countries and regions

In this project, the assumption “the peace process does not stagnate” was set during project planning as an external condition for the output to lead to the project purpose. This assumption was not met in the early phase of the project (initial project period) due to the occurrence of the Mamasapano incident. As a result, achieving the project purpose became difficult, leading to revisions in objectives and indicators, an extension of the project period, and consequently, a revision in the project scope. In this context, the deterioration of the situation and security at the time could be considered as an external factor beyond what was anticipated as risks during planning. Therefore, despite the project cost and period significantly exceeding the initial plan due to the extension, the project was still evaluated as efficient. On the other hand, between the latter half of the project (after the extension of the project period) and the time of the ex-post evaluation, the said assumption was largely met. This, in combination with internal factors such as the high relevance of the project and the efforts of the stakeholders, led to high effectiveness and impacts.

This evaluation is appropriate when considered within JICA’s general project evaluation framework and the framework for projects in conflict-affected countries and regions. However, when looking solely at the conclusions, it may seem that factors outside of this project, such as the peace process, consistently contribute to a high evaluation regardless of whether they are favorable or unfavorable. That is, if the peace process is going smoothly, it would contribute to a high evaluation, and if it is stagnating, it would be considered as an external factor, avoiding a low evaluation. Especially in projects implemented in conflict-affected countries and regions, the influence on the project from conflict and political instability may not be fully recorded or shared. However, if one simply attributes this to

external factors, even when evidence is lacking, due to the nature of operating in a conflict-affected area it could potentially lead to an inflated evaluation.

Therefore, when conducting in-project reviews or ex-post evaluations for projects where the progress of peace or political processes significantly influences the project's progress and achievements, it is essential to fully understand how such processes were initially assumed as assumptions in the project plan. One must carefully assess whether the actual trends in these processes are beyond the project's control and exceed the assumptions made during planning, qualifying them as significant external factors. Moreover, it is crucial to fully recognize the relationship between external factors and evaluation results. Even if the project receives a high rating, it is important, in light of the evaluation's goals of accountability and project improvement, to explicitly state any points of caution or challenges related to the project, regardless of the rating.

(4) Setting direct indicators

The indicators for the governance-related project purpose and overall goal of this project (CCDP-B) were "BBL is drafted" and "Draft related codes are formulated," respectively. Both were indeed drafted/formulated. However, the project's intervention mainly consisted of intellectual inputs like training and seminars (e.g., introducing Japanese cases) for some of the drafting members. Therefore, the project's contribution to achieving these indicators was both indirect and limited. As noted in "2.3 Constraints During the Evaluation Study," especially in projects in conflict-affected countries and regions, objectives and indicators tend to be ambiguous, leaving much room for interpretation, due to the fluid and politically influenced environment. In such a context, setting clear indicators like drafting legislation could arguably be considered important. However, this project did not draft or comment on any bills, and other factors could have influenced the drafting/formulation. Therefore, it is difficult to confirm the project's direct contribution to the achievement of objectives based on these indicators alone. For example, the indicator "BBL is drafted" could have been specified as "Drafting members reflect the knowledge and experience gained in this project in the draft BBL," which would have made the project's contribution and influence more explicit.

(5) Consideration and documentation of the implementation structure from a peacebuilding perspective

The latest PNA available at the time of the project's ex-ante evaluation in 2012 was from 2007, which naturally did not include analyses on the change of government, progress in the peace process, or the signing of the FAB. The situation was fluid before the implementation of this project, so even without a formal PNA, regular reports from JICA staff assigned to

the International Monitoring Team and visits from headquarters were used for information gathering, analysis, and sharing, based on which the project plan was formulated. However, the consideration of the implementation structure, which is one aspect of the PNA's perspective (e.g., ensuring that the selection of counterparts and cooperating agencies does not have a negative social or political impact or exacerbate instability factors), was neither sufficiently carried out nor documented and shared in a manner that could be utilized in planning. This may have contributed to a situation where the initial project plan (PDM) proposed by JICA headquarters suggested that the BTC, which was on the MILF side, would take the lead in jointly conducting activities with the ARMM government. This proposal met strong opposition from both the MILF and ARMM sides, potentially delaying the planning process and risking the introduction of instability factors (in reality, the instability factors were avoided by changing the plan). In Mindanao, it seems that regional PNAs are conducted approximately every 10 years. However, to ensure that implementation structures are proposed based on a thorough understanding of the current political and organizational context and outlook, it may be important to either conduct these PNAs more frequently or to document and share the results of project-level PNAs or equivalent monitoring and situational analyses in a manner easily accessible by the headquarters.

Additionally, the Comprehensive Review of JICA's Assistance in Mindanao, which includes a review of this project, has drawn out the following lessons learned: "It is crucial to understand the trends in the peace process from the planning stage, conduct political and stakeholder analyses, and utilize these analytical results for revising the support plan. In the case of assistance in Mindanao, understanding the political capital of a president with significant authority, and the relationships between the president and high-ranking officials in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, as well as changes in peace policies due to regime changes, is useful for predicting the future course of the peace process, assessing the feasibility and timing of the project, and considering its effectiveness. Especially during the transitional period, the political and security situation becomes fluid, influenced by the functional status of the interim autonomous government (the BTA) and the progress of normalization, including disarmament. Therefore, it is crucial to anticipate multiple scenarios, discuss assistance policies and content based on those scenarios among stakeholders, formulate contingency plans including for the worst-case scenario, monitor them regularly, and enhance responsiveness."²⁸ From interviews with stakeholders, it appears that the project was generally implemented with a flexible approach to the situation at the time. However, by conducting a new PNA during both the planning and

²⁸ "Contributions to Peace and Development in Mindanao by JICA: Findings from the Comprehensive Review of JICA's Assistance in Mindanao" (in Japanese), JICA, 2021. Accessed on July 9, 2023. URL: <https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/1000044368.pdf>, p. 15.

implementation stages, carrying out the aforementioned political and stakeholder analyses, and proactively anticipating systematic scenarios, there is a possibility that support resources could have been used even more effectively.

5. Non-Score Criteria

5.1. Performance

5.1.1 Objective Perspective

JICA has fulfilled its role as an implementing partner institution and can be said to have contributed to the results. As a donor that had provided long-term support to Mindanao and as a donor to offer direct support to the MILF side, JICA initiated balanced support for both the MILF and the ARMM sides even before the peace agreement, contributing to a smooth transition.

The supervisory system, which also took into account the changing project environment, is considered to have been appropriate. The headquarters, the Philippines Office, and the Cotabato Project Office coordinated in implementation and supervision. The local field coordinators also played a crucial role in continuing activities during times of deteriorating security.

Communication with the implementing agencies and the building of cooperative relationships are also considered to have been well-managed. This point was noted by all former counterparts interviewed. The project was implemented based on JICA's long-term support in Mindanao, and furthermore, continuous JICA support is being provided under close coordination with the BTA and Philippine government implementing agencies, indicating that mutual trust has been established. (However, as noted in the second paragraph of "4.2.2 Recommendations to JICA," it is necessary for the impact of such relationships to be fully recognized by the Philippine government's Mindanao peace-handling agencies.)

5.1.2 Subjective Perspective (retrospective)

We conducted interviews with former experts and multiple former JICA officials involved in this project to reflect on the situation at the time. The interviews revealed that the project commenced in an uncertain environment where the political and security situations were fluid, and the future roles of BTC stakeholders and ARMM government officials were unclear. Despite these challenges and unforeseen changes in circumstances, the project was successfully completed (see Box 6)."

Box 6 Reflections from JICA Stakeholders

The main challenges and responses during the planning and implementation of the project were compiled from the perspectives of multiple stakeholders, based on interviews. (Factual information is supplemented with materials provided by JICA.)

1) Two PDMs (Project Planning Stage)

Accounts from JICA Headquarters Personnel

In November 2012, a detailed planning survey team was dispatched. A proposal for the implementation structure was presented, suggesting that the MILF and the ARMM government jointly carry out a single project, and the Joint Coordinating Committee (JCC), the decision-making body for the project, would have its chairperson come from the BTC (effectively the MILF side). However, this was not accepted. Both the MILF and the ARMM acknowledged the importance of cooperation and coordination toward the new autonomous government and the significance of capacity-building for ARMM staff who would become administrative officials in the future new autonomous government. However, they expressed opinions such as: “There is no need to strengthen the organizational capacity of the ARMM, which is set to be abolished” (MILF), “It is difficult to mention the ARMM in documents due to MILF policy” (MILF), and “The ARMM is an independent autonomous government where the governor is elected by vote; it is legally difficult to be positioned under the BTC, which is established by presidential decree” (ARMM).

At the time, although the FAB had been concluded, the CAB had not yet been signed. We believed that it was not possible to exclude the ARMM under such circumstances and that since they would eventually be together, both parties could collaborate moving forward. In other words, we weighed the objective of accumulating a track record of joint activities between the BTC and the ARMM government against the risks that could arise from it. We judged that the potential risks were within acceptable limits. Given that there was already a good relationship of mutual trust with the then-chairman of the BTC and the governor of the ARMM, we were confident that even if our proposal angered them, a careful explanation of JICA’s intentions would eventually bring the reality closer to the ideal over time. In that sense, their reaction was within the expected range, although it was not immediately understood. We thus renegotiated the implementation structure. Ultimately, we divided the project plan into two PDMs: CCDP-B, to be implemented by the BTC—an MILF-affiliated organization—and CCDP-A, to be implemented by the ARMM government. Agreements were reached with each agency, allowing the project to commence.

Accounts from JICA Philippines Office Personnel

Given our history of engagement with both the MILF and the ARMM, we had believed that implementing a project with both of them together was unthinkable. There was a gap in understanding as the headquarters initially told us to “do it as one.” We were concerned that if the headquarters insisted on unification, it would damage JICA’s reputation and exacerbate tensions with the stakeholders. Therefore, we explained the situation on the ground to the headquarters and advocated for proceeding with two separate tracks.

2) Extension of Project Period and Plan Modification (Project Implementation Stage)

Accounts from Former Experts

When the project started in 2012, there was a sense that if things went smoothly, a peace agreement would be reached in the early stages, and an autonomous government would be established during the project’s implementation. Therefore, we set establishing the foundation of the autonomous government—including its governance structure, organization, and human resources—as the objective. However, the reality turned out to be more challenging than expected, as the enactment of the BBL was delayed. As a result, for a while, we shifted the focus toward strengthening the core under the assumption that the BBL and the new autonomous government would not be established for some time. In other words, preparations for the establishment of the new autonomous government, including gaining the trust of the residents and realizing the dividends of peace, were considered as the foundation for the autonomous government, along with creating an organization and society capable of supporting it once established.

The occurrence of the Mamasapano incident in January 2015 definitively necessitated this shift in focus. Even before the incident, the deliberation of the BBL was already lagging, as discrepancies between the draft and the constitution were pointed out and needed to be resolved. People were highly upset about what happened in Mamasapano, making it clear that approval of the bill was unfeasible. The likelihood of establishing an interim autonomous government by the end of President Aquino’s term in June 2016 also

diminished. After discussions with the Philippine side, it was decided to extend the project for another three years, and an agreement was signed with each of the BTC and the ARMM government in October 2015. For the extension period, subprojects with communities and LGUs were added, which were not dependent on the progress of establishing the autonomous government.

Those who are familiar with the latter half of the project often say that the “first and second halves are two different projects.” However, from the perspective of someone involved in the first half, it feels like several pillars created in the first half are still relevant in the second half. The focus of the activities in the first half was on supporting the drafting of the BBL and formulating development plans. These were activities conducted by a limited number of people and did not directly involve the residents. Therefore, we implemented QIPs, surveys in MILF camps, and initiatives to promote industrial clusters (local industry promotion) to cultivate a sense among the residents that “something promising will happen when the new administration is established.” In the second half, it seems like these activities have evolved and expanded. As for activities with the ARMM government, we engaged in various activities with young talents who were likely to become future leaders, believing that leveling up the ARMM would also benefit the next government. While not everything went smoothly, we operated with the belief that it was certain that talents from both the MILF and the ARMM sides would work together in a single organization. I am very interested to see what the situation is like at the time of the ex-post evaluation and whether the activities were ultimately futile or meaningful.

The basic stance throughout the project implementation period was to respond to the current situation. It is easy to say in hindsight that “you should have done it this way,” but things do not always go as planned. On the counterpart side, only a few capable individuals were busy, so flexibility in scheduling and role allocation was also important.

Accounts from JICA Philippines Office Personnel

We handled the procurement of service providers and the supervision of QIPs. The most challenging aspect was having to concurrently manage the procurement and construction for QIPs at 20 different locations. Speed was of the essence for QIP, so it was necessary to carry them out simultaneously. By outsourcing procurement support and construction supervision to local consultants, we managed to complete the projects despite some delays (even so, looking back, the financial settlement tasks handled by the Philippines Office were truly challenging).

3) Integration of Implementing Agencies into the BTA and Handover of Project Outcomes (Project Implementation Stage)

Accounts from Former Experts

In the first half of 2018, it was still uncertain whether the BBL would be enacted. Within the project team, the atmosphere was leaning toward it not being enacted, and the focus of activities leading up to the project’s completion in July 2019 was on wrapping up the project and compiling outputs that could be externally explained. However, the situation changed when it was learned in June 2018 that the President would sign the bill into law. As a result, the direction of activities shifted toward initiatives aimed at post-enactment developments and preparations for a successor project.

In July 2018, the BOL (BBL) was enacted, and following the plebiscites, the BTA was established in February 2019. Just before the project’s completion, the implementing agencies for this project were shifted from the BTC and the ARMM government to the single entity BTA. While there was not strong resistance from the counterpart side to this consolidation, as there had been during the project planning phase, care was taken on the Japanese side to emphasize that the efforts were “for the sake of Bangsamoro.” A key activity after the establishment of the BTA was the handover of the project’s outputs. Once it was known who would assume key positions such as ministers, we initiated the transition of project outputs to them. As for the outputs of CCDP-A, in which former counterparts from CCDP-B were not involved, it was up to the BTA to decide whether to adopt them, as they were achievements made by the ARMM side. However, the desire for their continuation was communicated.

5.2 Additionality

As for forward-thinking and unique elements and initiatives that can be cited, the project continuously provided adaptive support in response to the situation, a hallmark of JICA's long-standing peacebuilding efforts in Mindanao. The project also addressed diverse needs through multi-sectoral support and was the first to undertake community development projects within a MILF camp (URTP-B subproject). Additionally, the insights gained from these initiatives were widely disseminated not only by the project team but also through JICA's *Comprehensive Review of JICA's Assistance in Mindanao* and various seminars. The project has also been extensively covered in media, books, and magazines related to peacebuilding in Mindanao.

(End)

Appendix: Timeline

	Philippines	Project (CCDP-B and CCDP-A)
2010	July: Aquino administration inaugurated	
2011	August: Meeting between President Aquino and MILF Chairman Murad in Narita	
2012	October: Aquino administration and MILF concluded the <i>Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro</i> (FAB) Bangsamoro Transition Commission (TC, later BTC) established	November: Detailed planning survey
2013		July: Record of Discussion (R/D) concluded with BTC Project commenced Cotabato Project Office (CPO) established September: Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concluded with ARMM government (17th)
2014	March: Aquino administration and MILF concluded the <i>Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro</i> (CAB) September: <i>Bangsamoro Basic Law</i> (BBL) submitted to both houses of Congress (later abandoned)	
2015	January: Mamasapano incident	February: First mid-term review Project plans (PDMs) revised (first time) October: Extension of cooperation period until July 2019 agreed upon with BTC and ARMM government, respectively
2016	June: Duterte administration inaugurated August: New administration announced <i>Roadmap for Peace and Development</i> (peace policy)	
2017	May: Marawi siege, martial law declared across the island (resolved in October) July: Revised BBL (BBL2) submitted to President, deliberated and approved in Congress	June: Second interim review July: PDMs revised (second time)
2018	July: BBL2 (now <i>Bangsamoro Organic Law</i> (BOL)) signed by President	March: PDMs revised (third time) (final) November: Terminal evaluation
2019	January: First plebiscite (21st) February: Second plebiscite (6th), BOL ratified, Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) confirmed, Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) established	February: Implementing agencies for CCDP-B, CCDP-A shifted to BTA July: Project completed Successor project, Capacity Development Project for Bangsamoro (CDPB) commenced
2021	October: BOL revised, decision made to hold Bangsamoro parliamentary elections in 2025	
2022	May: Marcos administration inaugurated	CDPB extended until 2025
2025	Bangsamoro parliamentary elections scheduled Bangsamoro Government expected to be established	CDPB expected to be completed